

## INTRODUCTION

The Japanese Government have studied with all the care demanded by the importance of the document the Report presented by the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nations.

It has been the constant object of the Japanese Government to do everything in their power to afford information to the Commission and to facilitate their investigations. They sincerely appreciate the endeavours made by the members of the Commission to make themselves acquainted with the details of a very delicate and complex situation which presents many unfamiliar and novel features.

In view of the exacting nature of the task and of the very short time which could be devoted to it, it is not, however, surprising that the Report should in various passages be marked by omissions, inconsistencies and misapprehensions. To obtain a thorough knowledge of the situation, a year would not have been too long. A six weeks' visit to Manchuria and some weeks spent in the atmosphere of Peiping and Nanking could only impart a superficial impression, dependent as the Commission necessarily were on the information furnished them, and the views entertained, by authorities more familiar than they with the Chinese language and conditions. Had they had more time and visited other parts of the country, especially South China, the optimism which they express regarding the Chinese situation would, it is felt, have been considerably modified.

It is by no means the intention of the Japanese Government to indicate all the points in which they feel that the Report lies open to exception. Nor do they intend to enter into any meticulous criticism of details in the Report, which, taken as a whole, and especially in its descriptive portions, furnishes a valuable compendium of events. For the moment, and of course without prejudice to the presentation of their further opinion, they will limit themselves to the formulation of certain observations on matters of capital importance, with the sole object of establishing the true facts.

In offering these observations, the Japanese Government have, needless to say, not the remotest intention of casting any reflection on the conscientious way in which the Commission have drawn up their Report. But they are impressed by the feeling that items of information drawn from unimpeachable sources --e.g. those presented by the representatives of the Japanese Government--have been passed over or disregarded, whilst undue credit has been accorded to dubious information coming from obscure or even unknown quarters.

The Japanese Government cannot ignore the fact--apparent on the face of the Report--that in addition to the documents duly exchanged between the Parties, the Commission have based their findings on newspaper articles, on letters received from casual correspondents, and on the private conversations of members of the Commission and their expert advisors with individuals in-

vested with no special qualifications. It is a fact worthy of remark that this kind of evidence emanating from indefinite and uncertain sources is invariably used to corroborate Chinese contentions as against those of Japan. The Japanese Government had no means of ascertaining in each case the source of such information and refuting it, and must necessarily reserve the right of making further enquiries to elucidate the degree of credit which is to be attached to such material.

The reception of this kind of dubious or worthless evidence is particularly noticeable in the sections dealing with the Incident of 18 September and with the establishment of the Independent State of Manchoukuo. In the former case it leads to a complete misconstruction of the motives which actuated the Japanese armed forces and in the latter case to the presentation of suggestions for the future government of Manchuria which are consistent neither with the tenor of the remainder of the Report nor with the realities of the situation.

In its future deliberations directed to securing the peace of the Far East, the League of Nations cannot, in fact, avoid taking into account the whole of the existing circumstances in this part of the world -- in China as well as in Manchuria, including the events which have transpired subsequently to the preparation of the Report. It is with a view to afford what assistance they can to this endeavour that the present observations have been drawn up, so that Members of the League may have a clear comprehension of the real situation in all its bearings.

When, in the course of these observations, reflections are unavoidably cast on the conduct of the Chinese, it may be well to disclaim the idea, sometimes latent in the Report, that Japan entertains feelings of bitterness or hostility towards the Chinese people. The Japanese Government believe that the Chinese people have been much misled, much terrorized and much misrepresented and that their main desire is to enjoy in peace and quiet the results of their industry. Japan, maintaining her old friendly attitude, looks forward to ages of prosperous and neighbourly cooperation between the two nations.

## CHAPTER I

### CHINA

#### A. General Survey

The Report very properly endeavours, before dealing with the situation in Manchuria, to give in Chapter I a general view of China and to furnish some account of the internal conditions there prevailing.

Unfortunately, it reveals that the investigations conducted by the Commission have been not only incomplete, but somewhat superficial. It contains, indeed, many just conclusions flowing for the most part from observed facts. But all these observations and conclusions are enveloped in a mist of optimism, the glamour of which is certain to be misleading to anyone who does not know the true facts.

The Commission appear to be surprised at such statements as that "China is not an organized State" (p. 17) and that "China is in a condition of complete chaos and incredible anarchy." (p. 17) They call attention to "an altogether different attitude that was taken at the time of the "Washington Conference by all the participating Powers," when in fact there were two completely separate Governments in China, one at Peking and another at Canton -- when banditry was rife, frequently interfering with the communications in the interior, and when preparations were being made for a civil war which a few months afterwards overthrew the Central Government and set up a third independent government in Manchuria; when, in short, "there existed no fewer than three Governments professing to be independent, not to mention the virtually autonomous status of a number of provinces or parts of provinces." (p. 17)

At that time, conditions were certainly not ideal. But there were then only three main rivals in the field. Now there is a whole kaleidoscope. Outer Mongolia and Thibet have been almost entirely lost, while the National Government at Nanking not only secure no obedience from various local leaders, especially, the Southern faction at Canton, but are actually threatened by the tremendous communist aggregation which has its centre in the Provinces of Hupei, Fukien and Kiangsi. That most of the factions aim at the ideal of a United China, of which each thinks to be the master, is possible enough, but that does not make China united, as the Report seems inclined to assert.

At the time of the Washington conference, it was possible to hope for an early restoration of unity and peace to China, but events have belied that hope. The disunion and anarchy of China have gone from bad to worse. The struggles of rival militarists have been woven into the very fabric and structure of Chinese politics, communism has deeply entrenched itself in the heart of the country. The habit of civil strife has become ingrained and endemic; and it is only unreasoning optimism, or a failure to acquaint oneself with the conditions on the spot, which can prompt an observer to detect progress since 1922.

The Japanese Government recognize the justice and force of many of the conclusions of the Report in so far as it deals in Chapter I with the present conditions prevailing in China.

"Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with the resulting weakness of the Central Government, have been the characteristics of China since the revolution of 1911. Those conditions have adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact, and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace and a contributory cause of world economic depression." (p. 13)

At p. 14, dealing with the problems of assimilation and transformation which confronted both Japan and China, the Report emphasizes the special conditions of China "owing to the vastness of her territory, the lack of national unity of her people, and traditional financial system, under which the whole of the revenue collected did not reach the Central Treasury." It remarks that "the reluctance of China to receive foreigners, and her attitude toward those who were in the country was bound to have serious consequences," and that "it concentrated the attention of her rulers on resistance to and restriction of foreign influence," and it adds that "as a result, the constructive reform necessary to enable the country to cope with the new conditions was almost completely neglected."

At p. 16, the Report calls the fact that from 1914 to 1928, "China was ravaged by warring factions; and the ever-present bandits grew into veritable armies by the enlistment of ruined farmers, desperate inhabitants of famine stricken districts, or unpaid soldiers. Even the constitutionalists, who were fighting in the South, were repeatedly exposed to the danger of militarist feuds arising in their midst."

At pp. 16-17, it notes that upon the establishment of a government at Nanking in 1927, "the party was now ready to put into operation its schemes of political and economic reconstruction, but was prevented from doing so by internal dissensions, the political revolt of various Generals with personal armies, and the menace of Communism. In fact, the Central Government had repeatedly to fight for its very existence."

Finally, on p. 17, it remarks that "for a time unity was maintained on the surface. But not even the semblance of unity could be preserved when powerful war lords concluded alliances amongst themselves and marched their armies against Nanking. Though they never succeeded in their object, they remained, even after defeat, potential forces to be reckoned with. Moreover, they never took the position that war against the Central Government was an act of rebellion. It was in their eyes simply a struggle for supremacy between their faction and another one which happened to reside in the national capital and to be recognized as the Central Government by foreign Powers," and reaches the conclusion that "from this summary description it appears that disruptive forces in China are still powerful." (p. 17)

How can these entirely justified statements be reconciled with the optimistic views to which expression is given in the same Chapter? It is stated, for instance, on p. 17, that "although, at present, the Central Government's authority is still weak in a number of provinces, the central authority is not, at least openly, repudiated."

It is hardly necessary to recall facts of recent date, subsequent to the composition of the Report, which prove that the struggles between rival war lords are very far from having come to an end. In the North, despite the injunction of the National Government, General Liu Chen-nien and General Han Fu-chu have been carrying on hostilities since the middle of September. In the South, for instance, the struggle for the presidency of the Provincial Government of Fukien has also brought about fights between opposing military and civil factions. In the West, Tibetan troops have occupied the Provinces of Hsikang and Kokonor. In the Province of Szechuan military operations have taken place between General Liu Hsiang; and in spite of an urgent telegram from General Chiang Kai-shek, reminding them that such behaviour is calculated to produce an impression of want of unity, these hostilities have gone on unabated.

The Report indeed explicitly states that communism in China does not only mean, as in most countries other than the U.S.S.R. either a political doctrine held by certain members of existing parties, or the organization of a special party to compete for power with the other political parties. "It has become an actual rival of the National Government. It possesses its own law, army and government, and its own territorial sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country." (p. 23).

Upon this rapid review of the "disruptive forces," the continually controlling nature of which the Report duly recognizes, it is the conviction of the Japanese Government that, contrary to the view expressed on p. 17 of the Report, that "considerable progress has in fact been made" since the date of the Washington Conference, an impartial examination will show that the condition of China is in fact much worse.

#### B. ANTI-FOREIGN ACTIVITIES IN CHINA

The many intense manifestations of anti-foreign sentiment that have taken place in China have played no less a part than those conditions of anarchy and disturbance which have just been described, in creating the atmosphere that gave rise to the recent unfortunate conflict.

The Report itself takes occasion to pronounce that:-

"Having started upon the road of international cooperation for the purpose of solving her difficulties, as was done at Washington, China might have made more substantial progress in the ten years that have since elapsed had she continued to follow that road. She has only been hampered by the virulence of the anti-foreign propaganda which has been pursued. In two particulars has this been carried so far as to contribute to the creation of the atmosphere in which the present conflict arose, namely, the use made of the economic boycott and the introduction of anti-foreign propaganda into the schools." (P. 18)

Anti-foreign propaganda (in the schools especially) and boycott are circumstances of aggravation which are unfortunately dissevered from each other in the Report. They must be attentively co-ordinated, if we desire to understand the real state of things which prevailed in China, when special causes of tension in Manchuria resulted in the Incident of 18 September, 1931.

The "National" Government are permeated by acute anti-foreign feeling, and work earnestly to instil a virulent hatred of foreigners into the minds of the younger generation. Fifty millions of young Chinese are growing up under the influence of violent ideas, thus constituting a terrific problem for the immediate future. The Nanking Government are doing their best to foster this alarming process. Let us cite from the Report:--

"The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are now taught in the schools as if they had the same authority as that of the Classics in former centuries. The sayings of the Master receive the same veneration as the sayings of Confucius received in the days before the Revolution. Unfortunately, however, more attention has been given to the negative than to the constructive side of nationalism in the education of the young. A perusal of the text books used in the schools leaves the impression on the mind of a reader that their authors have sought to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to build up manliness upon a sense of injury. As a result of this virulent anti-foreign propaganda, begun in the schools and carried through every phase of public life, the students have been induced to engage in political activities which sometimes have culminated in attacks on the persons, homes or offices of Ministers and other authorities, and to attempts to overthrow the Government." (p. 19)

The Report recognizes that the Chinese boycotts have been the definite expression of a hostile attitude on the part of China towards Japan, that they injure the economic interests of Japan, and that they are consequently detrimental to friendly relations between Japan and China both from a psychological and from a material point of view. These observations confirm what the Japanese Government have always consistently maintained.

Some remarks may, however, be made on the special character of Chinese boycotts and on the question of responsibility for them.

In recent years, the boycott has developed in China the special characteristic of being employed not only as a means of protest against legitimate measures of foreign Powers to protect the lives and property of their respective subjects in China, but also as an instrument of national policy to secure the abandonment by another nation of its treaty rights.

As to the question of governmental responsibility, the Report states that "there is no doubt" as to the responsibility of the Kuomintang for the boycotts. This is patently correct, and it must be added that the Kuomintang, or the Nationalist Party, is not a simple political party in the Occidental sense of the term, but a regular state organ of China in accordance with the Chinese organic law. It is evident that its acts entail a national responsibility upon the National Government.

No isolated descriptions, however minute and detailed, of anti-foreign methods of education and of the operation of boycott movements can be sufficient of themselves to give a full understanding of the actual conditions prevailing in China. It is necessary that the whole should be co-ordinated, so as to reveal, underlying these two phases of anti-foreign activity, the anti-foreign policy of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government. This feature the Report fails to bring out. It is noteworthy that the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government began to play an important role in China within a few years of the Washington Conference. They have persistently pursued their so-called "revolutionary policy" ever since they came into power. It is this avowed policy of theirs, as well as the lawless conditions subsisting in China, that has alarmed foreign Powers and has increased their reluctance to surrender the rights which constitute at the moment their only protection.

On this point, the Report itself states that "the influence of the Kuomintang has introduced into the nationalism of China an additional and abnormal tinge of bitterness against all foreign influences.....It demands the return of leased territories, of administrative and other not purely commercial rights exercised by a foreign agency in railway areas, of administrative rights in concessions and settlements, and of extraterritorial rights which imply that foreigners are not amenable to Chinese laws, law courts and taxation" (p. 18), and that "China demands immediately the surrender of certain exceptional powers and privileges because they are felt to be derogatory to her national dignity and sovereignty." (p.23)

Further study would have revealed to the commission that these were not empty "demands", but that the Chinese authorities were determined to push them through to fruition by their own unilateral declarations and their own brute force.

The Kuomintang Party has time and again announced as its basic foreign policy the abolition of foreign rights, with the avowed intention of denouncing "unequal" treaties unilaterally, if need be, regardless of the attitude of the other signatory Powers. In 1926, General Chiang Kai-shek declared that should the Nationalist revolution succeed, China would abolish all "unequal" treaties immediately and unilaterally. In January, 1927, the British Concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang were forcibly seized by the Kuomintang. Its actions may have become somewhat more moderate after the establishment of the Nationalist Government at Nanking in April, the same year, but its policy did not change. They repeatedly proclaimed their intention of abrogating "unequal" treaties and of doing away with the rights and interests acquired by foreigners in China. They repeatedly pledged themselves to the public to carry out this policy. Acting upon the pledge, the Government on December 28, 1929, promulgated a law providing for the abolition of extraterritoriality as from January 1, 1930, and again in January 1931, declared that unless a satisfactory settlement of the extraterritoriality issue could be arrived at by the end of February, the same year, the Government would proceed with their proclaimed policy of abolishing extraterritoriality by other than diplomatic means. At the same time, there were issued "Regulations regarding the Administration of Justice in the case of Foreigners," and thus they openly expressed their intention of unilaterally doing away with the treaties, announcing the fact to the interested Powers.

It will be apparent that foreigners and their rights in China were faced with serious dangers prior to the Incident of 18 September. And, as the Report observes, "so far as Japan is China's nearest neighbour and largest customer, she has suffered more than any other Power from the lawless conditions...." (p. 23)

#### C. Abnormal Status of Foreigners in China.

The internal disintegration which in fact lies at the very heart of the capital question of China, together with the state of constant insecurity to which the lives and property of foreigners are consequently exposed: the inculcation of hatred in the schools and the anti-foreign propaganda among the adolescent; the, rejected methods of boycott to be applied to foreigners of one nationality or another; the unilateral denunciation of treaties, along with the rest of the measures derived from the theories of "revolutionary diplomacy", all contribute to invest the problems which are presented by China, destitute as she is of a strong and united government, with an entirely special character, and prevent the application of usual methods of solution. Such anti-foreign characteristics as have been described (and which are unparalleled anywhere else), have obliged foreign Powers to maintain a system for the protection of their rights and interests at their own hand. These Powers not only possess rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, but maintain (of course besides their leased territories) concessions in Tientsin, Hankow, Shanghai and other cities, which they themselves police and administer. While thus making due provision to minimize the evil effects of Chinese lawlessness, these Powers hold themselves in a condition to protect their rights by force of arms. Besides the forces protecting the Japanese railway in Manchuria, there were before the Incident of 18 September, 4,700 American, British, French and Italian troops, together with some 900 Japanese, in the Peiping and Tientsin districts, all stationed there since 1901 in virtue of treaty stipulations. Most of these Powers also have forces stationed in Shanghai, not under treaty,

but under the simple necessities of self-defence--a state of affairs which has come about altogether subsequently to the Washington Conference of 1922, and thus shows the deterioration of conditions since that date. Many men-of-war are also stationed, not only at sea-ports like Shanghai and Tsingtao, but also in inland waters, such as the Yangtze River and the Paiho.

Nor is this an empty form. There have been many occasions on which these troops and vessels have been employed in active self-defence.

Besides such conspicuous cases as those presented by the firing by foreign forces at Shamian in 1925, the bombardment of Wanhsien in 1926 and that of Nanking in 1927, there have been numerous cases in which foreign men-of-war navigating the Yangtze River have been compelled to return the unprovoked fire of Chinese troops from the banks. These unprovoked attacks have indeed been on the increase in recent years, particularly since the Kuomintang came into power.

It is thus clear that the position of foreign Powers in China is an altogether exceptional one, without parallel in other parts of the world. International usages and the manner of exercising the right of self-defence are there marked by characteristics unlike any to be found in other civilized countries. The Report itself states on p. 23 that "the realisation of China's national aspirations in the field of foreign relations depends on her ability to discharge the functions of a modern Government in the sphere of domestic affairs, and until the discrepancy between these has been removed the danger of international friction and of incidents, boycotts, and armed interventions will continue."

The application of what may be called "Peace Machinery" such as resort to International Courts or Arbitrators encounters insuperable obstacles in the case of China. It has been found impossible in the past to make use of these organs even in disputes which did not involve vital interests. The abnormal conditions of China and the fact that the Powers refuse, in view of their existence, to modify the abnormal and extraordinary institutions above-mentioned are sufficient proof of the impossibility of applying to Chinese disputes the normal "Peace Machinery", as constituted at present.

## CHAPTER II

### Manchuria

#### A. General Survey

The Commission seem throughout to be influenced by the assumption that Manchuria is naturally and necessarily part of China. In fact, on p. 29, they say it has always been considered "an integral part of China." As a matter of fact, the union of Manchuria with China has only been temporary and accidental. This is apparent from the Report, which passes lightly over the situation which supervened on the dethronement of the Manchu Dynasty. In actual fact, although the Manchurian authorities may have "followed the lead of Yuan Shih-kai," and many have not concerned themselves very much about their constitutional position, it is safe to accept the considered opinion of M. Escarra, an adviser to the Nanking government, (*La Chine et le Droit International*, p. 240), that the disappearance of the Manchu Dynasty from China and the consequent disappearance

of the substratum ("support") of the dynastic bond which united Manchuria is  
with the rest of China "ne s'accompagnait guere d'autres modes de rattachement." "La Mandchourie", says this author, "n'a jamais ete vassale de la Chine,  
puisque c'est une famille mandchoue, au contraire, qui a conquis l'Empire  
chinois. On ne peut pas, d'autre part, considerer la Chine comme ayant ete  
vassale de la Mandchourie,..... Il s'agit bien d'un exemple d'union personnelle,  
....." "Au fond", M. Escarra proceeds, "il ne pouvait guere etre ques-  
tion des droits de la Chine sur la Mandchourie. Il n'y avait eu que ce fait  
que des Mandchous etoient sur le trone de Chine, sans plus. Cette famille  
disparissant, il fallait trouver une autre formule juridique pour expliquer le  
rattachement de la Mandchourie a la Chine. Il ne semble pas que cette formule  
ait ete recherchee d'une maniere consciente." Thus the connection between Man-  
churia and China was loose and vague, and on various occasions Chang Tso-lin  
repudiated it in set terms.

Even assuming that in this ambiguous state of things Manchuria must be  
pronounced to have been for the moment duly incorporated with China--a large  
assumption--the fall of the United Republic after the death of Yuan Shih-kai in  
1916 signalized the break-up all unity of government in China. None of the gov-  
ernments arising in that vast area had any title to supremacy over the rest,  
and the eventual establishment of a government at Nanking and its recognition  
as a legitimate government by the Powers could not invest it with authority  
over regions, such as Manchuria, which had never been subject to its sway.

In point of fact, Chang Tso-lin never took orders from any of the various  
parties who from time to time seized authority in Peiping, though he may have  
consulted their inclinations when it suited him to do so. "His attitude from  
time to time," says the Report (p. 28), "depended on the nature of his personal  
relations with the military leaders who controlled the changing central authori-  
ties. He seems to have looked upon his relations with the Government in the  
sense of a personal alliance." The Report gives many instances of his in-  
dependence and proceeds to develop the theory, that in asserting independence  
of, and free alliance with, the Chinese Government, he did not mean to be  
independent of China. (pp. 28-29) This assertion can only mean, at most, that  
Chang desired and would have welcomed a United China comprising his own Man-  
churia. That may or may not have been the case, but it obviously in no respect  
affects the status of Manchuria, which depends solely on facts and not upon  
surmises. In point of fact, in his declaration of May, 1922, Chang expressly  
says that the North Eastern Provinces "are not recognized as territories of the  
Republic of China."\*

Chang Tso-lin's son and successor, General Chang Hsueh-liang, has  
adopted essentially the same attitude; not repudiating the ideal of a United  
China which should include Manchuria, and accepting the Nanking Government as  
a symbol of that ideal unity, but entirely repudiating any subjection to it in  
practice. As the Report says (p. 30), "The relationship with the Central  
Government depended in all affairs military, civil, financial and foreign, on  
voluntary co-operation. Orders or instructions requiring unquestioning  
obedience would not have been tolerated. Appointments or dismissals against  
the wishes of the Manchurian authorities were unthinkable."

\* "To the Foreign Ministers in Peking, the Foreign Consuls in Tientsin  
and the Foreign Residents both Civil and Military in Tong-shan.

The Report thus clearly demonstrates the entire independence of Manchuria under the Changs from subjection to, or interference by, any Chinese government.

When, therefore, on p. 29, the Report declares Manchuria to have "remained integral part of China" and elsewhere declares that such is still its position, it contradicts all that it has adduced to prove its perfect independence. Invoking against Japan the Law of Nations, it collides with the most fundamental doctrine of that law, viz., that a state must possess and continue to possess one supreme government. Since 1916 no single government has ever exerted actual authority over the whole of China.

As a further attempt to prove that Manchuria ought to be regarded as a part of China, the Report relies on the undoubted fact that many or most of the present inhabitants of Manchuria are Chinese immigrants. To this, it is sufficient to remark that, as the Report itself observes, the Chinese have not a keen sense of nationality, and to add that the doctrine of the Report would have very awkward consequences for the territorial status of many countries and for the peace of the world, if applied elsewhere.

#### B. Misgovernment of the Chang Dynasty.

The independence of the Three Eastern Provinces, and subsequently of the Four North-Eastern Provinces, and the maintenance even subsequently to December 1928, of their administrative unity, does not mean that Manchuria was well governed. The Commission note, while they somewhat extenuate, the maladministration which prevailed under the Changs. (p. 31)

"The Manchurian authorities realized that, as before, their power derived much more from their armies than from Nanking.

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I have received from Hsu Shih-chang a communication giving away Three Eastern Provinces, the special areas, Jehol and Cha Ha-erh, also the Inner and the Outer Mongolia. All these are not recognized as territories of the Republic of China.

I, with my special position, cannot but assume all the responsibilities thereof, and do my utmost to protect the lives and properties of all the friendly nations, cultivating friendly relationship with them. All the important treaties which have been made under the Manchu Regime and the Republic of China will be fully recognized and respected. The Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Consuls and Foreign Residents who wish to conduct negotiations on other matters and affairs can communicate with my office at Lanchow. I shall hereafter have closer commercial relationship than ever before with the friendly nations in order to promote the happiness and prosperity of the people. Whatever treaties Hsu Shih-chang will make after the first day of this month with reference to the Three Eastern Provinces, the Inner and the Outer Mongolia, Jehol and Cha Ha-erh, and which do not have my direct permission, will not be recognized by me, and I shall look upon them as something done with bad intention by Hsu Shih-chang. (Signed) Chang Tso-lin Commander-in-chief of Fengtien Troops."

"This fact explains the maintenance of large standing armies numbering about 250,000 men, and of the huge arsenal on which more than \$200,000,000 (silver) are reported to have been spent. Military expenses are estimated to have amounted to 80 percent of the total expenditure. The remainder was not sufficient to provide for the costs of administration, police, justice and education. The treasury was not capable of paying adequate salaries to the officials. As all power rested in the hands of a few military men, office could be owned only through them. Nepotism, corruption and maladministration continued to be unavoidable consequences of this state of affairs. The Commission found grave complaints concerning this maladministration to be widely current. This state of affairs, however, was not peculiar to Manchuria, as similar or even worse conditions existed in other parts of China.

"Heavy taxation was needed for the upkeep of the army. As ordinary revenues were still insufficient, the authorities further taxed the people by steadily depreciating the irredeemable provincial currencies. This was often done, particularly of late, in connection with "official bean-buying" operations, which by 1930 had already assumed monopolistic proportions. By gaining control over Manchuria's staple products, the authorities had hoped to enhance their gains by compelling the foreign bean-buyers, particularly the Japanese, to pay higher prices. Such transactions show the extent to which the authorities controlled banks and commerce. Officials likewise engaged freely in all sorts of private enterprise and used their power to gather wealth for themselves and their favourites."

This gloomy picture is a soberly edited summary of the material presented by the Japanese Assessor to the Commission in Chapter VIII of "The Present Condition of China", and only imperfectly reflects the true and actual conditions, which were even worse (especially as regards the administration of justice and the police) than the above extract would suggest. But the passage is effective, even in its moderate statements, as showing how the Manchurian people laboured under an oppressive yoke of official and militarist victimization and how unlikely it was that any artificial Japanese stimulus was necessary in order to induce them to break it when the opportunity came.

#### C. Special Position of Japan

It is in this region that Japan has acquired a "special position." The "special position" of Japan in Manchuria, to which so much mystery is attached, is in reality a very simple matter. It is nothing but the aggregate of Japan's exceptional treaty rights in that country, plus the natural consequences which flow from her close neighbourhood and geographical situation and from her historical associations. Her measures of self-defense must be measured by the extent of her interests and her interests are exceptional, intimate and vital. In the standard case of the Caroline, it was the propinquity to the United States and the extreme importance and disturbed conditions of Canada that led the United States to acquiesce in the action of Great Britain in invading American soil and destroying the instant menace.

Every act of self-defense must depend for its justification on the importance of the interests to be defended, on the imminence of the danger, and on the necessity of the act. Japanese interests in Manchuria are commanding; her territory is contiguous, and Japan can not depend wholly upon the local force.

Her "special position" is at once apparent. It does not give her, nor is it asserted to give her, a general and vexatious right of intervention in the administration of the country. But it certainly creates a position in which she must defend herself with uncommon energy against military attack.

The Japanese Government agree fully with the passages in which the Commission enumerate the rights acquired by Japan in Manchuria by virtue of the Treaties of 1905 and 1915, which it is satisfactory to know that they recognize are in full force and cannot be abolished by unilateral action.

At p. 38 they observe:--

"This summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighbouring State such extensive economic and administrative privileges."

And on p. 39:--

"Japanese interests in Manchuria differ both in character and degree from those of any other foreign country. Deep in the mind of every Japanese is the memory of their country's great struggle with Russia in 1904-5, fought on the plains of Manchuria, at Mukden and Liaoyang, along the line of the South Manchuria Railway, at the Yalu River, and in the Liaotung Peninsula. To the Japanese the war with Russia will ever be remembered as a life and death struggle fought in self-defence against the menace of Russian encroachments. The fact that a hundred thousand Japanese soldiers died in this war, and that two billion gold Yen were expended, have created in Japanese minds a determination that these sacrifices shall not have been made in vain."

There is nothing in this "special position" conflicting (as the Report asserts) with the sovereign rights of China.

The powers conferred upon Russia, and secured by Japan, in the extremely limited area known as the South Manchuria Railway Zone did not at all present a conflict with Chinese sovereignty. No exception could have been taken to a cession or long lease by China of this Zone to Russia, and through Russia to Japan. It would have been an exercise of sovereignty and not a conflict with sovereignty. That the nominal sovereignty of China was permitted to subsist when the agreement with Russia was made, does not make the rights which China conferred on Russia "conflict" with the sovereignty of China: they were, on the contrary, derived from the sovereignty of China.

Nor is it possible to imagine that the propinquity, and the economic and strategic importance of Manchuria to Japan conflict with the local sovereignty. They make it more possible that Japan might be obliged to resort to self-protection by events in Manchuria than she would be if Manchuria were on the other side of the world. But this is no restriction on the sovereignty of the region; it is only a remote liability to an occurrence to which every state is subject, --even the strongest. The sovereignty of the United States was not impaired by the Caroline Case.

The "special position" of Japan, so persistently assailed, has resulted in Japan's accomplishment, in spite of many embarrassments, of a great work of civilization in Manchuria. The principal agent in this development has been the South Manchuria Railway in its multiform activities. But neither in Chapter II nor in Chapter VIII of the Report is any acknowledgement made of the work so accomplished -- in fact, the Railway is scarcely mentioned at all, although great stress is laid on the activities of Chinese immigrants. The present prosperity of Manchuria is no doubt due as the Report says, in no small measure to the influx of a hard-working and plain-living Chinese population. This can not be ascribed to an official Chinese policy of emigration. The phenomenon is simply and solely due to the attractiveness of Manchuria to the Chinese farmer. And Manchuria was attractive, not because it was well-governed, but because, owing to the presence of Japan, it was free from the scourge of war. The Chinese, as is well known, and as is pointed out in the Report, are highly adaptable to environment and are destitute of any strong national feeling. Their connection, if any, with China is a matter of social and family sentiment. It implies no political attachment whatever. "The ties", as the Report observes (p 125), "between Manchuria and the rest of China remain chiefly racial and social," i.e., they are not political. They are "racial and social rather than economic." (p 123) In view of this, it is difficult to understand the emphasis which is placed by the Report on the political efficiency of this non-political, non-economic tie.

#### D. Attacks on Japan's Position

Although the Report says little concerning the enterprises and establishments of the Japanese in Manchuria, it is these enterprises and establishments which have been the objects of Chinese direct attack, and in Chapter III of the Report these particular questions are examined, viz:-

1. The encircling policy directed against the South Manchuria Railway.
2. The embarrassments placed in the way of leasing land and of the exercise of other treaty rights.
3. The oppression exercised upon Japanese subjects, and especially on those of Korean origin.
4. The assassination of Captain Nakamura.

But the Report, neither in Chapter III nor anywhere else evinces any condemnation of the deliberate policy of violation and repudiation of treaties and other engagements pursued by China,--it even inclines to excuse them on the plea of the nationalist programme of emancipation. Nor does the Report touch on the impossibility, by reason of the hostile attitude of China, of arriving at any satisfactory solution of pending questions. It is to be regretted that the Report deals with those matters piecemeal and here again fails to co-ordinate them into one whole. If that had been done, it would have been apparent that one basic cause underlay them all, and that, whatever the precise rights or wrongs of each case, they were manifestations of a fixed intention to annihilate Japanese rights in Manchuria.

That conclusion is more clearly apparent in the summary given in the report (pp 30-31) of the situation as it developed in Manchuria after the alliance of General Chang Hsueh-liang with the Government at Nanking.

"In the domain of foreign policy, the union of Manchuria with the Nationalist Government was to have more important consequences, although in this respect, the local authorities were also left much liberty of action. The persistent assaults of Chang Tso-lin on the position of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and his disregard of certain rights claimed by Japan, show that in Manchuria a "forward policy" had already been adopted before the union with the Nationalists. However, after the union, Manchuria was opened to well-organized and systematic Kuomintang propaganda. In its official party publications and numerous affiliated organs, it never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the recovery of lost sovereign rights, and abolition of unequal treaties, and the wickedness of imperialism. Such propaganda was bound to make a profound impression in Manchuria, where the reality of foreign interests, courts, police, guards or soldiers on Chinese soil, was apparent. Through the Nationalist school-books party propaganda entered the schools. Associations such as the Liaoning People's Foreign Policy Association made their appearance. They stimulated and intensified the nationalist sentiment and carried on an anti-Japanese agitation. Pressure was brought to bear on Chinese house-owners and landlords to raise the rents of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to refuse renewal of rent contracts. The Japanese reported to the Commission many cases of this nature. Korean settlers were subjected to systematic persecution. Various orders and instructions of an anti-Japanese nature were issued. Cases of friction accumulated, and dangerous tension developed. The Kuomintang Party headquarters in the provincial capitals were established in March, 1931, and subsequently branch organizations were set up in the other towns and districts. Party propagandists from China came North in increasing numbers. The Japanese complained that the anti-Japanese agitation was intensified every day. In April, 1931, a five days' conference under the auspices of the People's Foreign Policy Association was held at Mukden, with over three hundred delegates from various parts of Manchuria in attendance. The possibility of liquidating the Japanese position in Manchuria was discussed, the recovery of the South Manchuria Railway being included in the resolutions adopted. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. and her citizens suffered from similar tendencies, while the White Russians, although they had no sovereign rights or exceptional privileges to surrender, were subjected to humiliation and ill-treatment."

Unfortunately, this summary, which gives an adequate picture of the situation as it existed on the eve of 18 September, is only to be found in Chapter II of the Report, and nothing is said about it in connection with the account of the incident of that date (which is dealt with in Chapter IV).

In dealing with that crucial subject in Chapter IV, the Report evinces no appreciation of its connection with the long chain of Chinese attacks on Japanese interests. Neither the intensive boycott of Japanese goods, nor the denial of validity to Japanese treaties, nor the destructive competition with the Japanese railways, nor the obstructions put in the way of Korean immigrants, nor the Wanpaoshan affair, is referred to; and the case of Captain Nakamura is only incidentally touched upon. The whole background of the incident is cut adrift.

All the evidence of an aggressive determination on the part of Chinese is discarded. It is replaced by a heterogeneous collection of reasons why the Japanese people may be supposed to have been prepared "for a resumption of 'positive policy'."

Surely an armed attack on a vital nerve of the nation's safety by the regular troops of an aggressive neighbour may be repelled without calling in such factors as Japanese trade depression to explain it. The result of dissociating the swift and complete repulse from the prior evidence of Chinese aggressive disposition is to put before the reader the domestic discontents in Japan, in place of Chinese aggressiveness, as the reason why the final attack on the railway was dealt with as it deserved. It is the reason why the Chinese adopted a "positive policy" in Manchuria that the Commission might well have investigated.

As early as 15 June, 1931, the Japanese Government were pointing out the serious results which would be liable to follow from the conduct of the officials and police in Manchuria, and so far from being impelled by trade depression or military and political discontents to initiate a "positive policy", they endeavoured by all means to lessen the tension. In spite of these efforts, the aggressive attitude of the Chinese continued unabated, and it is notable that when the "North Barracks" were entered by the Japanese troops, there was observed on the walls a placard exhorting the men in garrison to "Look at the railway running along the west side of these Barracks!" It is little wonder that at this very sport the explosion of 18 September was engineered by those very men.

This attitude of aggressiveness on the part of the Chinese, and not the resumption of a "positive policy" on the part of Japan, as is suggested in the Report, explains the state of tension which existed in Manchuria. Many other instances of the insolence and truculence prevailing in General Chang Hsueh-liang's army in Mukden are given in a pamphlet prepared by the Kwantung Army and laid before the Commission on 24 April, entitled "A Review on Sino-Japanese Clashes in Manchuria", to which their Report has not thought it necessary to allude. The paramount necessity of avoiding the smallest act which might explode the inflammable atmosphere must be apparent to everyone who has followed the march of events so far, and has realized the growing aggressiveness of the Chinese as detailed in the Report.

### CHAPTER III

#### The Incident of 18 September and Subsequent Operations

The Japanese military authorities have furnished to the Commission both in writing and in conversations with the Headquarters Staff of the Kwantung Army, with a complete and detailed information regarding the various phases of this incident. This information is considered by the Japanese Government an accurate and truthful account, and they must sustain it in its integrity.

The Report sums up this information in six paragraphs entitled "The Japanese Version". (pp 67-69) From this summary, many not unimportant details are omitted; accordingly, Members of the Council, who wish for further information, are referred to the accounts supplied by the principal actors themselves and inserted in the documents presented by the Japanese Government.

After summing up also the "Chinese version", the Report formulates certain conclusions which cannot but cause surprise, as they are not the logical consequence of the two versions which precede them, and appear, as the Report itself admits, to be especially uninfluenced by information drawn from other and unofficial sources.

The Commission recognize (p.71) the fact of the explosion, but they add that the damage done was not of itself sufficient to justify military action. Here they fail to take into account two other factors, which they nevertheless admit to have existed, viz., the state of acute tension already existing between the conflicting military forces and the existence of an emergency plan of campaign which the Japanese army, like any other organized force, must necessarily prepare whenever it is stationed on or in the neighbourhood of foreign territory, particularly when repeated occurrences show that prompt measures may become imperative.

This state of acute tension, admitted by the Report to have existed, - general and growing tension between China and Japan and local tension between the military forces in close contact, - is, as has already been observed, insufficiently brought out in the Report.

As respects the assertion that the Japanese had "a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese" (p.71), it is only necessary to look for a moment at the facts, to be convinced that no other Power or its armed forces could possibly have acted otherwise.

The Japanese Army in Manchuria before 18 September, in view of its much inferior strength faced as it was by very superior forces provided with a vast supply of material including aeroplanes, reserve munitions and a great arsenal, naturally had to provide for the event of some occurrence or a Chinese attack obliging it to take immediate steps to prevent itself from being overwhelmed by a more numerous adversary. That the Japanese Army had its plans for dealing with such a situation is undoubtedly the case and it would have been a gross dereliction of duty if it had not. Every possible combination had been minutely worked out; frequent manoeuvres helped to make the execution of the plan almost automatic. And although a certain amount of initiative had to be left to those who were on the spot in any given conjuncture, the main objectives in case of any attack were foreseen and well known. It was therefore perfectly natural that after the explosion on the railway line and the firing of the first shots, - all the work of Chinese soldiery - the plan was "put into operation with swiftness and precision." (p.71)

The Report draws a contrast between the preparation of this emergency plan, a most legitimate and necessary measure of security, and the absence on the Chinese side of any plan "of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place." (p.71) They rely, in

support of this attitude, on a telegram supposed to have been sent on 6 September by General Chang Huch-liang, instructing the Chinese forces to exercise patience and avoid having recourse to force. Supposing - though the Japanese have no knowledge on the point - that such a telegram was in fact despatched, received and circulated, and further that these orders were not subsequently cancelled or modified by General Chang Huch-liang himself, the telegram in itself could not, in the notorious state of indiscipline of a Chinese army, give any guarantee that the Chinese would never have attacked the Japanese, nor could it furnish any decisive proof that they did not make the attack of the 18th of September. And it is to be remarked that in point of fact the Chinese troops did attack on that night and continued to resist by force of arms. The Commission's statement that "the Chinese made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces," shows that they do not discard the hypothesis of a Chinese attack, but would limit its bearing on the case by refusing to call it "concerted" or "authorized". According to the Report, the attack might be the work of soldiery acting on their own initiative and without orders from their superiors.

But in any event there remains the solid fact that the explosion did take place, and that an attack was launched by Chinese soldiers: in consequence, the Japanese emergency plan was automatically put in motion long before such questions as the extent of the damage could ever be discussed.

In dealing with the events of the night of 18 September, the Commission have thought it their duty further to add that "the military operations of the Japanese troops during this night. . . . cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence." (p.71)

It is entirely impossible to accept this opinion, which must be a surprising one to anyone belonging to those countries which are parties to the Briand-Kellogg Treaty for the Outlawry of War.

The paragraph concerning the right of self-defence contained in the Idenitic Note of Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State, dated 23 June, 1928, reads: -

"(1) Self-defense. There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense. . . ."

The Resolution adopted by the Senate of the United States at the time of ratification of that Treaty states: -

"It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may, and frequently does, extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it."

AI 200

The letters of Sir Austen Chamberlain to the American diplomatic representatives in London, dated 19 May and 18 July, 1928, may also be cited.

The first observes: -

"4. After studying the wording of Article 1 of the United States draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a state may be forced to take in self-defence. Mr. Kellogg has made it clear in the speech to which I have referred above that he regards the right of self-defence as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary. . . . .

"10. The language of Article 1, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government."

The Second says: -

"I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Kellogg in his speech of the 28th April that the proposed treaty does not restrict or impair in any way the right of self-defence, as also with his opinion that each state alone is competent to decide when circumstances necessitate recourse to war for that purpose."

The French Government in their reply of 14 July, 1928, to the American Ambassador in Paris, similarly remarked: -

"Rien dans le nouveau Traité ne restreint ni ne compromet d'une façon quelconque le droit de défense personnelle. Chaque nation à cet égard reste toujours libre de défendre son territoire contre une attaque ou une invasion; seule elle est compétente pour décider si les circonstances exigent de recourir à la guerre pour sa propre défense."

The German Government in their letter of 27 April, 1928, to the American Ambassador in Berlin, also declare that they start with the presumption that the proposed treaty "would not put in question the sovereign right of any state to defend itself."

The Japanese Government, informed of all these communications, also did not fail to emphasize in their note of 26 May, 1928, to the American Ambassador, that "the proposal of the United States is understood to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defense."

In the face of these express reserves, the right to pronounce a decisive opinion on an act of self-defence, falls solely within the sovereign appreciation of the interested state. And on this point the finding of the Commission explicitly is that "the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence." (p.71) In the case of this incident of 18 September, no one except the officers on the spot could possibly be qualified to judge whether or not the action undertaken by the Japanese Army was a measure of self-defence.

It is unnecessary here to enlarge on the nature of the right of self-defence. It has never been better defined than by Mr. Daniel Webster when as Secretary of State of the American Republic, he laid down that it demanded for its just exercise a case of "necessity, instant and overwhelming, allowing no choice of means and no instant for deliberation." With those conditions the Incident of 18 September precisely complies. There was the necessity of meeting a great and imminent danger - an overt attack by members of a vastly superior force, capable, if not nipped in the bud, of driving the Japanese into the sea. There was no choice of means - what else was to be done? There was no instant for deliberation - the open attack was launched upon them. It is fortunately unnecessary to consider whether the magnitude of the interests at stake warranted forcible measures. For these interests were nothing less than the whole position of Japan in the Far East.

It is as impossible as it would be unjust to make Japan responsible for the further events which supervened on the Chinese resistance. Measures of self-protection usually meet no resistance and are at once settled by amicable discussion between the governments concerned. If, however, they are met by armed opposition, there is no knowing how far they may develop, and necessarily so.

It may not be inappropriate to recall the case of Navarino, where a conflict was so little desired or expected that one of the governments involved described it as an "untoward event." The Egyptian armament had come to assist the Turks to suppress the revolt in Greece; they were faced by a fleet of English, French and Russians, who were bent on preventing them from doing so. In that state of tension, a chance shot furnished the spark that produced

the conflict. The result destroyed the Egyptian fleet and Turkish hopes, and set the seal on the independence of Greece. Yet it began in mere self-defence - the return of fire. This illustrates how impossible it is to limit the consequences of self-defensive measures.

The Commission, while drawing attention to the synchronization of the operations which took place on 18 September throughout the entire extent of the South Manchuria Railway Zone, omit to notice the necessity for such simultaneous action. There was no other alternative for the Japanese Commander, with his 10,400 troops stationed all along an eleven-hundred kilometre line of railway, and faced by 220,000 Chinese troops (without reckoning 110,000 beyond the Great Wall also under General Chang Hsueh-liang's command) At Mukden itself, a single Japanese regiment of reduced strength together with a few railway patrols, 1,500 men in all, were faced by 15,000 Chinese with some forty guns; and a similar situation existed at Changchun and elsewhere. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief was in fact responsible for the protection of over a million Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria. In case of an attack at one point, and with the evident possibility before him of attacks at other points, the only possible way of assuring that protection was to use all the transport facilities that the railway afforded, and to take the Chinese troops by surprise before they could have time to move.

To sum up, the operations which commenced on the night of 18 September were only the putting into active execution of a plan prepared to meet the case of a Chinese attack, and whose prompt and accurate execution had always been considered by the Commander-in-Chief as absolutely essential for the fulfilment of the task of protection which was incumbent on him, in view of the great local superiority of the Chinese. These operations had no relation to anything but self-defence, and the Japanese Government cannot allow either their necessity or their appropriateness to be the subject of dispute.

The Report relates at considerable length the ensuing operations undertaken subsequently to 18 September with a view to effectively ensuring the safety of Japanese life and property. The Japanese Government will not here enter into the numerous points of detail on which observations would have to be made. They are conscious of never having transgressed the due limits of the right of self-defence.

#### CHAPTER IV THE NEW STATE

The questions regarding Manchuria considered in Chapter VI of the Report are of first-rate importance, since it is on the conclusions formulated in this Chapter respecting the establishment of Manchoukuo, and the attitude of its inhabitants towards the new Government, that the Commission base their general finding in Chapter IX to the effect that "the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria would be equally unsatisfactory."

The conclusion in question appears to have been reached with little reference to proved facts. It is certainly hard, in the course of a brief sojourn, to ascertain the true state of affairs in the case of a new state, only a few weeks old. Such a state is naturally subject to infantile ailments - to all the hostile activities of dissident and discontented elements - to the difficulties necessarily incident to a period of transition, particularly inimical to business and agriculture - and, in an especial measure in the case of Manchoukuo, to an intensely hostile and unscrupulous propaganda.

It is nevertheless regrettable that the Report, declining to accept the solemn declarations of the Japanese Government and attaching too little value to the detailed documents presented by them, have, alike in Manchuria and in Peiping, the stronghold of General Chang Hsueh-liang, apparently listened to the opinions of the unidentified persons, and given credence to letters and communications of doubtful or unknown origin.

Accordingly, the Japanese Government think it their especial duty to enable the Council of the League of Nations to acquire a more correct idea of the matters which form the subject-matter of Chapter VI; viz., the establishment of Manchoukuo, the views of its inhabitants and the organization and prospects of the new State.

#### A. ESTABLISHMENT OF MANCHOUKUO.

The Report concludes, in the first place, that nothing was ever heard of the independence of Manchuria before September, 1931 (p. 97)

It has been clearly explained above, however, that Manchuria has always constituted a special territory, geographically and historically distinct from China Proper. It constituted a separate crown domain; there was no power in the Republic or its officers to annex it to China Proper, and its independence was at least twice proclaimed by Chang Tso-lin, as the Report itself acknowledges. The oppressive misgovernment of that ruler, and still more, that of his son, General Chang Hsueh-liang, are notorious and are also admitted by the Report. At the expense of Manchuria, their ambition and greed induced them to embark on costly and disastrous invasions of China, and it is matter of history that this led very long ago to the cry of "Manchuria for the Manchurians," embodied in the movement known as "Paoching Anmin" (Preserve the frontiers and give us peace). From such a movement to complete independence, in name as well as in fact, was a very small step. The existence of this movement is no supposititious figment; its leaders are perfectly well known; they were Mr. Wang Yung-chieng (Provincial Governor of Fengtien under Chang Tso-lin) and Mr. Yu Chung-han, one of Chang's counsellors. Both had to resign and give way to Chang's grandiose schemes. It was this Yu who subsequent to the Incident of 18 September became the organizer of the Self-Government Guiding Board mentioned later. In this he was not yielding to Japanese solicitations; he was merely carrying on his interrupted work. His case is typical.

The point need not be elaborated by citing the other independence movements of different shades which arose in the time of the Changs. But a certain surprise may be evoked that the Report avers that the idea of independence did not exist.

The misgovernment and extortions of Chang Tso-lin and General Chang Hsueh-liang had long driven the educated Chinese and Manchus to consider the necessity of reforms. Dr. Chao Hsin-po, President of the Lawyers Association of Mukden, broached the subject to Chang Tso-lin, but he had refused to listen to him. At the Feng-yung University, in Mukden, a group of professors also took up the study of the political reforms rendered necessary in order to counteract the militarist policy of General Chang Hsueh-liang, and Dr. Chao was in touch with this group.

There was in existence, therefore, at a period prior to September 1931, a movement based on Manchurian independence, and here the Commission appear to have entirely left out of sight all the information supplied then, particularly in the course of conversation in Manchuria with the leading personages in the new Government.

So much for the assertion that Manchurian independence had never been heard of. We now come to the node of the definite establishment of the independent State of Manchoukuo and the attitude of the Japanese toward it. Here the Report is very far from being in accordance with the facts.

The Report says that the movement to proclaim the independent State of Manchuria was inaugurated, organized and carried through by the Japanese as a solution for the situation which had arisen as a consequence of the events of 18 September, utilizing for this purpose the names and active co-operation of certain Chinese personages; that the activities of the Japanese Headquarters Staff were marked, from 18 September onwards, by political motives; and that the General Staff in Tokio lent the independence movement their assistance and gave directions to its organizers.

But a little thought will show how unfounded is this assumption.

When the authorities who under General Chang Hsueh-liang were responsible for the maintenance of order in Manchuria disappeared, as they mainly did after the events of 18 September, some organization was evidently necessary in order to carry on the normal machinery of daily life; local vigilance committees were formed by the local leaders, and the Japanese Army welcomed their cooperation and assisted them. An army is bound to do as little damage to an occupied territory as possible, and the preservation of the means of civilized life was one of the first cares of the Japanese Army and was accomplished in this way. That these nuclei of government eventually coalesced and developed into a genuine state is no matter for astonishment and offers no occasion for invoking an imaginary Japanese stimulus. The country had been wretchedly governed and was only superior to China in this, - that it had one master and was not ravaged by the conflicts of half a dozen. It is no

wonder that its new administrators decided to be free of the Chang regime. To anyone acquainted with the actual conditions which prevailed in Manchuria before and after the 18th of September, 1931, it will be readily apparent that the widespread determination to get rid of the Chang administration was one which was easily capable of developing into a movement for the proclamation of complete independence. And in this connection, it should also be remembered that another movement - that for the Restoration of the Manchu Dynasty - is as old as the Republic of China, and has been connected throughout in a large degree with Manchuria, once the cradle of that Dynasty and later its own crown domain. The "independence movement," as it actually developed, can have caused no surprise to anyone with an intimate knowledge of these circumstances. And the supposition that it was wholly (p. 97, line 25), or partially (p. 97 line 33), the work of unidentified Japanese or of the Japanese General Staff must then be discarded.

According to the statements of the Report itself, all these movements in favour of local, provincial and state independence were the work of personages of high standing who were all Chinese, Manchus or Mongols. At Mukden, it was Dr. Chao Hsin-po, President of the Lawyers Association, Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, a former Vice-President of the North Eastern Political Committee under General Chang Hsueh-liang, Mr. Yu Chung-han, Vice-President of the Committee of Peace and Order, General Tsang Shih-yi, Governor of the Province of Fengtien. At Kirin, it was General Hsi Hsia, Acting President of the Provincial Government; at Harbin, it was General Chang Chin-hsi, Administrator of that Special District. And the persons who worked at the preparation of plans of the establishment of the new State were two Chinese, Mr. Yu Chang-han and General Tsang Shih-yi. The detailed organization of the state was framed, and the Declaration of Independence drawn up, by the principal men of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Jehol and the Special District, and by various Mongolian bannermen who assembled at Mukden. And Chinese, Manchus and Mongols alone comprised the North-Eastern Administrative Council, which formed the germ of the new State.

The evident inconsistency between the facts and the conclusions of the Commission becomes a sheer contradiction if we consider the dates. The Committee for the Preservation of Order in the region of Fengtien was established on 24 September and already on the 26th it was issuing declarations which contemplated the independence of that province and of the Three Eastern Provinces. On 26 September General Hsi Hsia declared the independence of the Province of Kirin. At Harbin, on 27 September, there was established a Committee for the Preservation of Order. On 1 October, General Chang Hsi-peng proclaimed his independence at Taonan. On 17 October General Yu Chi-shan, the Commander of the Liaoning Army of Defence, also declared his independence, demanding the foundation of a Manchu-Mongol state with the ex-Emperor as its ruler. Can it be supposed that between 18 September and these various independence movements, Japanese officials can have met together, concerted and agreed upon a programme of initiating independence, and secured its

being at once put in execution by Chinese, Manchus and Mongols as their own? It is more simple and more reasonable to conclude that the aspirations which were already floating in the minds of many of the leading Chinese and Manchu inhabitants spontaneously and naturally found a sphere of action hitherto denied them, upon the disappearance of an administration which presented so many objectionable features.

There can be no doubt that the idea of proclaiming independence, which had also a certain affinity with the idea of restoring the Manchu Dynasty, had its origin, therefore, entirely among the Chinese, Manches and Mongols. For instance, Mr. Chang Yin-ching (Manchoukuo Minister of Industry, Commerce and Agriculture, a son of Chang Chin-tung, the renowned scholar statesman under the Manchu regime) and Mr. Hsieh Chich-shih, the present Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo, were both prominent figures in the movement, particularly in the Restoration movement of the Manchu Dynasty. General Hsi Hsia, a Manchu and a noted monarchist, at present the Manchoukuo Minister of Finance, was also a leading member of the same group. Japanese officials were certainly cognizant of the tendency of these ideas; but whatever sympathy may have been felt for such projects by individuals, neither the Japanese Government nor the Headquarters Staff on the spot gave them any encouragement.

It is proper, in this connection, to point out the fact that both Baron Shidehara, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and General Minami, Minister of War, issued on the 26th of September instructions to the Japanese officials in Manchuria, strictly forbidding participation by Japanese in the various attempts to establish a new political authority in Manchuria.

Conformably with these instructions the Japanese, civil as well as military, uniformly abstained from interference. When the movement had become a definite one, the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army could evidently not ignore it, and when its leaders had matured and explained their plans, the movement was in a situation to command respect from the ultimately responsible for the preservation of order, as a development calculated to remove all disquieting elements by the definite establishment of a new regime.

As for the "Self-Government Guiding Board," to which the Report appears to attach some importance, this was not created until 10 November, and was under the management of a Chinese. Yet the Report turns it into an organ of the Fourth Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, "organized and in large part officered by Japanese." (p. 92) This is a mere repetition of the allegations in the Chinese Memorandum, corroborated, according to the Report by "reliable" witnesses, who are left unidentified, and it is completely at variance with the facts. There has always been at the Kwantung Army Headquarters a department for the study of political developments in Manchuria, and after 18 September, 1931, when the independence movements began to show themselves, this department in the fulfilment of its functions, had certainly to collect all the information that could be gathered concerning them. But this

department of the Headquarters had no connection whatever with the "Self-Government Guiding Board" organized under the management of Mr. Yu Chung-han, for the purpose of co-ordinating the action of the various committees for the preservation of peace, or for independence, which had already been constituted in the Province of Fengtien since the beginning of October. Dr. Chao Hsin-po recounted to the commission how the association of which he is President set to work, immediately after 18 September, to form an Independence Committee, which sent delegates to the various provincial districts to ascertain the opinions of the leading personages regarding the establishment of a new government.

Finally the Report makes the point that such a movement in favour of a change of government could not have been carried through. But for the presence of the Japanese troops. But the Japanese troops were there in the exercise of their just rights. They were stationed in the railway zone in virtue of a right derived from treaty, and they moved out of the zone in the exercise of the right of self-defence. If the independence movement took advantage of the conditions thus created, that altered in no wise the spontaneity of the movement. There are many instances in other Continents where the presence of foreign forces has afforded the possibility of attaining independence, and where that independence has never been questioned.

It may be urged that the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 prevents the Signatory Powers from impairing the sovereignty of China. That is true, but irrelevant. If in the due fulfilment of its lawful rights, a Signatory Power finds herself in Chinese territory, she cannot be held responsible for the consequences. If these consequences impair Chinese sovereignty and integrity, it is not she who is to blame. Even supposing, therefore, that Manchuria under General Chang Hsueh-liang was really an integral part of China, still Japan cannot be answerable for the consequences of her proper and necessary action. If China really were an organized state, exercising an integrity of administration in Manchuria, this would still be true.

In short, to deny that the present regime is to be regarded as the outcome of a natural and spontaneous movement is to admit that all the evidence presented by Manchoukuo has been disregarded. The "Histoire de l'Indépendance du Mandchoukouo" prepared by the Manchurian Government and presented to the Commission, contains an account of the successive demonstrations in favour of independence which took place in the various districts throughout the country. Here, we have precision and open declarations; names are given; the text of declarations and resolutions is reproduced. Commercial, industrial, agricultural, educational groups, sometimes numbering thousands of adherents, were represented at those demonstrations. For the Constituent Assembly, delegates were appointed in each district, in the accustomed fashion, by the accord of the four leading local associations, so that the General Assembly which on 29 February, 1932, proclaimed at Mukden the establishment of the new State was fully representative of every interest. And

it is singular that the Report, in sketching a practical system by which to ascertain the state of popular opinion on the conduct of a Manchurian Government suggests this very same traditional system of representations of the Chambers of Commerce, the Trade Guild and other civil agencies. (p.134)

In fine, the conclusions of the Commission in this section of Chapter VI run counter to the historic elements which underly the new regime, to the psychological and material causes which have called forth the surge of latent sentiments, and to all the facts which go to prove the spontaneous character of the independence movement among the people of Manchuria, which has had for its result the foundation of the new State.

The Japanese Government repeat, without fear of contradiction, that the movement for the proclamation of the independence of Manchuria was a genuine, spontaneous, popular and natural one. The old crown domain installed the descendant of its ancient chiefs as its ruler, to secure it alike from the oppressions of its quondam militarist tyrants and from the anarchy of China Proper. Why this eminently rational and natural step should be ascribed to the machinations of Japan, it is hard to imagine. The assertions that the chief agency in bringing about independence was an organ of the Kwantung Army Headquarters (p.92); that a group of Japanese officials conceived, organized and carried through this movement (p.97), and that the activities of Japanese officials were a "most effective" factor in the creation of Manchoukuo (*ibid*) are assertions destitute of foundation, contrary to the express assurance of this Government, and entirely unsupported by evidence. In putting them forward, the Report appears simply to have adopted wholesale the allegations of the Chinese Assessor.

#### B. ATTITUDE OF THE INHABITANTS TOWARDS MANCHOUKUO.

The Commission have had placed at their disposal as material upon which to form their opinion: -

1. Petitions and declarations emanating from qualified bodies composed of persons of various races (Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese, Koreans, Russians) representing chambers of commerce, political organizations, agricultural and educational organizations, etc.

2. Letters and other written communications to the number of 1550, transmitted by post or otherwise, and apparently coming from Chinese.

3. Private conversations with businessmen, bankers, professors, physicians, police officers and others.

A striking feature of this part of the Report is the great credit accorded to the letters of unknown Chinese, all but two of which are said to be unfavourable to Manchoukuo and Japan - and the little weight ascribed to official memoranda and to the petitions and declarations of responsible bodies, which enumerate the grievances which the population had against the late administration and which give voice to its aspirations and its hopes.

The Commission have received 1548 letters objecting to the foundation of the new State. Considering the vigour and activity of Chinese propaganda, it is really astonishing that they received no more. There are some 30,000,000 people in Manchuria, and if one in twenty thousand only was moved to communicate his desires to the Commission, the fact is rather a tribute to the credit of Manchoukuo than otherwise. On the other hand, the positive evidence afforded by gatherings of thousands of people in favour of Manchoukuo, supported by the testimony of responsible delegations and leading citizens, is simply dismissed as generally due to the machinations of the Japanese. It is surely intelligible that a people who had admittedly been systematically "squeezed", oppressed and defrauded by their rulers would not need the stimulus of Japanese threats and bribes to induce them to accept and approve a government which at least offered them a chance of security for the produce of their labour. Certainly the attitude of the farmers and workmen cannot be collected from the opinions of "foreigners and educated Chinese". (p. 109)

As to the other classes of the population (officials, police, soldiers, business men, bankers, etc.), the Report not only carefully takes note of anyone who is hostile, but discredits those who support Manchoukuo as being actuated by self-interest or by fear, and as moved by no patriotic ideals.

Lastly, the Report, insisting on the antagonism of the Chinese to Manchoukuo, tries to explain away the adhesion freely given to the new State by the Koreans, the Russians and the Mongols. The Report admits the welcome given by the Koreans to the new regime, but it cannot bring itself to do so ungrudgingly. It wonders how long the welcome will last. As for the Mongols, while recognizing their generally favourable attitude, the Report gives undue emphasis to one anti-Manchoukuo declaration made by a deputation of Mongol princes at Peiping under the aegis of General Chang Hsueh-liang.

The truth is fortunately more encouraging than the unfavourable picture drawn in the Report. It is needless to recall once more the many great popular demonstrations which immediately preceded the establishment of the new State, described as they are in detail in the document "Histoire de l'Indépendance du Mandchoukuo." Nor need there be enumerated here the signal marks of acceptance which, in spite of the efforts of the enemies of Manchoukuo, the population has continuously accorded to the new regime. It is a civil government, the first of this character that the people of the country have known since the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown, and this civil character stands out conspicuously in comparison with any of the autocratic militarist governments which at present bear rule in China.

### C. ORGANIZATION AND PROSPECTS OF MANCHOUKUO

The Report, after describing in Chapter VI the organization of Manchoukuo, its programme, and the various measures it has taken to affirm its independence from China, observes that: -

"The programme of this 'Government' contains a number of liberal reforms, the application of which would be desirable not only in Manchuria but also in the rest of China; in fact, many of these reforms figure equally in the programme of the Chinese Government. In their interviews with the Commission, the representatives of this 'Government' claimed that, with the help of the Japanese, they would be able to establish peace and order within a reasonable time and would thereafter be able to maintain it permanently. They expressed the belief that they would be able to secure the support of the people in time by assuring them an honest and efficient administration, security from bandit raids, lower taxation as the result of reduced military expenditure, currency reform, improved communications and popular political representation." (pp.105-106)

But from this promising material the Report only concludes that "after making every allowance for the short time which has hitherto been at the disposal of the 'Manchoukuo Government' for carrying out its policy, and after paying due regard to the steps already taken, there is no indication that this "Government" will, in fact, be able to carry out many of its reforms. To mention but one example, there seem to be serious obstacles in the way of the realization of their budgetary and currency reforms." (p.106)

The comments of the Commission on Manchoukuo above quoted present a curious contrast with certain comments offered in Chapter I, where we read: -

"The present Government has tried to balance its current receipts and expenditures and to adhere to sound financial principles. Various taxes have been consolidated and simplified. In default of a proper budgetary system, an annual statement has been issued by the Ministry of Finance. A Central Bank has been established. A National Financial Committee has been appointed, which includes among its members influential representatives of banking and commercial interests. The Ministry of Finance is also trying to supervise the finances of the provinces, where the methods of raising taxes are often still highly unsatisfactory. For all these new measures the Government is entitled to credit. . . . In many things, no doubt, the Government has failed, but it has already accomplished much." (pp.17-18)

It will be noted that while China is given credit for having accomplished much, in view of the various measures which are enumerated by the Commission, but which in fact have mostly failed to bring about any actual results, judgement on Manchoukuo is pronounced from Ebal and not from Gerizim.

The Japanese Government are not disposed to discuss the ground of the pessimistic opinion advanced by the Commission, because facts are more eloquent than words. However, the attention of the Council is called to two important points; namely, the steps for the restoration of peace and order, in which the Japanese Army is co-operating with the Government of Manchoukuo, and the financial condition of that Government.

That in a newly founded state peace and order should be disturbed by reactionaries and malcontents is a common phenomenon in all parts of the world. In the case of Manchoukuo, there is further to be observed the special circumstance that vast forces, enlisted in regular armies under the old regime, were upon the fall of that regime turned adrift to become hordes of bandits. The Government of Manchoukuo in their programme for the restoration of peace and order consider the first stage to be the destruction or dispersal of the major groups formed by these bandits; the second stage being the subjugation of the less important remnants, and of the smaller native bands of brigands, through the police system now in process of complete establishment, as well as by other administrative measures. At the same time they are improving the existing means of communication in order to facilitate the work of restoring order. It should be stated that much progress has been made in the accomplishment of the work of the first stage above indicated since the time when the Commission were in Manchuria. The forces under the command of General Ma Chan-shan, by far the most formidable foe to the new State, have been destroyed. Those under General Li Hai-ching have been beaten. Those under Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu have been driven into the remote regions north of the Eastern Section of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The strong brigand bands which infested an area between the Mukden-Hailung Railway and the River Yalu and constituted the principal source of danger in South Manchuria, have been annihilated by the joint forces of Japan and Manchoukuo. Other major groups in South Manchuria are being driven into remote places along the border between Mukden and Jehol. Generally speaking, the present situation throughout Manchuria, North and South, is such as to make it possible for the Government of Manchoukuo to embark upon the second, or police, part of their programme.

Regarding the present condition of banditry in Manchuria, the significant fact should not be forgotten that all these soldier-bandits are receiving support from China Proper. It is sufficient to point to the public collection of funds for the assistance of the Manchurian bandits, which is conducted in various Chinese cities, without adverting to the many cases in which such support is secretly given.

It should also be noted that of late in proportion to the lessening of that menace to peace and order which arises from the activities of major groups of bandits, the operations of the numerous minor bands have come more and more to display the character of political tactics. For the instance, the recent activities of bandits and kidnappers in Manchuria have mainly been directed against foreigners, thus casting discredit upon the newly established nation. This is believed to be a deliberate attempt on the part of the anti-Manchoukuo element in China to make present conditions ap-

pear worse than before.

Mr. Hig, the Japanese Government, whilst anticipating that the complete restoration of peace and order in Manchuria will require some considerable time, as indeed it would anywhere in similar circumstances, are content to repeat the expression of their confident belief, quoted in the Report, that the presence of the Japanese troops in the country will enable the principal bandit units to be wiped out within from two to three years: and they adopt as their own the words in which the Commission describe their attitude: -

"They hope that the organization of 'Manchoukuo' police and of self-defence corps in each community will help to put an end to banditry. Many of the present bandits are believed to have been peaceful citizens who on account of the complete loss of their property were induced to take up their present occupation. Given the opportunity of resuming the occupation of farming, it is hoped they will return to their former peaceful mode of life." (p.83)

As regards the financial condition of Manchoukuo, the Council can easily see how unfounded is the gloomy view contained in the Report by referring to the following information supplied by the Government of Manchoukuo.

From the foundation of the State on 1 March, 1932, to 30 June of the same year (the first year of Tatung) the income and expenditure of the Central Government are as follows: -

Income: (Income from taxes and from the Salt Gabelle) 9,300,000 yuan.

Paid out: 9,100,000 yuan.

This indicates a fair better financial status than existed at the time of the visit of the Commission of Enquiry.

Subsequently, Manchoukuo has taken over the Maritime Customs (in June) and has abolished the finance offices of the various provinces (in July), thus proceeding rapidly with its task of centralizing and strengthening the financial structure. As a result of these measures, its budget for the first year of Tatung (from 1 July, 1932, to 30 June, 1933) is based upon the following estimate:

Annual income: 101,000,000 yuan

Annual expenditure: 113,000,000 yuan

This indicates a very satisfactory condition. (Incidentally the military expenditure in this budget totals 33,000,000 yuan, i.e., about one third of the 100,000,000 yuan expended in 1930; and while the budget shows a deficit of 12,000,000 yuan, it must be noted that the budget allows for an emergency reserve fund of 15,000,000 yuan).

The Central Bank of Manchoukuo, founded with a capital of 30,000,000 yuan, took over from provincial banks of the old regime 142,000,000 yuan in notes in circulation against which it has a specie reserve of 82,000,000 yuan and a guarantee fund of 60,000,000 yuan. It opened for business on 1 July.

In this connection it is interesting to observe that the Bank of Japan opened for business in 1882 with a silver capital of ¥ 10,000,000 and successfully unified all the paper currency issued by various national banks; and that the capital of the Manchoukuo Central Bank is sufficient if one takes into due consideration the economic status, the trade conditions and the population of Manchuria.

The Manchoukuo Government, respecting the independence of the bank, are taking every precaution not to interfere with the functions of the institution as a note-issuing bank, and therefore it may safely be said that to declare that the basis of the Central Bank and Manchurian currency is unstable is a flagrant error. As a point of fact, the Central Bank, since its establishment four months ago, has maintained its paper currency at par, and has stabilized the currency, the circulation of which is very normal. It may be remarked that this shows a signal contrast to the actual state of things under the Cheng Dynasty.

Manchuria, having an excess of exports, receives a large amount of silver from abroad. Therefore, there is no doubt that Manchoukuo will be able to maintain the value of its currency.

The Japanese Government desire, further, to give emphatic expression to their opinion formed upon mature consideration regarding the future prospects of the country.

Manchoukuo has before it a brilliant future. With a great extent of territory and large population, it has the advantage of possessing natural frontiers. Its Government have spontaneously declared that they intend to respect all international engagements made by China, so far as they are applicable to Manchuria, and that they will faithfully observe the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity. They entertain no anti-foreign sentiments. There is no communist peril, such as exists in China. Manchoukuo is still in its infancy, but would it not have been an act of straightforward justice on the part of the Commission, who have shown themselves, in spite of all discouragements, so sympathetic towards China, to exhibit some degree of patience with a state scarcely six months old?

In so far as the Report's observations concern the Japanese Government, they would prefer not to dwell upon the purely gratuitous suppositions contained in the Report, to the effect that all political and administrative power in Manchoukuo is in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers. The Report indeed notes the occasional divergence of opinion between these officials and the Tokio Government, but it states that the Japanese officials possess

all the means of exerting irresistible pressure on the Manchoukuo Government. This, it remarks, flows from the fact of military occupation and through the dependence of Manchoukuo on the Japanese troops for the maintenance of its sovereignty and independence.

These allegations can certainly not command the attention of the League of Nations. There are, and there have been, numerous states, universally acknowledged to be independent, which employ the services of many officials of one or more foreign nationalities, and others which have foreign troops stationed within their territory. The Members of the League of Nations have only recently admitted that the presence of such foreign troops is no obstacle to the admission of a state as a Member of that Society.

Finally, the Report emphasizes (p.106) the difficulty that was experienced by the Commission in defining the relations between Japan and Manchoukuo. That difficulty has now disappeared through the signature of the Protocol of 15 September, 1932, which reads: -

"Whereas Japan has recognized the fact that Manchoukuo, in accordance with the free will of its inhabitants, has organized and established itself as an independent State; and

"Whereas Manchoukuo has declared its intention of abiding by all international engagements entered into by China in so far as they are applicable to Manchoukuo;

"Now the Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo have, for the purpose of establishing a perpetual relationship of good neighbourhood between Japan and Manchoukuo, each respecting the territorial rights of the other, and also in order to secure the peace of the Far East, agreed as follows: -

1. Manchoukuo shall confirm and respect, in so far as no agreement to the contrary shall be made between Japan and Manchoukuo in the future, all rights and interests possessed by Japan or her subjects within the territory of Manchoukuo by virtue of the Sino-Japanese treaties, agreements or other arrangements or of Sino-Japanese contracts, private as well as public:

2. Japan and Manchoukuo, recognizing that any threat to the territory or to the peace and order of either of the High Contracting Parties constitutes at the same time a threat to the safety and existence of the other, agree to co-operate in the maintenance of their national security; it being understood that such Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose shall be stationed in Manchoukuo."

It is scarcely necessary to point out that nothing in this Protocol, nor in the acts of Japan in co-operating with the new Government thus established, is inconsistent with any of the public engagements of this country. By the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, she joined in an undertaking to respect the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. That undertaking was never intended to exempt China from the usual accidents

of state life, and to deprive the people of China of the right of self-determination and of securing themselves a sound and acceptable government. It is an inevitable corollary from this that the signatories cannot be disabled from recognizing such a fait accompli. As required by the necessities of international intercourse. In the same way, the 10th Article of the Covenant of the League of Nations is an engagement to respect and preserve the territorial integrity of Members of the League ~~As~~ against external aggression." If by internal developments the territorial integrity of a Member is impaired, there is nothing in the Covenant to interfere with the right and duty of Members to recognize that impairment. To hold otherwise would be to deny the basis on which many European and most American States subsist.

#### CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS

In the observations advanced above, the Japanese Government have set forth the following positions:

1. That China has, since the Revolution of 1911, fallen into a condition of confusion bordering upon anarchy, and remains in the same condition at the present moment; that so long as such a state of affairs persists, China may properly be considered as in a condition of national disintegration, and that at least under present circumstances it is entirely impossible to tell when China may come to have a strong and permanent central government, even if we grant the ultimate possibility of that event.
2. That, because of the fact that such a state of affairs prevails in China, foreign lives and property cannot be afforded adequate protection, and that especially in recent years the situation has been aggravated as a result of the intensification of internal conflict and the operation of the so-called "revolutionary" foreign policy of the Kuomintang directed against foreign Powers.
3. That consequently foreign Powers have continued to exercise exceptional powers and privileges in China of a character now without parallel elsewhere in the world, such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, settlements and concessions, the maintenance of garrisons and the permanent stationing of warships in inland waters.
4. That while all foreign Powers having interests in China have suffered from the anarchical condition and anti-foreign policy of China, Japan has suffered by far the most severely.
5. That Japan stands in the most intimate relation, geographically and historically, to Manchuria; that she possesses in that region important treaty rights besides vast economic interests, while great numbers of her people are settled there; that, moreover, the question of her own national security makes Japan vitally interested in Manchuria both from a political and a strategic point of view: - in fine, that Japan's position in Manchuria is an altogether exceptional and special one, unparalleled in other parts of the world.

6. That of late years the former Manchurian authorities resorted to various intrigues with a view to undermining this special position, and that after the rapprochement of General Chang Hsueh-liang with the National Government the encroachments of the Manchurian authorities upon the rights and interests of Japan became increasingly frequent and flagrant, despite Japan's earnest efforts to ameliorate the situation, producing an alarming state of tension.

7. That it was in this strained atmosphere that the events of 18 September occurred; that none of the measures taken by the Japanese Army at the time of that incident, or subsequently, exceeded the limits of the right of self-defence; and that Japan must on any impartial consideration be pronounced to have done precisely what any other Power would have done in similar circumstances

8. That Manchuria has always occupied a separate position, historically as well as geographically, in relation to China Proper, and that its inhabitants bitterly resented the tyrannous rule of the Changs, and opposed the latter's policy which dragged Manchuria into the civil turmoil of China Proper; - that from this geographic and historical circumstance, coupled with the popular opposition to the Chang family, there sprang the movement known as "Preserve the frontiers and give us peace"; - that the foundation of Manchoukuo was accomplished by the spontaneous action of the Manchurians with this movement, coupled with the Manchu Restoration Movement, as its main-spring; - that Manchoukuo is making steady progress guided by sound policy, and has a highly promising future before it; - and finally, that the attitude of Japan towards the establishment of Manchoukuo and her eventual formal recognition of that State do not violate any international engagement whatever.

In order therefore to understand correctly the questions at issue, it is necessary to bear constantly in mind these positions. First, that the abnormal conditions of China are such as can scarcely qualify her to be a modern organized state, and that because of this abnormal condition other Powers have, in order to protect their own interests by themselves, retained extraordinary powers and privileges which operate as limitations on Chinese sovereignty, and have been accustomed, whenever those rights were threatened or injured, to make use of these extraordinary powers. Second, that this aspect of the foreign relations of China Proper becomes more pronounced in the case of Manchuria as far as Japan is concerned, because of her special position there and the special position which Manchuria itself occupies in relation to China Proper. The fact must be thrown into relief that the Chinese problem, and especially the Manchurian problem, are characterized by exceptional complexity and by abnormal features, which are to be found nowhere else. Consequently, in handling the quite abnormal problem it is difficult to apply the formulae commonly employed in dealing with international questions under ordinary circumstances, nor can the procedure employed in handling such an abnormal question or any solution that may eventually be reached thereon establish precedents for ordinary cases of international dispute. With regard to this point the Report contains a significant passage at the beginning of Chapter IX: -

"It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapters that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighbouring country, because in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world." (p.126)

The above are put forward as the fundamental views of the Japanese Government with regard to the Chinese problem, and particularly the Manchurian problem. A few observations may not be offered, on the basis of these fundamental views, on some of the points advanced in Chapters IX and X of the Report.

One paragraph in Chapter IX reads: -

"It must be clear from everything that we have already said that a mere restoration of the status quo ante would be no solution. Since the present conflict arose out of the conditions prevailing before last September, to restore these conditions would merely be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It would be to treat the whole question theoretically and to leave out of account the realities of the situation." (p.127)

The statement has the unreserved concurrence of this Government. But they cannot agree with the opinion recorded in the same Chapter to the effect that the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria would be an equally unsatisfactory course to adopt. In fact, even if all the passages in the Report bearing on the point were accepted for the sake of argument, it is impossible to admit that such an opinion can be arrived at as a necessary deduction. The Japanese Government's view has already been stated that a solution based upon the maintenance and recognition of Manchoukuo would in no way be in contravention of the fundamental principles of international obligation. It has further been stated that such a solution would satisfy the aspirations of the Manchurians. Moreover, the expectation may be confidently entertained that the Chinese people themselves will ultimately come to realize that such a solution alone can stabilize relations between Japan and China and ensure peace in the Orient. At any rate, it can never be supposed that the dissolution of the new State, which has been set up and is making rapid and healthy progress, can really be a course adapted to "existing realities". It is the belief of the Japanese Government that in view of the necessity of handling and regulating these matters in accordance with the realities of the situation, it cannot be a commendable policy to ignore the impressive fact of the existence of Manchoukuo, or to leave that State devoid of international intercourse.

Japan, because of the important and special position which she occupies in Manchuria, cannot afford to leave the country and her relations with it in a state of instability and uncertainty. For the above stated reasons Japan considers the general recognition of Manchoukuo and international co-operation for the purpose of fostering its healthy development, as the only solution which is adapted to existing circumstances and which will stabilize conditions in Manchuria and bring peace to the Far East. It is believed that any other country placed in Japan's position would have come to the same conclusion and would have followed the same course. It was for this reason that the Japanese Government signed the Protocol of 15 September which is based upon the above essential conditions and defines clearly the relations between the two countries. A foundation has thereby been laid down in an amicable manner for the protection of Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria, for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Manchoukuo, and for the assurance of Manchurian safety against external and internal menaces; in this way contributing in no small degree to the securities for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

Upon this point a passage, occurring at the beginning of Chapter X of the Report, may be regarded as pertinent.

"It is with this object that, whilst bearing in mind the principles of the League of Nations, the spirit and letter of the Treaties concerning China and the general interests of peace, we have not overlooked existing realities, and have taken account of the administrative machinery existing and in process of evolution in the Three Eastern Provinces. It would be the function of the Council, in the paramount interests of world peace, whatever may be the eventuality, to decide how the suggestions made in our Report may be extended and applied to events which are still developing from day to day, always with the object of securing a durable understanding between China and Japan by utilizing all the sound forces, whether in ideals or persons, whether in thought or action, which are at present fermenting in Manchuria." (p. 132)

The council of the League of Nations, in studying the Report with due regard to the view of the Commission expressed in this passage, must necessarily desire to acquire a full comprehension of, and satisfactory information regarding, the course of events as it develops from day to day, which will be found to exhibit continued confusion in China Proper and steady progress on the part of Manchoukuo. In this connection the Japanese Government are at all times prepared to furnish the Council with any further information at their disposal, so that, in accordance with what was said in the introduction to these observations, the Members of the Council may have a thorough acquaintance with every aspect of the complex situation.

As regards certain suggestions contained in Chapter X of the Report, that Chapter opens with a statement that "it is not the function of the Commission to submit directly to the Governments of China and Japan recommendations for the solution of the present

dispute" (p.132), which is a right and proper observation in view of the Commission's terms of reference. The Report itself brings out the point clearly that these suggestions are merely intended as an illustration of one way in which the various principles contained in Chapter IX might be carried into practical effect. Moreover, the Commission themselves show the tentative and contingent nature of these suggestions, in adding the following observations:-

"Even if the formal recognition of 'Manchukuo' by Japan should take place before our Report is considered in Geneva - an eventuality which we cannot ignore - we do not think that our work will have been rendered valueless. We believe that, in any case, the Council would find that our Report contains suggestions which would be helpful for its decisions or for its recommendations to the two great Powers concerned, with the object of satisfying their vital interests in Manchuria." (p.132)

In other words, the Commission recognized, by the vague terms in which they attached some continuing importance to their suggestions in such an event, that a certain amount of doubt would be cast upon the utility of these suggestions in case the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan should have taken place. It would, therefore, seem unnecessary to enter into detailed discussions of these suggestions. In order further to elucidate the position, however, the following brief remarks on certain features of these suggestions may be ventured.

a) As we shall see, Principle 10 of Chapter IX would be liable to result in an international control of China Proper. In the same way, the still more important suggestions contained in Chapter X would amount in practice to a disguised international control of Manchuria, which is certain to be rejected by Manchukuo. Nor from the stand-point of Japan can these suggestions be regarded as acceptable.

b) These suggestions appear moreover to be of too refined and intricate a nature. They might prove suitable, if applied to Europe and America, but would not prove adaptable to the realities of the Far East as they at present exist. Such a plan as is advanced by the Commission calls for the minimum requirement that the disputant parties shall each possess a strong and reliable central government. To attempt to apply these suggestions to the solution of the Manchurian question, which is one of unprecedented complexity, and one in which one Party does not possess a strong and reliable central government, is to make confusion worse confounded.

c) The Japanese Government cannot persuade themselves that the suggestion of demilitarizing Manchuria, maintaining peace and order there by a special international gendarmerie alone, would adapt itself to the realities of the situation. It is questionable whether even in Europe, peace and order could possibly be adequately maintained throughout a territory so vast as Manchuria by such a system. It could never meet the desires of the Manchurians, and would be a source of great anxiety to the Japanese Government as it would foment unrest and disturbances in that region, which is exactly what Japan desires above everything to avoid. Thus the

The question is extremely unsatisfactory in that it would make matters worse than the restoration of the status quo ante, which is rejected by the Commission themselves.

So much for the concrete suggestions. We now come to a little more abstract matter, viz., the principles for the solution of the dispute on which these tentative suggestions are based. The Commission took pains to define in Chapter IX "the general principles to which any satisfactory solution would conform," and it was in supposed conformity with these principles, that the plan of settlement in Chapter X was elaborated. Certain of these principles to which the Japanese Government have no fundamental objection, have already found concrete application in the Protocol signed by Japan and Manchukuo. But, in any view of the matter, it must evidently be impossible, so long as the anarchical state of things in China persists, to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the questions at issue on the basis of the first nine of these principles, especially Principles 4-9 inclusive. As is sustained in Principle 10, these nine principles cannot be practically applied "without a strong central government in China." In order to help a strong central government to come into being in China, international co-operation in the task of internal reconstruction is certainly desirable. Any international co-operation (apart from technical assistance), for that purpose is, however, a remote contingency and extremely difficult to attain, unless indeed such co-operation were to take the form of an international control of China. Moreover, even granting that such an international co-operation were possible, there would be no assurance that in that way a strong central government would forthwith be brought into being. Japan cannot idly wait for such an uncertain eventuality in order to solve the Manchurian question.

Such being the case, any scheme that might tend to destroy that peace and order which is now in process of restoration will inevitably usher in a new era of disputes and difficulties. Would it not then be better statesmanship to work at least for the stabilization of conditions in Manchuria? Should not the world, which has manifested to much patience and sympathy regarding the reconstruction of China throughout these past twenty years, come to entertain sentiments of understanding and hope concerning the new State of Manchukuo? When the Manchurian question shall have once been settled, the settlement of the far greater question of China itself will be materially simplified. It can hardly be the subject of doubt that the advent of peace and a good and efficient administration in Manchuria will set an example which it would be well for China to follow, and will exert a favourable influence upon her attitude and divert her domestic and foreign policies into sane and moderate channels, not only bringing happiness to the Chinese people, but allowing other nations to share the resultant benefits.

(translation)

Certificate on Compilation of a Document

I, HORIUCHI Kensuke, the President of the United Nations Study Association, hereby certify that the attached document, printed both in English and in Japanese, consisting of 138 pages and entitled "Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry" is a document which was published by the KOKUSATRENMEI (or League of Nations) Association, and which is based upon an official document of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,  
on this 21st day of January, 1947.

The President of the United Nations  
Study Association Incorporated Jurist  
HORIUCHI Kensuke (Seal)

I hereby certify that the above was signed and sealed in  
my presence

At the above-mentioned date and place  
(On the same day, at the same place.)

Witness: MATSUSHITA Masatoshi. (Seal)

DEF LOC # 189

「リットン」報告書ニ對スル帝國政府意見書

目

次

論

論

論

一頁

第一章 支那

洲

二四五

第二章 滿洲

四六

第三章 九月十八日ノ事件及其ノ後ノ軍事行動

一

第四章 新國家

五九

第五章 結論

八九

論

論

論

一

論

論

論

一

論

論

論

一

論

論

論

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論

委員會日本政府へ  
助ヒンコト援  
切セリト  
望セリト

日本政府ハ國際聯盟ニ依リ任命セラレタル調査委員會ノ提出セ  
ル報告書ニ對シ、該文書ノ重要件ニ鑑ミ、極メテ慎重ナル検討  
ヲ加ヘタリ。

日本政府ハ終始調査委員會ニ對シテ各般ノ情報ヲ供給シ其ノ調  
査ヲ容易ナラシムルコトニ全力ヲ注キタル次第ナルカ、調査委  
員等カニ常ニシテ新規ナル多數ノ問題ヲ包含スル機微且複雜ナ  
ル事態ニ付テ其ノ詳細ヲ知悉セシカ爲傾例セル努力ヲ衷心ヨリ  
多トスルモノナリ。

時間短  
キニ過ク

只委員會ノ任務タル極メテ困難ニシテ、而モ與ヘラレタル時日  
ノ甚タ短カリシニ鑑ミ、報告書中隨所ニ脱漏、矛盾及誤解ヲ認  
ムルハ蓋シ已ムヲ得サル所ナルヘシ。事態ニ對スル十分ナル智  
識ヲ獲得スルニハ一ヶ年ト雖モ長シトセス、然ルニ一行ハ滿洲  
ニ備カ六週間ヲ、又北平及南京ノ零圃氣中ニ數週間ヲ過シタル  
ニ止マルヲ以テ、勢ヒ委員ニ比シ支那語及支那ノ實狀ニ通曉セ

妙ニハ新著  
ナル點ノ見  
ニ付意見ヲ  
シトス

ル人々ノ供給スル情報乃至其ノ抱懷スル見解ニ倚頼スルノ外ナ  
ク、從テ其ノ受ケタル印跡ハ幡ル皮相ナルヲ免レス。委員カ今  
少シタ長時日ヲ有シ且支那ノ他ノ部分特ニ南支ヲモ訪問シタラ  
シニハ、支那ノ事態ニ關シ其ノ表示セル樂觀ハ著シク變更セラ  
レタルナルヘシ。

日本政府ハ報告書中其ノ不當ナリト認ムル凡テハ點リ指摘シ  
トスルモノニ非ス、又末節ノ事項ニ關シ拘羅別扶セムトスルモ  
ノニモ非ス。報告書ハ全體トシテハ殊ニ其ノ敍述的部品ニ於テ  
事件ノ摘要トシテ其ノ價值ヲ認ムルヲ得ヘシ。即ヨリ是等ノ點  
ニ付テ必後日改テ意見ヲ提出スルノ機利ハ放棄ハルモノニ非  
サルモ、茲ニハ差當リ事實ノ眞相ヲ明カニスル目的ヲ以テ最モ  
重要ナル真摯ニ關シ若干ノ意見ヲ提示スルニ止ムントス。

日本政府ハ是等意見ヲ提出スルニ當リ、委員會カ誠心誠意ヲ以  
テ報告書ヲ作成セルコトニ對シ敢テ疑念ヲ挾マムトスルモノニ  
非サルハ勿論ナルモ、同時ニ例ヘハ日本政府提出ニ係ル資料等

充證機ノ取捨  
分ナラス

ジ斯八特  
然國日事件及  
リ家ニ  
關

ノ如キ出所確實ナル各種ノ情報カ看過又ハ無視セラレ、之ニ反  
シ出所不明ノ疑ハシキ情報ニ對シ不當ノ信用與ヘラレタルノ嫌  
アルコトヲ痛感スルモノナリ。

委員會カ兩當時間ニ正式ニ交換セラレタル書類ノ外、新聞記事、  
偶々入手シル私信並ニ委員自身及其ノ専門委員等カ何等特別ノ  
資格ヲ有セサル個人ト爲シタル私的談話等ニ其ノ斷定ノ基礎ヲ  
置キタルノ事實ハ報告書面ニモ明カニシテ、右ハ日本政府、默  
過シ得サル所ナリ。而シテ此ノ種出所ノ不眞且不確實ナル資料  
カ常ニ日本ノ主張ニ對スル支那ノ主張ヲ支持スル爲ニ利用セラ  
レ居ルコトハ注目ニ倣ス。日本政府ハ各個ノ場合ニ付斯ル資料  
ノ出所ヲ確メテ之ヲ反駁スルノ方法ナカリシヲ以テ、是等ノ資  
料ニ對シ如何ナル程度ノ信用カ與ヘラルヘキヤフ印カニスル爲  
更ニ調査ヲ爲スノ権利ヲ留保セサルフ得ス。

此ノ種ノ疑ハシキ又ハ償償ナキ證據ヲ認容セルコトハ九月十八  
日事件及滿洲國成立ニ關スル部分ニ於テ特ニ顯著ナリ。其ノ結

事態全般ヲ  
考観セサル  
へ力ラス

日本國民ハ  
支那ニ有對  
非スルモ

果ハ前者ノ場合ニ於テハ日本軍行動ノ動機ニ對スル完全ナル誤解トナリ、後者ノ場合ニ於テハ滿洲將來ノ統治ニ關シ報告書ノ他ノ部分ノ趣旨トモ一致セス又現實ノ事態トモ一致セサル提案トナレリ。

今後極東平和確保ノ方法ヲ討究スルニ當リ、國際聯盟トシテハ支那及滿洲ニ於ケル實情全般ニ付、報告書ノ作成後ニ起レル事件ヲモ併セ考観スルニ力メサルヘカラス。日本政府力本意見書ヲ作成セルハ、聯立ノ右努力ニ對シ及フ限りノ援助ヲ供シ、聯盟各國ヲシテ現實ノ事態ヲ凡ユル關係ニ於テ日隨ニ理解セシメンカ爲ニ外ナサズ。

本意見書中自カラ支那人ノ行爲ニ對シ批難ヲ加ヘタル節アルモ報告書中ニ間々潛在スルカ如キ日本ハ支那國民ニ對シ反感又ハ敵意ヲ有ストノ觀念ハ之ヲ否定セサルヘカラス。日本政府ハ支那國民カ甚シク誤解レル指導ト恐怖政治トノ種事件トナリ、日外部ニ對シ多大ノ誤解ヲ與ヘ居ルモ、彼等ノ欲スル所ハ平和及靜穩

ノ裡ニ其ノ勵勞ノ成果ヲ享受セムトスルニ外ナラサルコトヲ信  
フル也ノナリ。日本ハ年來ノ友説的態度ヲ維持シ、日支兩國民  
間ニ情好リ通セ、以テ繁榮且善隣ノ實ヲ擧クルノ時期ノ到來ス  
ルヲ信マセレナリ。

第一章 支那

イ、一般考察

報告書カ洲洲ニ於ケル事照ヲ論計スルニ付テ、第一章ニ於テ支  
那ノ一般的の狀況ヲ述ヘ、其ノ國內ノ現狀ヲ端窺セント終メタル  
ハ誠ノモ學究ニ適スル所ナリ。

不吉ニシテ報告書ハ、委員會ノ爲セル調査カ否ニ不完全ナルノ  
ミナミス、皮相的ナルコトヲ暴露セリ。蓋シ報告書中ニモ主ト  
シテ實際ノ見聞ニ基ク正確ナル判断ノ勢ナカラサルハ事實ナル  
モ、是等折角ノ見聞及判断モ樂觀ノ端ニ包マレ、爲ニ遺恨ノ事  
情ニ通セサルモノヲ感感シ眞相ヲ認ラシムルノ憾アリ。

支那ハ組織  
アル國家ニ  
非ス

委員會ハ「支那ハ組織アル國家ニ非ス」<sup>一</sup>、「支那ハ完全ナル混沌且思想外ノ無政府狀態ニ在リ」<sup>二</sup>ト云フカ  
如キ敘述ヲ意外トスルモノノ如シ。即チ委員會ハ、華府會議當時北京及廣東ニ完全ニ分離ケル二個ノ政府存立シ、匪賊跳梁シテ屢々内地ノ交通ヲ妨害シ、而シテ數ヶ月後中央政府ヲ顛覆シ滿洲ニ第三ノ獨立政府ヲ樹立セシムルニ至シル内亂ノ氣運醸醸シツツアリシコトヲ述へ、要スルニ支那ニ於テ一若干ノ省又ハ城ノ一部ヲ事實上自治狀態ニ在リタルハ勿論、少クニモ獨立ヲ主張スル三個ノ政府存在スル」<sup>三</sup>ハ拘テス、華府會議參加國ハ支那に對シ前記ノ敘述トハ全ク異ナリタル態度ヲ執リタル旨ヲ指摘シ居シ<sup>四</sup>（一七頁）

該府會議當時ノ事態ハ決シテ満足ナルモノニハ非サリシモ、當時ハ於テハ僅ニ三個ノ主要勢力ノ對抗ヲ見タルノミ。然ルニ今日ニ於テハ支那ハ全ク支離滅裂ノ狀態ニ在リ、外蒙古及西藏ハ殆ト完全ニ離脱シ、南京國民政府ハ各地方ノ權力者殊ニ廣東ニ

實

其ノ後ノ  
假想會  
切ノ情

於ケル南方派ノ服從ヲ贏チ得サルノミナラス、現ニ湖北、福建及江西ノ諸省ニ中心ヲ有スル共匪ノ大集團ノ脅威ヲ受ケ居ル状況ナリ。

是等權力者ノ多クハ何レモ自ラ首長トナリ支那ヲ統一セムコトヲ夢想シ居ルヤモ知レサルモ、此ノ故ヲ以テ報告鳥ノ動モスレハ所定セムトスルカ如ク支那ヲ以テ統一セリト爲スコトヲ得る華府會議當時ニ於テハ支那カ速カニ統一平和ヲ恢復スヘシトノ希望ヲ懷クコト不可能ニハ非サリシモ、其ノ後ノ情勢ハ右希望ヲ裏切レリ。其ノ不統一及無政府状態ハ益々悪化ノ度ヲ加ヘタリ。諸將領ノ鬭争ハ支那ノ政治機構中ニ織り込マレ、共産主義ハ國土ノ中根ニ深ク喰人リ、内争ノ習慣ハ全般ニ浸潤シ風土病化スルニ至レリ。華府會議當時ニ比シ事態カ改善セリト爲スハ道理無限ヲ閉チムトスルハ樂觀主義カ、然ラスンハ現地ノ状況ヲ認識シ得サリシニ基クモノト講フヘキノミ。

例

日本政府ハ報告書第一七所述ノ支那ノ現状ニ關スル判断中正當

ニシテ有力ナルモノノ妙ナカラサルヲ認ム。

即チ報告書ハ第一三頁ニ於テ「政治的擾亂、内亂、社會的及經濟的不安定並ニ其ノ結果タル中央政府ノ萎縮ハ一九一一年ノ革命以來支那ノ特徵ト爲リタリ。是等ノ状態ハ支那ト接觸シ來レル一切ノ國家ニ不利ナル影響ヲ及ホシ來レルモノニシテ、匡救セラルル迄至ル迄ハ常ニ世界平和ニ對スル脅威タルヘク、又世界經濟不況ヲ助成スル一原因タルヘシ」トナシ、

第一四頁ニ於テ、日支兩國力當面シタル外國文明ノ同化及之ニ基ク國內改革ニ關スル附問題ヲ論シ、支那ノ「領土ノ廣大ナルコト、支那國民ニ國家の統一ノ缺如セルコト、及徵收セラレタル收入ノ全部カ中央國庫ニ到達セサル傳統的財政組織」ニ基ク支那ノ特殊ノ状態ヲ強調シ、「支那ノ外國人ヲ受入ルコトニ對ス、嫌惡及支那在住外國人ニ對スル支那ノ態度ハ當然重大ナル結果ヲ生ムヘヤモノナリシ」コト、及「右ハ其ノ爲政者ノ注目ヲ外國人ノ勢力ニ對ヘル反抗及其ノ制限ニ集中セシメタル」

コトヲ記載シ、「其ノ結果トシテ支那ヲシテ新シキ情狀ニ善處シ得シムル爲ニ必要ナル建設的改革ハ殆ト全ク頗ミラレサリシ」コトヲ附記シ、

第一六頁ニ於テ、一九一四年乃至二八年「支那ハ各軍閥間ノ戰爭ニ依リ荒廃セラレ、當時ニ存在スル賊兵ハ零落セル農夫、飢餓ニ至ハレタル諸地方ノ絶望セル住民及給料不渡リノ兵士等ヲ編入シテ屬正ノ軍隊ト奉フ所ナキニ至レリ。南方ニ於テ戰ヒツツアリシ立憲主義ノ人士サヘモ幾度トナク彼等自身ノ中ニ發生スル軍閥間ノ確執ノ偏諱ニ嘆サレタル一事實ヲ回想シ、

第一六頁一一七頁ニ於テ、一九二七年南京ニ政府ノ樹立セラルルヤ該民黨ハ「今ヤ其ノ政治的及經濟的再建ノ計畫ヲ實行スルノ用意成リタルモ、内部ノ不和、私的軍隊ヲ有スル諸將軍ノ定期的叛亂及共產主義ノ脅威ノ爲ニ實行シ得サリキ。實際ニ於テ中央政府ハ幾度トナク夫レ自體ノ生存ノ爲ニ戰フコト必要ナリ

一旨ヲ記載シ、

權中  
セラ力央  
ハ政  
シト前記  
和記主  
セト記述  
張り認ノ

最後ニ第一七頁ニ於テ「外見上統一ハ暫時保留セラレタリ。然レトモ有力ナル軍閥カ相互ニ連合シ南京ニ向ヒ進軍セル場合ニハ統一ノ外觀スラモ保持スルコト不可能ナリキ。是等軍閥ハ未タ曾テ目的ヲ達セサリシモ彼等ハ戰敗ノ後ニ於テモ輕視シ得サル洋勢力タリキ。加フルニ彼等ハ決シテ中央政府ニ對スル戰爭ハ叛逆行爲ナリトノ解釋ヲ採ラサリキ。彼等ノ眼ヨリ見レハ是等ノ戰爭ハ單ニ彼等ノ黨派ト偶々國都ニ在在シ諸外國ニ依リ中央政府トシテ承認セラレタル他ノ黨派トノ間ノ爭戰ニ過キサリキ」ト述ヘ、「右概括的敍述ヨリ見ルニ支那ノ崩壞的勢力ハ今猶優勢ナルモノノ如シ」トノ結論ニ達シ居レリヘ一七頁一  
以上ノ敍述ハ全然正當ナルカ、右敍述ハ同一章ニ表示セラレタル樂觀的見解、例ヘハ第一七頁ノ「現在ニ於テハ中央政府ノ權威ハ尙甚干ノ省ニ於テ保弱ナリト雖モ中央ノ權力ハ少クトモ公然トハ否認セラルルコ「ナシ」トノ所定ト如何ニシテ之ヲ調和シ得ヘキヤ。」

## 最近ノ事態

諸將領間ノ戰闘ヲ容易ニ経験スルニ至テサルハ報告書作成後ノ最近ノ事實ニ徵スル所見瞭ニシテ、北方ニ於テハ國民政府ノ命令ニモ拘ラス劉珍年及韓復榘ハ九月中旬以來敵對行爲ヲ繼續シ居リ、南方ニ於テハ側ヘハ福建省政府主席ノ蒋介石ヲ廻ツテ相反スル軍閥及黨派ノ間ニ抗爭勃發セリ。西方ニ於テハ西藏軍隊ハ西康及青海ヲ占領シ、又四川省ニ於テハ劉文輝、劉湘ノ間ニ軍事行動起リツツアリ。蔣介石將軍カ是等諸將ニ對シスル行爲ハ統一缺如ノ印象ヲ外間ニ與フヘシトシ急電ヲ發シ、切ニ其ノ注意ヲ喚起シモニモ拘ラス敵對行爲ハ依然續行セラレタリ。

報告書ハ又交郡ニ於ケル共產主義ハ單ニ「ソヴィエト」聯邦以外ノ多數ノ國ニ於ケルカ如ク現存ノ政黨員ニ依リテ支持セラルル政治上ノ主義ニモ拒ス、又他ノ政黨ト權力ヲ爭フ特別ノ黨組織ニモ拒ス、又交郡ニ於ケル共產主義ハ聯民政府ニ對スル現實ノ爭取者トナレリ、支那共產主義ハ其レ自體ノ法律、軍隊及政府故ニ領土ニモ比スヘキ其ノ行動地域ヲ有ス。是等ノ事態ニ關

化來華一  
ノ府九二二年  
狀能譏惡以

シテハ他ノ如何ナル國ニ於テモ其ノ類ヲ見サル」コトヘ二三頁  
ヲ印白ニ記述シ居レリ。

以上所謂「崩壊力」ニ何概說スル所アリタルカ、右崩壊力カ絶  
エス支那ヲ支配シツツアルコトハ報告書正ニ認メ居レリ。之  
ニ依リテ見ルモ公平ナル検討ノ結果ハ、華府會議以來「事實ニ  
於テ相當ノ進歩カ逐ケラレタリ」トスル報告書第一七頁ノ意見  
トハ反對ニ、支那ノ狀況力事實上更ニ一層悪化シ居ル事ヲ明示  
スルモノナルコト、日本政府ノ信シテ疑ハサル所ナリ。

非ヘシト一排外  
スキテレボ宣傳及  
モ考ハ分離ニス

### 口、支那ニ於ケル排外運動

這般ノ不幸ナル日支間ノ衝突ヲ誘發セル如キ零園氣ノ醸成上前記ノ無政府及混亂狀態ニ勝ルモ劣ラサル役割ヲ演シタルハ、支那ニ於ケル排外思想ノ幾多強烈ナル表現ナリトス。

報告書モ亦左ノ如ク所定シ居レリ。

支那ハ、華府會議ニ於テ爲サレタル通、其ノ困難ヲ解決スル爲ノ國際的協調ノ道程ニ上リタルヲ以テ、若シ右道程ニ從ヒ進ミタルニ於テハ、爾後ノ十年間ニ於テ更ニ顯著ナル進歩ヲ遂ケ得タルナルヘシ。然ルニ支那ハ其ノ舜々スキ排外宣傳ノ遂行ニヨリ妨害ヒラレタリ。右宣傳ハ特ニ二方面ニ於テ執拗ニ實行ヒラレ、其ノ結果現在ノ紛爭ヲ惹起セル零園氣ノ醸成ヲ誘導セリ。

即チ經濟的「ボイコット」ノ利用及諸學校ニ對スル排外宣傳ノ注入之ナリ（一八頁）

如斯專熊熙化ニ與ツテ力アリタルハ排外宣傳（特ニ學校ニ於ケ

學校ニ於ケ  
宣傳

ル）及「ボイコット」ナルカ、不幸ニシテ報告書ハ兩者ヲ分離シテ取扱ヒ居レリ。最近ニ於ケル支那ノ實情ヲ了解シ、特ニ日支間ノ緊張ヲ沼來シ遂ニ一九三一年九月十八日ノ事件ヲ誘發シタル特殊ノ原因ヲ了解センカ爲ニハ右兩者ヲ相關聯シテ考察スルコトニ特ニ意ヲ用ヒサルヘカラス。

國民政府ハ獨キ排外感情ニ充タサレ、青少年ノ腦裡ニ激シキ外國人憎惡ノ念ヲ吹汎ムコトニ之努メ來レリ。五千萬ノ支那青年カ激烈ナル思想ノ影響ノ下ニ成長シツツアルノ事實ハ、近キ將來ニ對スル寒心スヘキ問題ナリ。而シテ南京政府ハ此ノ警戒スヘキ道程ノ促進ニ膺心シツツアルモノナリ。

報告書ニ曰ク

孫逸仙博士ノ思想ハ恰モ從來古典ノ有シタル權威ヲ持ツカ如キモノトシテ今ヤ諸學校ニ於テ教授セラレ、孫總理ノ遺訓ハ草命前ニ於テ孔子ノ教訓カ受ケタルト同様ノ尊敬ヲ受ケツツアリ。

然レトモ不幸ニシテ青少年ノ教育ニ當リ、注意ハ國民主義ノ建設的方面ニ對スルヨリモ寧ロ否定的方面ニ注カレタリ。諸學校ノ教科書ヲ讀むスル者ハ、其ノ著者カ變國心ヲ燃スル憎悪ノ情ヲ以テシ、男性的精神ノ養成ヲ被害ノ意識ノ上ニ置ク、マトニ努メタリトノ印象ヲ得。此ノ結果トシテ、學校ニ於テ植付ケラレ且社會生活ノ凡ラユル方面ヲ遍シテ實行セラレタル毒々シキ俳外宣傳ハ學生ヲ誘リテ政治運動ニ參加ヒシムルコトト爲リ、時ニハ國務大臣其他ノ官憲ノ身體、居住又ハ官署ノ過渡乃至政府ノ顧覆ヲ計ルカ如キ事態ニ至ラシメタリ。

(一九頁)。

「ボイコツ」報告書ハ支那ノ「ボイコツト」カ支那ノ日本ニ對スル敵意ノ明確ナル表現ニシテ同時ニ日本ノ經濟的利害ニ對スル侵害ナルコト、從テ「ボイコツト」カ心理的ニ物質的ニ日支間ノ友好關係ニ害アルマトヲ認メ居レル處、是等ノ見解ハ日本政府力終始一貫主張シ來レル所ヲ確認スルモノナリ。

「ボイコット」  
トニ  
ル責任  
「ボイコット」  
トニ  
ル責任

然レトモ支那ノ「ボイコット」ノ特質及「ボイコット」ニ對スル責任問題ニ關シ左ニ若干説述セムト欲ズ。

近年ニ於テハ支那ノ「ボイコット」ハ特殊ノ性質ヲ帶ヒ來リ、實ニ外國カ其ノ在立居留民ノ生命財産保護ノ爲執レル合法的措置ニ對スル抗議ノ手段トシテノミナラス、外國ヲシテ其ノ條約上ノ權利ヲ拠棄セシメムトスル國策遂行ノ手段トシテモ使用セラルルニ至レリ。

「ボイコット」ニ對スル政府ノ責任問題ニ付テハ報告書ハ國民當ニ其ノ責任アルコトニ關シテハ「何等ノ擧點ナシ」ト述ヘ居レリ。右ハ正ニ肯綮ニ當レルカ、一方則民黨カ西洋ノ釋義ニ於ケル單テル政黨ニハ非スシテ、古既約法ニ基ク正規ノ國家機關ナルコトヲ明却スヘカラス。從テ國民黨ノ行爲ニ對シテハ國民政府ニ於テ責任ヲ負フヘキモノナルコト明カナリ。

海外教育及「ボイコット」運動ノ實行ヲ別々ニ敍述スルノミニテハ、如何ニ精細ニ瓦ルモ支那ノ現狀ヲ充分ニ了解セシムルニ

足ラス。宣シク問題ノ全局ヲ相、即、的ニ敍述シテ、右等排外的活動ノ根底ニハ國民營及國民政勵ノ排外政策ノ存在スルコトヲ明カナラシムルヲ要ス。然ルニ報告書ハ此ノ關係ヲ明カニシ居ラス。茲ニ注目スヘキハ、華府會議後數年ニシテ、國民黨及國民政府カ支那ニ於テ重要ナル役割ヲ演スルニ至リタル事實ナルニ彼等ハ權力ヲ掌握シテ以來所謂「革命政策」ナルモノヲ執拗ニ遂行シ來レル次第ニシテ、右政策ハ支那ニ於ケル無法律狀態ト相俟ツテ甚タシク外國ヲ尋滅シシメ、諸權利ノ還付ヲ益々躊躇ヒシメタルカ、現在ニ於テハ是等諸權利ハ支那ニ於ケル外國人ノ生命財產ニ對スル唯一ノ保障タルニ至レリ。

此ノ點ニ關シ報告書自身モ「國民營ノ勢力ハ一切ノ外部的勢力ニ為々反感ヲ懷カントスル異常ナル色彩ヲ支那ノ國民主義ニ注入シ來リ、、、、、國民主義ハ租地、鐵道地域内ニ於テ外國ノ手ニ依リ行使セラルル行政的及其ノ他ノ純粹ニ商業的ナラザル諸權利、租界ニ於ケル行政権、並ニ外國人力支那ノ法律、法

的當局ノ  
明為迫

種及課稅ニ服從セサルコトヲ意味スル治外法權等ノ返還ヲ要求ス』ヘ一八頁)ト述ヘ、又「支那ハ例外的權力及特權ハ其ノ國民的榮譽及主權ヲ侵害スルモノナリト感スルカ故ニ是等ノ特權ヲ直ニ棄付スルコトヲ要求ス」(二三頁)ト述ヘ居レリ。

吾國會ニシテ更ニ研究ヲ進メタランニハ、右ハ單ナル「要求」ニ止ラニシテ、支那官憲カ一方的宣言及暴力ニ依リテ的迄モ實現セシメシニ決意シ居タルコトヲ明カニシタルナルヘシ。

國民黨ハ必要ノ場合ニハ相手國ノ態度ヲ無視シテモ「不平等」條約ヲ一方的ニ廢棄セントスル決意ヲ以テ外國ノ有スル權利ヲ廢除スルニトテ其ノ基本的外交政策トシテ既々聲明セリ。一九二六年蔣介石ハ國民革命成功ノ慶ニハ支那ノ一切ノ「不平等」修約ヲ即時互一方的ニ廢棄スヘキ旨ヲ宣言セリ。一九二七年一月漢口及九江ノ英國租界ハ國民黨ニ依リ強力ヲ以テ奪回セラレタリ。同年四月南京政府成立後國民黨ノ行動ハ或ハ稍緩和セラレタルモノアリタルヘキモ、其ノ政策ハ依然トシテ變化ナク、

日本ハ最大  
ノ被  
害者ナ

「不平等」條約ノ廢棄及外國ノ權益排除ノ意圖ヲ反覆宣言シ、又一般民衆ニ對シ右政策ノ實行ヲ再三誓約セリ。而シテ右誓約ニ基キ國民政府ハ一九二九年十二月二十八日附ニテ一九三〇年一月一日ヨリ治外法權ヲ廢棄スヘキ旨規定セル法律ヲ公布シ、更ニ一九三一年一月ニ及ヒ同年二月末日迄ニ治外法權問題ノ滿足ナル解決ニ到達シ得サルニ於テハ、外交手段以外ノ方法ニ依リ治外法權撤廃ノ既定政策ヲ遂行スヘキ旨宣言シ、同時ニ「在華外國人管理條例」ヲ發布シ、斯クシテ一方的ニ條約ヲ廢棄スルノ意圖ヲ公然表明シ、右事實ヲ調査列國ニ通報セリ。

依之觀在支外國人ノ生命及權利カ九月十八日事件前重大ナル危険ニ面シ居タルコト明白ナルヘク、而シテ「日本ハ支那ノ最大モ近接セル隣國ニシテ且最大顧客ナルヲ以テ本章ニ於テ記述セラレタル無法律狀態ニ依リ他ノ何レノ勵ヨリモ損害ヲ受ケタル」

(二三頁)コトハ報告書ニモ記述セラレタル通ナリ。

外國ノ執  
ル自衛的  
方法ナ

ハ、支那ニ於ケル外國人ノ管則的ナル地位  
支那問題ノ根底ニ據ハレル同國ノ内部的不統一、其ノ結果外國  
人ノ生命財産力不附ニ喫盡セラレ居ル不安狀態、學校ニ於ケル  
排外心ノ注入及青年ニ對スル排外宣傳、外國人ニ對スル徹底セ  
ル「ボイコット」手續、條約ノ一方的廢棄其ノ他「革命外交」  
ノ原理ニ由來スル凡ニル手段ハ、相俟ツテ堅固ナル統一政府無  
キ支那ニ發生スル各種問題ニ對シ全然特殊ナル性質ヲ與ヘ、通  
例ノ處理方法ノ適用ヲ不可能ナラシム。

而シテ斯クノ如キ排外的特徵ハ世界ノ何處ニモ續例無キ所ニシ  
テ、其ノ結果列國ニシテ自力ニ依リ其ノ管轄ヲ保護スルノ制度  
ヲ維持スルノ餘櫻無キニ至ラシメタリ。即チ列國ハ支那ニ於テ  
治外法權ヲ有シ、又租借地ノ外天津、漢口、上海其ノ他ノ都市  
ニ於テ租界ヲ維持シ、自ラ警察及行政ヲ施行シ居レリ。斯クシ  
テ支那ノ無法律狀態ヨリ生スル悪影響ヲ妨止スル爲必要ナル措  
置ヲ講シ居ル一方、列國ハ又武力ニ依リ其ノ権利ヲ保護スルノ

## 實例

已ムナキ實情ニ在リ。現ニ滿洲ニ於ケル日本鐵道守備隊ノ外、平津地方ニハ一九〇一年以來日英米佛伊各國軍隊駐屯シ、其ノ兵數ハ九月十八日事件直前ニ於テ日本軍約九百、其ノ他約四千七百ヲ算セリ。是等軍隊ハ凡テ條約ノ規定ニ基キ駐屯シ居ルモノナリ。是等列國ノ多クハ又條約ニ基カス單ニ自衛ノ必要上上海ニモ軍隊ヲ駐屯セシメ居レルカ、右ハ一九二二年華府會議後新ニ發生シル韓熊ニシテ、同會議以後事態ノ更ニ悪化セルコトヲ示スモノナリ。加之列國ハ上海及青島ノ如キ海港ノミナラス、揚子江及白河ノ如キ内水上ニモ多數ノ軍艦ヲ配備シ居レリ。而モ右ハ開タル裝飾ニ非シテ是等軍隊及艦船ハ實々現實ノ自衛ノ爲ニ使用セラレタリ。

一九二五年ノ沙面ニ於ケル外國軍隊ノ發砲事件、一九二六年ノ萬縣砲擊事件、及一九二七年ノ南京砲擊事件ノ如キ著例ノ外ニ揚子江航行中ノ外國軍艦カ沿岸ノ支那軍ヨリ擅ニ發砲セラレ之ニ反駁スルノ已ムチ得サリシ幾多ノ事例アリ。而シテ右支那軍

ハス  
スル  
コチ  
ト  
右  
門常ニノ  
於結果  
平テ果  
能和ハ支

示ルチ政那報  
スコス告書  
ト行ノ近代  
チセラ能的支

ノ攻撃ハ近年就中國民權ノ権力掌握以來殊ニ增加シ來レリ。

斯ノ如ク支那ニ於ケル列國ノ地位ハ全ク例外的ノモノニシテ、世界ノ何レノ部分ニモ類例ナキモノナルコト明白ナルヘシ。從而國際慣例及自衛權行使ノ態様ハ支那ニ於テハ他ノ文明國ニ於テ見サルカ如キ特脣チ有ス。現ニ報告書自ラモ第二三頁ニ於テ「支那ノ國民的要望ノ實現ハ内政ノ分野ニ於テ近代的政府ノ機能ヲ發揮ハル能力ノ如何ニ繋ルモノナリ。而シテ是等兩者ノ醜體力除去ミラレサル限り國際的衝突及事件ノ發生ノ危險、「ボイコット」並ニ武力干渉ハ總源セラルヘシ」ト述ヘ居レリ。

國際裁判又ハ仲裁裁判ニ訴フル等所謂「平和機關」ヲ適用スルカ如キハ支那ノ場合ニ於テハ到底因縁ニシテ、假令死活的利益ニ門セサル份譲ニ付テモ是等機關ヲ利用スルコトノ不可能ナリシコト既ニ過去ニ於テ經驗セラレタル所ナリ。支那ノ變則ナル狀態及列國カ右狀態ノ存在ニ候ミ前記ノ變則且特異ナル制度ノ

變更ヲ肯セサルノ事實ハ、通常ノ「平和機關」ヲ現在ノ組織ノ  
儀ニテハ支那ニ開スル紛爭ニ適用スルノ不可能ナルコトニ證明  
シテ餘アリ。

支那且満洲  
スノレ那必然ハ  
一ノ完ニ自然  
部ニ全ハ

第二章 满洲

イ、一般的の考察

委員會ハ満洲力自然且必然ニ支那ノ一部ナリトノ推定ニ左右セラレ居ルモノノ如ク、現ニ報告書第二九頁ニ於テ満洲ハ常ニ「支那ノ完全ナル一部」ト看做サレ居リタルコトヲ述ヘ居レリ。實際上満洲ノ支那トノ結合ハ單ニ一時的且偶然ノコトニシテ、右ハ報告書ニ付テ見ルモ明力ナルカ、報告書ハ不幸ニシテ清朝ノ退位後ノ事態ニ付極メテ輕ク解レ居ルニ過キス。満洲官憲ハ「清世祖ノ統率ニ従ヒ」タルヤモ知レス、又國家組織法上ノ自己ノ地位ニ關シ餘り考慮ヲ拂ハサリシヤモ知レサルモ、實際ノ事實トシテハ、支那ヨリ満洲朝廷力消滅シタル結果、右帝室ニ依リ、満洲ヲ同君聯合ノ關係ニ於テ支那ニ結ヒ付ケ居タル連繫ノ基礎消シシ、而モ「何等新ナル連繫様式ノ之ニ伴フモノナ力リキ」ト述ヘタル南京政府顧問「エスカラ」氏ノ達見ヘ「支那ト國臨法」(二四〇頁)ヲ採用スルコト無難ナリ。「エスカラ

「氏ハ「滿洲ハ未タ曾テ支那ノ國領タリシコトナシ、蓋シ支那國ハ却テ滿洲ノ一統ニ依リ征服セラレタレハナリ。然レトモ又支那ヲ以テ滿洲ノ國領ナリシトモ云フテ得ス、、、、本件ハ實ニ「同君聯合」ノ一例タルモノナリ」ト説明シタル後、「元來滿洲ニ對ハル支那ノ権利ナルモノハ殆ト問題ニナリ得サリキ、滿洲ニ對ハル支那ノ権利ナルモノハ殆ト問題ニナリ得サリキ、單ニ滿洲人力帝位ニ在リタリト云フコト以外何モノモナカリシナリ。此ハ帝室治滅シタルヲ以テ更ニ滿洲ヲ支那ニ結ヒ附ケム力爲ムハ、一ノ新ナル法律様式ヲ發見セサルヘカラサルコトトナリクリ。而モ右様式ハ特ニ探索セラレタルコトナカリシ力如シ」ト述ヘ居レリ。要スルニ滿洲ト支那トノ連繫ハ薄弱且曖昧ナルモノニシテ、張作霖モ種々ノ機會ニ於テ右連繫ヲ明白ニ否認セリ。

敍上ノ如キ曖昧ナル事態ニ拘ラス、但ニ百歩ヲ譲リ滿洲ヲ以テ一時支那ト正式ニ合體シ居リタリト推定スルモ、一九一六年袁世門ノ死後ニ於ケル統一共和國ノ没落ハ、支那ニ於ケル總テノ

## 張作霖

政治的統一ノ崩壊ヲ顯示スルモノナリ。其ノ廣大ナル地域ニ於テ生シタル何レノ政府モ其ノ他ノ政府ニ對シテハ何等ノ権力ヲ有セサリシ實情ニシテ、結局南京ニ於テ一ノ政府力成立セラレ且列國ニ依リ正當政府トシテ承認セラレタリト雖モ、右ノ事實ニ依リ同政府ハ滿洲ノ如キ曾テ其ノ實權下ニ服シタルコト無力リシ地方ニ對シ權力ヲ及ホシタルコトトハナラス。

事實張作霖ハ北京ニ於テ政權ヲ把握セル各派ニ對シ、自己ニ都合良キ場合ニ随リ其ノ意圖ヲ迎ヘムトシタルコトアリトルモノ、未々會テ彼等ヨリ命令ヲ受ケタルコト無シ。報告書モ亦「彼ノ態度ハ變化常ナキ中央ノ支配者タル車閥トノ個人的關係ノ如何ニ依リ變化セリ。彼ハ自己ト政府トノ關係ヲ視ルニ個人的同盟ノ意味ヲ以テシタルモノノ如シ」ト述ヘ居レリ（二八頁）。

然ルニ報告書ハ張作霖獨立ノ幾多ノ事例ヲ擧ケツツモ、一方張力支那政府ヨリ獨立シ又ハ之トノ任意的同盟ヲナシタルハ決シテ支那ヨリ獨立セントノ意圖ヲ抱キ居リタルモノニ非ストノ理

論ナ展開シ居ル處（二八一二九頁）、右ハ高々張力其ノ支配スル滿洲ヲモ包含スル支那ノ統一ヲ隣望シタルヘキコトヲ意味スルニ過キス。何レニスルモ滿洲ノ地位、力之ニ依リ何等影響セラルルモノニ非サルコト明力ナリ。蓋シ滿洲ノ地位如何ハ事實ニ基クヘキモノニシテ推定ニ基クヘキモノニ非サルナリ。

（註）張ハ一九二二年五月ノ宣言ニ於テ「北諸省ハ「支那共和國ノ領土ト認メス」ト明白ニ述ヘ居レリ。（註）

（註）在北京外國公使、在天津外國領事及在唐山外國文武在留者宛。

予ハ徐世昌ヨリ東三省、熱河及察哈爾ノ特別區域並ニ内外蒙古ヲ放棄スル旨ノ通知ヲ接受セリ。是等ノ地方ハ總テ之ヲ支那共和國ノ領土ト認メス。

予ハ予ノ特殊ナル地位ニシテ是等地域ニ關スル一切ノ責ナ有ヒ、且極力友好國民ノ生命財產ヲ保護シ、彼等トノ友好關係ノ增進ヲ圖ラサルヲ得ス。清朝及支那共和國時代ニ締結セラレタル一切ノ重要ナル條約ハ完全ニ承認且尊重セラルヘシ。外國公使、外國領事及在留外國人ニシテ爾餘ノ問題及事項ニ付交渉セント欲スルモノハ滿洲ニ於ケル予ノ政廳ニ申出ツルコトヲ得ヘシ。予

張學良

ハ人民ノ福祉及繁榮増進ノ爲、今後友好國民トノ通商關係ヲ從來ヨリモ一層新密ナラシムヘシ。徐世昌力本月一日以後、本三省、内外蒙古並ニ熱河及察哈爾ニ間シテ締結スル如何ナル條約モ予ノ直接ノ許可ナキモノハ予ニ於テ之ヲ承認セス、且予ハ右ヲ以テ徐世昌力惡意ヲ以テ爲シタルモノト看做スヘシ。

奉天軍總司令 張 作 穥

張作繩ノ後繼者タル張學良モ實質上同一ノ態度ヲ採レリ。即チ彼ハ滿洲ヲモ含ム支那統一ノ理想ハ之ヲ斥ケス、右理想ノ象徴トシテノ南京政府ヲモ容認セルモ、實際ニ於テハ之ニ服從スルコトヲ全然拒否セリ。報告書モ「軍事、政務、財政、外交等総テノ問題ニ付中央政府トノ關係ハ滿洲側ノ自發的協力ヲ必要トセリ。無條件服從ヲ要求スル力如キ命令又ハ訓令ハ容認セラレサリシナルヘシ滿洲官憲ノ意ニ反シタル任免ノ如キハ想像シ得ラレサリキ」ト述ヘ居レリ（三〇頁）。斯ノ如ク報告書ハ張家ノ下ニ於ケル滿洲力如何ナル支那政府ニモ全然服從セス且其ノ干渉ヨリ全ク獨立セルコトヲ明示シ居レリ。

報告書ノ自  
家擴差

々問題  
タ的住  
題ルニ民  
支那種族  
トコトナ  
ラ入

シナリ」ト述へ、又伸ノ部分ニ於テ今日ニ於テモ亦同様ナリト  
斷定シ居ルハ、報告書力滿洲ノ完全ナル獨立ヲ證スル爲引用シ  
來レル凡テノ他ノ記述ト擴着スルモノナリ。報告書ノ見解ハ日  
本ニ不利ニ國際法ヲ援用スルモノニシテ、國家ハ一個ノ至高ナ  
ル政府ヲ有シ且紹經的ニ之ヲ有セサルヘカラストノ最モ基本的  
ナル國際法ノ原則ニ背離シ居レリ。事實一九一六年以來支那ノ  
全部ニ對シ實際ニ權力ヲ行使シタル政府存シタルコトナシ。  
尙報告書ハ滿洲力支那ノ一部ト看做サルヘキコトヲ更ニ證セン  
トシテ、滿洲ニ於ケル現住民ノ多數乃至ハ大部分力支那移民タ  
リトノ疑モ無キ事實ヲ擧ケ居ル處、之ニ對シテハ、報告書自ラ  
モ述へ居ル如ク支那人ニハ深キ國家意識無キコト及報告書ノ此  
ノ論法ヲ世界ノ他ノ地方ニ適用スルトヤハ多數國家ノ領土的地位  
及世界平和ニ對シ尠ル困惑スヘキ結果ヲ齎スヘキコトヲ附言  
スルヲ以テ足ル。

口、張家ノ新政

東三省及絲ノ東北四省力獨立ノ狀態ニ社リタルコト並ニ一九二八年十二月以後ニ於テ是等各省ノ行政的統一ノ保持セラレタルコトハ、滿洲ノ施政力善良ナリシコトア意味スルモノニ非ス。委員會モ張家ノ新政ニ關シ幾分寬容ニ失スルノ嫌ハアルモ左ノ如ク記述シ居レリ（三一頁）。

滿洲當局ハ從來ノ如ク其ノ權力カ南京ヨリ來ルヨリモ遙ニ多ク彼等ノ軍隊ヨリ來ルモノナルコトヲ認識セリ。

右事實ハ約二十五萬ニ上ル大常備軍維持セラレ、又二億弗（銀）以上ヲ費シタリト傳ヘラルル大兵工廠ノ保持セラレ居ルコトヲ説明スルモノナリ。軍事費ハ全經費ノ八〇「バーセント」ニ達シタリト推計セラレ、其ノ殘額ヲ以テシテハ行政、警察、司法及教育ノ用ヲ支辨スルニ足ラス、又國庫ハ官吏ニ對シ適當ナル俸給ヲ支給スル能ハサリキ。而シテ凡ニル權力ハ少數軍人ノ手ニ歸シタルヲ以テ、官職ハ彼等ノ手ヲ通シ

蒐メタリ。

絃上ノ陰惨ナル描寫ハ日本參與員ヨリ委員會ニ提出セル「支那ノ現狀」第八章ノ材料ヲ甚シク切詰メ編述セルモノニシテ、右描寫ノ示ス所ヨリモ更ニ深刻ナリシ實情ヲ充分ニ表示シ居ラス（特ニ司法、行政及督察ニ關シ然リ）。然レトモ前掲ノ抜萃ハ、其ノ措置穩和ナルニモ拘ラス猶且如何ニ滿洲人力官憲及軍閥ノ壓制的極皓ノ下ニ呻吟シタルカ、從テ彼等ヲ驅テ機會タニアラハ其ノ極皓ヲ脫セムトスルノ舉ニ出テシムルニハ日本側ノ人爲的刺激ヲ必要トセリトノ推論ノ如何ニ當ラサリシカヲ示スニ足ルモノナリ。

#### ハ、日本ノ特殊地位

日本ノ滿洲  
ニ於ケル特殊地位

日本カ「特殊地位」ヲ獲得セルハ實ニ此ノ地域ナリ。

滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ「特殊地位」ニ付アハ多分ニ神祕的ナル觀念ノ附隨スルカ如ク見ルモノアルモ、實際ハ頗ル簡單ナルモノニシテ、同地方ニ於ケル日本ノ條約上ノ特殊諸權利ノ總和ニ、

其ノ隣接狀態及地理的地位並ニ歴史的交渉ヨリ生スル自然ノ結果ヲ加ヘタルモノニ外ナラス。日本ノ孰ルヲ得ヘキ自衛手段ハ其ノ権益ノ程度ニ準セサルヘカラサル處、右権益ハ特殊、繁密ニシテ且重大ナリ。自衛權行使ノ標準的實例タル「カロライン」號事件ノ際、英國力米國ノ領土ニ侵入シ目前ノ脅威ヲ排除セル行動ヲ米國ニ於テ容認シタル所以ノモノハ、加奈陀ト米國トノ接壤關係並ニ加奈陀ノ英國ニ對スル極度ノ重要性及當時ニ於ケル同地方混亂狀態ニ外ナラサリキ。

凡ソ自衛行動力正當ナリヤ否ヤハ擁護セラルヘキ権益ノ重要性、危害ノ急迫及該自衛行爲ノ必要性ニ依リ決定セラルモノナリ。日本ノ満洲ニ於ケル権益ハ絶對的ニシテ、且日本ノ領土ハ之ト境ヲ接シ而モ日本ハ同地方ノ軍隊ノミニ依倚スルコトヲ得ス。日本ノ「特殊地位」ハ一見シテ明白ナリ。右ハ滿洲ノ行政ニ對シ概括的ニ且濫リニ干涉スルノ權テ日本ニ與フルモノニ非ス、又敢テ斯ル主張ヲ爲サムトスルモノニモ非ス。然レトモ右

日本ノ特殊  
權利

ハ軍事的攻撃ヲ受ケタル場合異常ナル力ヲ以テ自己ヲ防禦セサ  
ルヲ得サル地位ヲ正ニ日本ニ對シ賦與スルモノナリ。

日本政府ハ一九〇五年及一九一五年ノ條約ニ依リ日本力滿洲ニ  
於テ獲得セル諸權利ヲ列舉セル委員會ノ記述ニ對シ全然同意ス  
ルモノニシテ、委員會力是等ノ條約力今猶完全ニ有效ニシテ一  
方的行爲ヲ以テ廢棄シ得サルモノナルコトヲ認メ居ルハ滿足ト  
スル所ナリ。

委員會ハ報告書第三八頁ニ於テ

「上記滿洲ニ於テ日本ノ有スル數多ノ權利ノ概說ニ依リ、滿  
洲ニ於ケル日支兩國間ノ政治、經濟及法律關係ノ特殊性ハ明  
瞭ニシテ、斯ノ如キ事態ハ恐ラク世界ノ何處ニモ其ノ例ナカ  
ルヘク、又隣邦ノ領土内ニ斯ノ如キ廣汎ナル經濟上及行政上  
ノ特權ヲ有スル國ハ他ニ比類ヲ見サルヘシ」ト爲シ、

又第三九頁ニ於テ

「滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ利益ハ、其ノ性質及程度ニ於テ諸外國

該地方ニ於  
ケル主權ト  
斯く七

ノ夫レト異ルモノアリ。一九〇四年乃至五年奉天及瀋陽、南滿洲鐵道沿線、鳴綠江及遼東半島等滿洲ノ野ニ於テ戰ハレタル日本ノ露西亞ニ對スル大戰爭ノ記憶ハ、總テノ日本人ノ惱禪ニ深ク印セラル所ナリ。日本人ニトリテハ對露戰爭ハ露西亞ノ侵略ノ脅威ニ對スル自衛ノ爲生死ヲ賭シタル戰トシテ永久ニ記憶セラルヘク、右ノ一戰ニ十萬ノ將士ヲ失ヒ且二十億圓ノ國帑ヲ消費シタル事實ハ日本人ヲシテ是等ノ犠牲ヲ決シテ無益ニ終ハラシメサランコトヲ決意セシメタリ」ト述ヘ居レリ。

此ノ「特殊地位」ハ報告書ノ主張スルカ如ク支那ノ主權ニ牴觸スルモノニ非ス。

南滿洲鐵道附屬地トシテ知ラル板メテ狹隘ナル地域ニ於テ露國ニ許與セラレ、次テ日本ニヨリ繼承セラレタル權力ハ、支那ノ主權ト臺无抵觸スルゴトナシ。支那力此ノ地帶ヲ露國ニ對シ割讓又ハ長期租貸シ又ハ露國ヲ通シテ日本ニ對シ同様ノ措置ニ

出テタリトスルモ、支那ノ主權ニ抵觸セサルコトニ於テハ何等  
變リナシ。右ハ主權ノ行使ニシテ何等主權ト抵觸セス。露國ト  
ノ協定成立ノ際支那ノ主權ハ單ニ名義上存續チ許サレタルニ過  
キサルカ、右ノ事實ハ支那力露國ニ與ヘタル權利ト支那ノ主權  
トノ抵觸チ來スモノニ非ス、寧口反對ニ是等ノ權利ハ支那ノ主  
權ニ由來スルモノナリ

又滿洲ノ日本ニ對スル近接關係並ニ經濟上及戰略上ノ重要性力該地方ニ於ケル主權ト佔領スルモノナリトハ想像スルコトスラ不可能ナリ。固ヨリ是等ノ事實ハ、假ニ滿洲カ他ノ遠隔ナル地ニ在リタル場合ニ比シ、日本ヲシテ滿洲ニ事アル際已ムヲ持ス自衛行爲ニ出ツルノ可能性ヲ大ナラシムルモノナリ。然レトモ右ハ何等同地方ノ主權ヲ制限スルモノニ非ス。斯ノ如キ自衛權行使ハ極メテ稀ニ發生スルモノナルモ如何ナル國家、假令最強ノ國家ト雖モ之ヲ免ルルヲ得サルモノナリ。

ノ國家ト雖モ之ヲ免ルルヲ得サルセラレタル現ニ米國ノ主權ハ「カロライン」號事件ニ依リ侵害セラレタルコトナカリシナリ。

日本ノ「特殊地位」ハ執拗ニ攻撃セラレ居ルモ、日本ハ之ニ依リ幾多ノ困難ニモ何ラス滿洲ニ於テ文化的ノ大事業ヲ成就セリ此ノ發展ニ主トシテ寄與シタルハ南滿洲鐵道ノ多面的活動ナルカ、報告書ハ第二章ニ於テモ亦第八章ニ於テモ何等右實績ヲ認ムル所ナク、支那移民ノ活動ヲ重視シナカラ、一方同鐵道ニ關

シテハ殆ト言及シ居ラス。滿洲ノ今日ノ繁榮カ勤勉且質素ナル  
 支那人ノ流入ニ賓フ所歎カラサルハ報告書ノ云ヘル如クナルモ  
 之ヲ以テ支那政府ノ移民政策ニ歸スルコトヲ得ス。右支那移民  
 流入ノ現象ハ實ニ彼等ニ對スル滿洲ノ魅力ニ依ルモノニ外ナラ  
 ス。而シテ滿洲カ魅力アルモノタリシハ、同地方ノ施政善良ナ  
 リシカ爲ニハ非スシテ、日本ノ存在ニ依リ戰爭ノ苦惱ヨリ解放  
 セラレ居リシカ爲ナリ。支那人ハ人モ知ル如ク、又報告書中ニ  
 モ指摘セラル如ク、環境ニ對スル適應性ニ富ミ、且強キ國家  
 的感情ヲ有セス、右支那移民ノ支那ニ對スル適應ハ若シアリト  
 スルモ社會的及家族的感情ノ問題ニシテ、何等政治的適應ヲ意  
 味スルモノニ非ス。報告書ノ記述スル如ク（一二五頁）「滿洲  
 ト支那ノ他ノ部分トノ連鎖ハ、主トシテ民族的及社會的ナリ。即  
 チ右ノ連鎖ハ政治的見地メ無非ズシテ「經濟的ヨリモ寧ロ民族  
 的及社會的」ノモノナリヘ一二三頁）。此ノ點ヨリ見ルニ報告  
 曆カ右非政治的、非經濟的連鎖ノ政治的效果ヲ強調シ居ルハ了

日本ノ  
地位ニ  
對スル  
侵害

解ニ苦シム所ナリ。

ニ、日本ノ特殊地位ニ對スル侵害

報告書ハ滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ企業及施設ニ關シ述フル所甚タ渺  
キモ、支那側ノ直接侵害ノ目的トナリシハ實ニ是等企業及施設  
ニ外ナラス。而シテ報告書ノ第三章ニ於テハ是等侵害ノ特定ノ  
問題ニ付檢討スル所アリ。即チ

一、南滿洲鐵道ニ對スル包圍政策

ニ、土地商租及其ノ他ノ條約上ノ權利ノ行使ニ對シ加ヘラレタ  
ル妨害

三、日本臣民就中朝鮮人ニ對シ加ヘラレタル壓迫

四、中村大尉ノ殺害  
等ナリ。

然ル處報告書ハ、第三章ニ於テモ又其ノ他ノ個所ニ於テモ  
支那側ノ公然條約其ノ他ノ約定ヲ侵犯シ且之ヲ廢棄セントスル  
政策ニ對シ誹謗ヲ加ヘサルノミナラス、却テ國民黨ノ解放運動

是等侵害ノ  
事件ニ  
關係  
九月十八日  
對ス

ニ藉口シテ之ヲ寛恕セントスルノ傾向スラアリ。又報告書ハ文  
鄰側ノ敵對的態度ノ爲懲戒ヲ満足ニ解決シ得サルコトニモ制レ  
居ラス。報告書カ是等ノ問題ヲ斷片的ニ取扱ヒ、此處ニ於テモ  
亦之ヲ一括シテ相間的ニ考察セサリシハ遺憾ナリ。若シ之ヲ相  
關的ニ考察シタランニハ、是等問題ノ根底ニハ一個ノ基礎的原  
因存シ、且是等問題ハ個々ノ場合ノ正邪ノ證議立ハ暫ク措キ、  
要スルニ滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ權益ヲ破壊セントスル決意ノ表現  
ニ外ナラサリシコトヲ明カニシ得タリシナルヘシ。

右ハ報告書中ニ於ケル張學良ノ南京政府トノ同監後、滿洲ニ於  
テ機長セル事態ノ概説（三〇一三一頁）ニ依リ一層明カナルシ  
外交政策ク範囲共於テハ地方官憲ハ依然多大ノ行動ノ自由ヲ  
有シタルニ相違ナキモ、滿洲ト國民政府トノ合體ハ相當重要  
ナル結果ヲ招來セリ。東支鐵道ノ滿洲ニ於ケル地位ニ對スル  
張作霖元帥ノ執拗ナル攻撃及日本ノ要求スル或種ノ權利ニ對  
スル無視ハ、滿洲ニ於テ既ニ國民黨トノ合體以前ヨリ「進取

政策」ノ採用セラレ居タルコトヲ示スモノナルカ、國民黨トノ合體後ハ滿洲ハ巧ニ組織セラレ且系統的ナル同黨ノ宣傳ニ開放セラレタリ。同黨ハ其ノ正規印刷物ニ於テ又同黨ト關係深キ多數ノ機關紙ニ於テ常ニ喪失主權ノ回復及不平等條約ノ廢棄ノ極メテ重要ナルコト並ニ帝國主義ノ罪惡ヲ強調スルコトヲ止メサリキ。支那領土ニ於ケル外國ノ利益、裁判所、警察、警備兵又ハ車隊ノ實體力明白ナル滿洲ニ於テ斯ル宣傳力深キ印象ヲ與ヘタルハ必然ナリ。國民黨ノ宣傳ハ同黨ノ教科書ニ依リ學校ニ侵入シ又遼寧人民外交協會ノ如キ協會出現シテ、國民主義的感情ヲ鼓吹強調スルト共ニ抗日煽動ヲ實行シ又支那人家主及地主ニ對シテハ日本人及朝鮮人タル賃借人ヘノ賃貸料ノ引上又ハ賃貸契約ノ更新拒絶ヲ強調シタリ。日本人ハ委員會ニ對シ多數ノ此ノ種事件ヲ訴へ來レリ。朝鮮人移民ハ組織的迫害ヲ蒙レリ。諸種ノ抗日的命令及訓令發セラレ軋轢ノ事例推積シ危險ナル緊張加ハレリ。一九三一年三月各

事件ノ背景  
レポート  
川瀬サレ

省首都ニ國民黨省黨部設立セラレ、次テ其ノ他ノ都市及地方ニ支部ノ設立ヲ見タリ。黨ノ宣傳員ニシテ支那ヨリ北上シ來ル者ハ次第ニ其ノ數ヲ加ヘ、日本側ハ抗日運動ノ日ニ激化スルヲ訴ヘタリ。一九三一年四月奉天ニ於テ人民外交協會主催ノ下ニ五日間ノ會議開催セラレ、滿洲各地ヨリノ代表者三百餘名之ニ參加シ滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ地位一掃ノ可能性ニ付討議セラレタルカ、其ノ決議ノ中ニハ南滿洲鐵道回収ノ一項ヲ含メリ。當時蘇聯邦及其ノ市民モ亦右同様ノ傾向ニ悟マサレタルカ、一方白鷹人ハ何等返還スヘキ主權又ハ例外的特權ヲ有セサルニ拘ラス屈辱感待ヲ蒙レリ。

右概説ハ九月十八日ノ置前ニ存在シタル狀況ヲ相當程度ニ描寫シ居ルモ報告書ノ第二章ニノミ掲ケラレ、第四章ニ於テ九月十八日事件ヲ記述スルニ當リ之ト關聯セシメテ何等言及スル所ナキハ遺憾ナリ。

報告書ハ第四章ニ於テ此ノ重大問題ヲ取扱フニ當リ、之ト日本

側権益ニ對スル支那側ノ連續セル侵害トノ關係ニ關シ何等ノ認識ヲ示サス。強烈ナル日貨排斥、日文諸條約ノ效力否認、日本側鐵道ニ對スル破壊的競爭、朝鮮人移民ニ對スル妨害、將又萬寶山事件ノ何レニモ言及シ居ラス、偶々中村大尉事件ニ觸レ居ルノミ。要スルニ九月十八日事件ハ其ノ全背景ヨリ切離サレ居レリ。

支那側ノ侵略的決意ニ關スル證據ハ一切無視セラレ、之ニ代フルニ日本國民カ「專ヒ積極政策ノ採用」ニ轉セムトシツアリタリト想像セシムルカ如キ難多ノ理由羅列セラレタリ。

侵略的ナル隣邦ノ正規軍ニ依リ、一國ノ安全ヲ構成スルノ致命的中権ニ加ヘラレタル武力攻撃ヲ反撻シ得ルハ理ノ當然ニシテ之カ説明トシテ意々日本ノ貿易不振ノ如キ理由ヲ援用スル要何レニ在リヤ。日本側ノ迅速且完全ナル反撻ト從來ノ支那側ノ證據歷然タル侵略的意圖トヲ分離シテ取扱ヒタル結果ハ、遂ニ鐵道攻撃ニ對スル當然ノ措置ノ説明トシテ前記支那國ノ侵略ノ事

緊張緩和ニ  
關スル日本  
ノ努力

實ヲ擧ケスシテ、却テ日本ニ於ケル内政上ノ不平ト云フカ如キ  
コトヲ擧ケサルヘカラサル破目ニ陥レリ。委員會力正ニ調查ス  
ヘカリシ問題ハ支那側カ何カ故ニ滿洲ニ於テ「積極政策」ヲ採  
用セシヤノ理由ナリシナリ。

既ニ一九三一年六月十五日、日本政府ハ滿洲ニ於ケル支那官吏  
及巡警ノ行動ニ依リ重大ナル結果ヲ惹起スルノ虞レアルコトヲ  
指摘セリ。而シテ日本政府ハ貿易不振又ハ軍事上若ハ政治上ノ  
不滿ノ爲何等「積極政策」ヲ開始スルノ必要ニ迫ラレタルカ如  
キコト毫モナク、導口凡ユル方法ニ依リ形勢ノ緊張ヲ緩和セン  
ト努メタリシナリ。斯ル努力ニ拘ラス支那側ノ侵略的態度ハ依  
然トシテ改マル所無カリキ。日本軍カ「北大營」ニ入りシトキ  
「看哪！營垣西邊的鐵道」ナル營兵煽動ノ「ビラ」ヲ營舍壁上  
ニ發見シタル事實スラアリ。九月十八日ノ爆破力實ニ此ノ地點ニ  
ニ於ケル是等ノ兵士ノ仕業ナリシコトハ怪シムニ足ラス。  
滿洲ニ存在セル緊張狀態ヲ明カニシ得ルモノハ實ニ此ノ支那側

ノ侵害的態度ニシテ、報告書中ニ仄メカサレタルカ如キ日本側ノ「種族政策」ノ復活ニ非ス。其ノ他奉天ニ於ケル張學良軍内ニ瀕漫セシ傲慢暴戾ノ幾多ノ實例ハ、四月二十四日委員會ニ交付セラレタル關東軍作成ノ「滿洲ニ於ケル日支衝突ノ管見」ト題スル冊子中ニ收メラレアルモ報告書ハ之ニ言及タモシ居ラス。斯ノ如ク當時ノ窮屈氣ハ極メテ引火シ易キ狀態ニ在リ、苟モ燃發セシムルノ萬アルカ如キ行爲ハ如何ニ些細ナルモノト雖モ絶對ニ之ヲ避ケルコト必要ナリシコトハ、然上事態ノ推移ヲ注視シ以テ報告書中ニモ詳述セラレタル支那側ノ政策的態度ノ益々熾烈ニ向ヒツツアリタルコトヲ了解スルモノニ取りテハ自カラ明カナルヘシ。

## 官憲ノ説明

## 第三章 九月十八日ノ事件及其ノ後ノ軍事行動

日本軍事當局ハ委員會ニ對シ、或ハ文書ニ依リ或ハ關東軍司令部員トノ會議ニ於テ本事件ニ關スル完全且詳細ナル資料ヲ供給セリ。日本政府ニ於テハ是等資料ハ正確ニシテ何等偽ラサルモノナルヲ信シ之ヲ全般的ニ支持セント欲スルモノナリ。報告書ハ右等資料ヲ「日本側ノ説明」ト題シ六節ニ亘り摘要シ居ル處ハ右等資料ヲ「日本側ノ説明」ト題シ六節ニ亘り摘要シ居ルヲ以テ、理事國ニシテ更ニ情報ヲ得ント欲スルニ於テハ事件（一六七一六九頁）、右摘要中ニハ多クノ重要ナル細目脱漏シ居ルヲ以テ、理事國ニシテ更ニ情報ヲ得ント欲スルニ於テハ事件ノ主要關係者及日本政府ノ供給セル資料ヲ參照スヘキナリ。

報告書ハ「支那側ノ説明」ヲモ摘要セル後若干ノ論斷ヲ爲シ居レルカ、右論斷タルヤ日支双方ノ説明ヨリ當然生スヘキ結論ト相距ルコト遠ク、且委員會自ラモ認メ居ルカ如ク何等ノ公的性質ヲ有セサル外部ノ情報ニヨリ著シク左右セラレタルノ感アルハ日本政府ノ一驚ヲ禁シ得サル所ナリ。

委員會ハ鐵道爆破ノ事實ハ認メタルカ（一七一页）其ノ損害輕微

員會ノ論斷  
クヘキ委

張報告書ハ緊  
張狀態等ヲ  
閑視ス

ニシテ之ノミヲ以テシテハ日本ノ軍事行動ヲ正當トルニ充分  
ナラサリシ旨附言セリ。然レトモ此ノ點ニ關シ委員會ハ次ノ如  
キ二個ノ事實ノ存在ヲ認メナカラ之ヲ充分ニ考慮ニ入ルルコト  
ヲ憚レルモノナリ。即チ第一ニハ相對抗スル兩兵力ノ間ニ緊迫  
セル狀態ノ存シタル事實ニシテ、第二ニハ一國ノ軍隊力他國ノ  
領域内又ハ之ニ近接シテ駐屯シ、而モ事件頻發シ何時カハ迅速  
ナル行動ヲ執ルノ必要アルヘキヲ思ハシムル場合、苟クモ組織  
アル軍隊トシテハ當然之ニ備フヘキ緊急作戰計畫ヲ有セサルヘ  
カラサル メテ明瞭ニシテ、日本軍モ亦斯ル作戰計畫ヲ豫メ  
用意セルノ事實之ナリ。

報告書カ右第一點ノ急迫セル緊急狀態、即チ日支間ニ漸次昂マ  
リツツアリタル一般的緊張狀態及相接觸スル兩軍間ノ局地的緊  
張狀態ヲ認メツツモ而モ之ヲ充分明白ナラシメサリシ次第ハ藝  
ニモ述ヘタル通ナリ。

日本軍ノ計  
畫

第二點即チ日本軍カ「支那軍トノ間ニ於ケル敵對行爲起リ得ヘ

キコトヲ豫想シテ慎重準備セラレタル計畫」一七一页一ヲ有シタリトノ點ニ關シテハ單ニ事實ヲ一瞥セムカ、他ノ如何ナル國他ノ如何ナル軍隊モ恐ラク同様方針ニ出ツルノ外無カリシナルヘキコト自カラ明白ナルヘシ。

九月十八日以前滿洲ニ於ケル日本軍ハ飛行機其ノ他豊富ナル軍需品及貯藏彈藥ヲ備ヘ、一太兵工廠ヲ有セル極メテ優勢ナル軍隊ニ對スルニ遙ニ劣勢ナル兵力ヲ以テシタリ。從テ同軍トシテハ何等力ノ事件發生スル場合又ハ支那側ノ攻撃アリタル場合、優勢ナル敵軍ニ依リ壓倒セラルコトヲ避ケンカ爲、迅速ナル行動ヲ執ルノ準備ヲナシ置クノ要アリシハ當然ナリ。日本軍カスル事態ニ備フヘキ計畫ヲ有シタルハ固ヨリ其ノ所ニシテ、若シ之ヲ有セサリシトセハ重大ナル職務懈怠ト云フヘシ。同軍ハ凡ユル場合ヲ周密ニ研究シ頗繁ニ演習ヲ行ヒテ其ノ結果ハ右計畫ノ殆ト自働的ニ實施ヲナシ得ル狀態ニ在リタリ。尤モ特定ノ場合現地將卒ニ對シ臨機裁量ノ餘地ハ與ヘラレタルモ、攻擊ヲ

## 所謂平和電報

受ケタル場合如何ニ對應スヘキカハ豫見セラレ且知悉セラレ居タリ。從テ支那軍ニ依ル鐵道爆破及最初ノ發砲アリタル後、此ノ計畫カ「迅速且正確ニ實施セラレタル」（七一页）ハ極メテ當然ナリ。

報告臺ハ日本軍力最モ合法且必要ナル防衛手段トシテ右緊急計畫ヲ用意セルコトト、支那側カ何等「日本軍ニ攻擊ヲ加ヘ又ハ特ニ右ノ時及場所ニ於テ日本人ノ生命及財產ヲ危險ナラシムルカ如キ」（七一页）計畫ヲ有セサリシコトトヲ對照シ、其ノ證據トシテ張學良カ支那軍隊ニ對シ懲忍ヲ旨トシ兵力ニ訴フヘカラスト訓令セル九月六日附電報ナルモノヲ引用セリ。尤モ日本側ハ右電報ニ關シ何等ノ情報ヲ有セサルモ、假ニ右電報カ果シテ適當ニ發受通達セラレ且其ノ後ニ於テ張學良自身ニ依リテ取消又ハ變更セラレタルコトアシトスルモ、支那軍隊ノ不規律力世界周知ノコトナルニ鑑ミ、右電報ノ故ヲ以テ支那側カ日本軍隊ヲ攻撃セサルコトノ保障トモ、又支那側カ九月十八日ノ攻擊

ヲ爲ササリシトノ證據トモナルモノニ非ス。況ニヤ當夜支那軍  
隊力實際攻事ヲ爲シ且引續キ武力抵抗ヲ爲シタルノ事實アルニ  
於テヲヤ。此ノ點ニ付テハ委員會ハ「支那軍ハ何等協同セル又  
ハ命令ヲ受ケタル攻事ヲ日本軍ニ對シ行ヒタルモノニ非ス」ト  
述ヘ、支那側力攻事セリトノ假定ヲ否定スルコトナク單ニ之ヲ  
「協同セル又ハ命令ヲ受ケタル」モノニ非スト云ヒテ右攻事ト  
本事件トノ關係ヲ輕視スルニ努メ居レリ。即チ報告書ニ據ルモ  
此ノ攻事ハ少クトモ上官ノ命令ニ基カサル支那兵ノ行爲ナルヘ  
シト見ラルル次第ナリ。

計畫ノ自衛的實行  
委員會ノ表  
示セル意見  
日本側ノ緊急計畫ハ自衛的ニ實施セラルニ至レルモノナリ。  
委員會ハ九月十八日夜ノ事件ニ關シ「同夜ニ於ケル日本軍ノ軍  
事行動ハ、、、、、正當ナル自衛手段ト認ムルコトヲ得ス」  
一頁一ト附言スルヲ以テ其ノ勝券ナリト思性セリ。

自衛ハ容認  
セラル

斯ル判断ハ全然受諾シ雖キ所ニシテ、右ハ戰爭拠棄ニ關スルヲ  
リアン、ケロツグ」條約加盟國ノ何レモ意外トスル所ナルヘシ。  
一九二八年六月二十三日附「ケロツグ」國務長官ノ同文通牒中  
自衛權ニ關スル一節ハ左ノ如シ。

(一) 自衛權、不戰條約米國草案中ニハ何等自衛ノ權利ヲ制限シ若ハ毀損スルモノナシ該權利ハ各主權國固有ハモハニシテ、一切ハ條約中ニ默示的ニ包含セラルモハナリ各國民ハ如何ナル時ニ於テモ又條約ノ規定如何ニ拘ラス攻撃又ハ侵入ニ對シテ其ノ領土ヲ防衛スルノ自由ヲ有シ且右國民ノミカ自衛ノ爲戰爭ニ訴フルヲ安スル情勢ニアリヤ否ヤヲ決定スルノ權能ヲ有ス

又同條約批准ニ際シ米國上院ノ採擇セル決議ハ左ノ如シ。  
自衛權ノ行使ハ右權利ヲ行使スル一國ハ領土權ハ範國外ニ及フコトヲ得ヘク又屢々及フモノナルコトハ十分ニ認メラル所ナリ。

更ニ一九二八年五月十九日及七月十八日附「サードオーステン・チエーンバレン」ノ在英米國外交代表者宛書翰ヲ引用スルニ左ノ如シ。

前者ニ於テハ次ノ如ク述ヘラル、

四、英國政府ハ合衆國第一條ノ用語ヲ攻撃シタルモ右文言  
ハ自衛上一國力執ルノ已ムナキニ至レル行爲ヲ排斥スルモ  
ノトハ思考セス「ケロツグ」氏ハ前記ノ演説中ニ於テ自衛  
權ハ犯樂シ得サルモノト認ムル旨ヲ明ニセラレタルニ依リ  
英國政府ハ本問題ニ關シ條文ニ追加ノ要ナシト思考スルニ  
至レリ

一〇、國家ノ政策ノ手段トシテノ戰爭ノ撫棄ニ關スル第  
文言ニ顧ミ本官ハ世界ノ特定地域ニ於テハ其ハ康寧及保全  
カ我國ハ平和及安全ニ對シ寄殊且緊切ナル利害關係ヲ構成  
スルモノハナルコトニ付國下ノ注意ヲ喚起セントス英國政  
ハ從來此等地域ニ對ヘル干涉ヲ容認シ得サルコトヲ明ニセ  
セ

、ント、努力、シ、來、レ、リ、攻、撃、ニ、對、シ、此、等、地、域、ヲ、防、護、ス、ル、コ、ト、ハ、英、帝、國、ニ、ト、リ、自、衛、ハ、一、手、段、ナ、リ、新、條、約、カ、此、ノ、點、ニ、付、英、國、政、府、ノ、行、動、ノ、自、由、ヲ、阻、害、セ、ス、ト、ノ、明、確、ナ、ル、諒、解、ノ、下、ニ、同、政、府、ハ、之、ヲ、受、諾、ス、ル、モ、ノ、ナ、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、明、カ、ニ、シ、置、ク、ノ、必、要、ア、リ、合、衆、國、政、府、モ、亦、同、種、ノ、利、害、ヲ、有、シ、他、國、力、之、ヲ、無、視、ス、ル、ヲ、非、友、誼、的、行、爲、ト、看、做、ス、ヘ、キ、旨、宣、言、シ、タル、コ、ト、アル、ニ、依、リ、英、國、政、府、カ、其、ノ、立、場、ヲ、斯、ク、明、カ、ニ、ス、ル、ハ、即、チ、合、衆、國、政、府、ノ、意、嚮、ト、見、解、ト、ヲ、表、明、ス、ル、モ、ノ、ト、信、ス、

後、者、ニ、於、テ、ハ、次、ノ、如、ク、述、ヘ、ラ、ル、

本、官、ハ、「ケ、ロ、ツ、グ」氏、ノ、四、月、二、十八、日、其、ノ、演、說、中、ニ、於、テ、本、件、條、約、ハ、何、等、自、衛、ノ、權、利、ヲ、制、限、若、ハ、毀、損、セ、ス、ト、述、ヘ、ラ、レ、タル、見、解、及、各、國、家、ハ、自、ラ、自、衛、ノ、爲、戰、爭、ニ、訴、フ、ル、ヲ、要、ス、ル、情、勢、ニ、ア、リ、見、ヤ、ヲ、決、定、ス、ル、ノ、權、能、ヲ、有、ス、ト、ノ、意、見、ニ、全、然、實、同、ス、ル、モ、ノ、ナ、リ、佛、國、政、府、モ、亦、一、九、二、八、年、七、月、十、四、日、附、在、佛、米、國、大、使、宛、回、答、…於、テ、同、樣、左、ノ、如、ク、述、ヘ、タ、リ、。

新條約中ニハ如何ナル方法ニ於テモ自衛権ヲ制限シ若ハ危殆  
ナラシムヘキ何モノヲモ包含セス此ノ點ニ關シ各國民ハ常ニ  
攻撃若ハ侵略ニ對シ其ノ領土ヲ防禦シ得ルノ自由ヲ有シ各國、  
民ハミカ自衛ハ爲戰爭ニ訴フルヲ要スル情況ニ在リヤ否ヤア  
判定シ得ルナリ

獨國政府ハ一九二八年四月二十七日附在獨米國大使宛書翰ニ於  
テ本條約ハ「各國家ノ自衛ノ主權ニ觸ルモノニ非ス」トノ前  
提ノ下ニ出發スルモノナルコトヲ宣言シ居レリ。

是等往復書翰ヲ了悉セル日本政府モ亦駐日米國大使宛一九二八  
年五月二十六日附公文ニ於テ「合衆國提案ハ何等獨立國家ニ對  
シ自衛ノ権利ヲ拒否セスト強調スルヲ忘レサリキ。」  
斯ル明白ナル留保アル以上、自衛ノ行動ニ對シテ決定的意見ヲ  
下スノ権利ハ專ラ當該國ノ主權ノ認定ニ繫ルモノナリ。本件ニ  
關シ委員會ハ「本委員會ハ現地ニ在リタル將校カ自衛ノ爲行動  
シツツアリト思惟シタルナルヘシトノ想定ハ之ヲ排除セス」ト

自衛ノ程度  
比例  
大關係  
性利益  
ニ  
比ノハ  
重關係  
ス

明白ニ判定シ居ル處、九月十八日ノ事件ニ付テハ現地ニ在リタル將校以外何人ト雖モ日本軍ノ執リタル行動カ自衛ノ措置ナリシヤ否ヲ判断スルノ資格ヲ有スルモノナカルヘシ。

自衛權ノ性質ニ關シ茲ニ詳説スルノ必要ナカルヘク、右ニ付テハ米國國務卿「ウエブスター」氏ノ定義ヲ以テ最モ適當トスヘシ。蓋シ同卿ハ自衛權ノ正當ナル行使ハ「手段ノ選擇及熟考ノ時間ナキ緊急且驟倒的ナル必要アル」場合タルコトヲ要ストナシ居レル處、九月十八日事件ハ是等ノ條件ニ正確ニ適合セリ。即當時ノ狀勢ハ絶大急迫ナル危險ニ對抗スルノ必要アリタリ。即チ優勢ナル兵力ニヨリ明白ナル攻撃ヲ受ケ、若シ早キニ及ンテ之ヲ排除セスンハ日本軍ハ滿洲ヨリ驅逐セラレタルナルヘシ。手段選擇ノ餘地無ク只反撃ノ一途アリタルノミ。固ヨリ熟考ニ時ヲ費スヲ許サス、攻撃ハ公然開始セラレタリ。問題ハ極メテ簡單ニシテ危險ニ曝サレタル利益ノ程度カ強力措置ヲ必要トスルヤ否ヤヲ考慮スルノ要ナカリキ。蓋シ是等ノ利益ハ極東ニ於

ケル日本ノ地位其ノ物ニ外ナラサリシヲ以テナリ。支那側ノ抵抗ニ伴フ爾後ノ事件ニ付テモ日本ハ何等ノ責任ヲ問ハルヘキ理由ナシ。普通ノ場合自衛ノ措置ハ抵抗ヲ受ケス且關係國間ノ友誼的商議ニ依リ直ニ解決セラルモノナリ。然レトモ一度武力抵抗ニ遭遇スルニ於テハ自衛手段カ如何ナル程度ニ擴大スルヤハ固ヨリ之ヲ豫測スルニ由ナキナリ。此ノ關係ニ於テ彼ノ「ナヴァアリノ」事件ヲ回想スルハ必シモ失當ニ非サルヘシ。該事件ニ於テ衝突ヲ希望シ又ハ之ヲ豫期シタルモノナカリシハ現ニ關係國ノ一國カ之ヲ「不慮ノ出來事」ナリト謂ヘルニ徵スルモ明カナリ。當時希臘ニ於ケル叛亂ヲ鎮壓スル爲土耳其ノ援助ニ赴キタル埃及艦隊ハ之ヲ妨ケントセル英佛露ノ艦隊ニ遭遇シ、事態甚タ緊張セルニ際シ遇然ノ發砲力導火トナリテ終ニ衝突ヲ惹起スルニ至リ、其ノ結果ハ埃及ノ艦隊ト共ニ土耳其ノ希望ハ殲滅セラレ希臘ノ獨立ハ刻印セラレタリ。然レトモ右ハ單ナル自衛行爲即チ發砲ニ對スル應射ニ發足

## 同時的軍事行動

セルモノニシテ、宣衛措置ヨリ來ル結果ヲ制限スルコトカ如何ニ不可能ナルカヲ示スモノナリ。

委員會ハ九月十八日滿鐵附屬地帶全域ニ亘リ同時ニ軍事行動ノ起リタルコトヲ姑済スルモ、當時斯ル同時的行動力何故ニ必要ナリシカヲ闇却セリ。千百杆ニ亘ル鐵道沿線ニ駐屯スル一萬四百ノ軍隊ヲ率キテ、關内ニ於ケル張學良麾下ノ十一萬ヲ除クモ尙二十二萬ヲ數フル支那軍隊ニ對峙セル日本軍司令官トシテハ他ニ歎ハキ手段ナカリシナリ。殊ニ奉天ニ於テハ定員ニ滿タサル一個聯隊及若干ノ鐵道守備兵總計千五百人ヨリ成ル日本軍カ、砲約四十門ヲ有スル一萬五千ノ支那兵ニ對峙シ居リ長春其ノ他ニ於テモ同様ノ状態ニ在リタリ。日本軍司令官ハ百萬ヲ超ユル在滿日本臣民保護ノ責任ヲ有シタルカ、既ニ一地點ニ於テ攻撃セラレ且明カニ他ノ地點ニ於テモ攻撃ヲ受クル虞アリシニ際シ、右保護ヲ確保スル唯一ノ手段ハ鐵道ニ依ル輸送ノ便ヲ悉ク利用シ支那軍隊ノ行動ニ對シ機先ヲ制スルニアリタリ。

## 結

## 論

要スルニ九月十八日夜開始セラレタル軍事行動ハ、支那側攻撃ノ場合ニ備フルカ爲準備セラレタル計画ヲ實施シタルニ過キサルモノニシテ、現地ニ於ケル支那側兵力ノ非常ニ優勢ナルニ顧ミ、日本軍司令官ハ常ニ右計画ヲ急速且正確ニ實施スルヲ以テ、右保護ノ任ヲ果ス爲ニ缺クヘカラサルモノト思考シ居リタリ。右行動ハ自衛以外ニ亘リシコトナク、日本政府ハ該行動力必要ナリシヤ否ヤ又ハ妥當ナリシヤ否ヤニ付外間ノ論議ヲ許ス能ハス。

## 其ノ後ノ軍事行動

報告書ハ九月十八日以後ニ於ケル日本臣民ノ生命財産ノ保護ヲ有效ニ保障スル爲ノ軍事行動ニ付相當仔細ニ記述シ居レル處、日本政府ハ是等細目ノ點ニ付テモ意見ヲ述ブルノ必要アルモノ多々アルヲ認ムルモ茲ニハ一々論議セサルヘシ。只何レノ場合ニ於テモ未タ曾テ自衛權ノ範囲ヲ逸脱シタルコトナキヲ確信スルモノナリ。

問題ノ重要 輸送會第六章ニ掲タル滿洲諸問題ハ最モ重要ナリ。何トナレハ委員會力第九章ニ於テ爲シタル「滿洲ニ於ケル現政權ノ存置及承認モ亦均シク不滿足ナルヘシ」トノ一般的判定ハ、滿洲國ノ成立及新政府ニ對スル住民ノ態度ニ關シ第六章中ニ爲サレタル論斷ニ其ノ基礎ヲ置キ居ルヲ以テナリ。

足證據ノ不滿  
ナルコト

右輸送ハ實證セラレタル事實ヲ殆ト參酌セシテ爲サレタルヤニ見受ケラル。短期間ノ潛在ヲ以テシテ、成立後僅々數週間ノ斯國家ニ於ケル事態ノ真相ヲ把握スルノ困難ナルハ勿論ニシテ斯ル新國家力建國早々ノ時代ニ於テ例へハ反動分子及不平分子ノ策動、過渡期ニ必然伴フ諸々ノ困難特ニ商業及農業ニ對スル打撻、特ニ滿洲國ノ場合ニ於テ殊ニ熾烈且惡辣ナル反對宣傳ノ如キ各種ノ障壁ニ遭遇スレハ免レサル所アリ。

然ルニ報告書カ日本政府ノ段肅ナル聲明ニ耳ヲ籍サス、且日本政府提供ノ詳細ナル文書ニ對シ殆ト價值ヲ認メサル一方、滿洲

及張學良ノ根據地タル北平ニ於テ素性不明ノ人物ノ意見ニ従順シ且出所ノ曖昧又ハ不明ナル書信ニ信ヲ置キタルコトハ遺憾ナリ。

從テ日本政府ハ報告書第六章ニ掲タル滿洲國ノ成立、住民ノ意  
識並ニ新國家ノ組織及將來ニ關シ、國際聯盟理事會ヲシテ史ニ  
正確ナル概念ヲ得シムルヲ以テ其ノ特別アル貢獻ト感スルモノ  
ナリ。

滿洲ノ獨立  
ハ新ナル  
事立

第一ニ報告書ハ一九三一年九月以前ニハ滿洲ノ獨立ニ關シ未タ  
曾テ開ク所ナカリキト論断シ居レリ（一九七頁）。

然ルニ滿洲カ地理的及歴史的ニ終始支那本部トハ分離セル一特  
別地域タリシコトハ既ニ明瞭ニ説述セリ。滿洲ハ清朝ノ帝室領  
ヲ形成シタルモノニシテ文那共和國又ハ其ノ官吏ハ支那本部ニ  
合併スルノ實力ヲ有シタルコトナシ。且滿洲ノ獨立カ少クトモ  
メ居レリ。張作霖及其ノ子張學良ノ暴政ハ周知ノ事實ニシテ之

亦報告書ノ認ムル所ナリ。彼等ノ野心及貪婪ハ彼等ヲ騙ツテ漏  
洲ヲ犠牲ニ供シテ高價且慘價タル支那侵入ヲ企テシメタリ。而  
シテ此ノ結果夙ニ所謂「保境安民」運動起リ「滿洲人ノ爲ノ滿  
洲」ナル叫ヒヲ擧ケシムルニ至レルハ儼然タル事實ニシテ、斯  
ル運動ヨリ名實共ニ元全ナル獨立ニ至ルハ眞ニ一步ニ過キサリ  
キ。該運動ハ架空ノ事實ニ非スシテ其ノ指導者ハ何レモ周知ノ  
人物ナリ。即チ張作霖時代ノ奉天省王永江及張ノ參議于沖漢ニ  
シテ共ニ張ノ暴舉ヲ謀止シテ容レラレス其ノ職ヲ辭スルニ至レ  
ルモノナルカ、九月十八日事件後ニ於テ自治指導部ノ組織者ト  
ナレルモノハ實ニ于沖漢其ノ人ナリ。即チ彼カ自治指導部ノ組  
以者トナレルハ口本側ノ誘引ニ屈服セルニ非スシテ單ニ彼ニ中  
止セル事實ヲ證紙セルニ過キス。斯ノ如キハ滿洲獨立運動ノ代  
表的事例ナリ。

以上ノ次第ヲ強調セムカ爲張家時代ニ起レル他ノ獨立運動ヲ一  
々列舉スルノ要アシ。然ルニ報告書カ滿洲獨立ノ思想力存在セ

ノル今  
ノル同  
ノル詳  
ノル細  
ノル立  
ノル遠  
ノル動  
ノルゲ

サリト明言シ居ルハ意外ニ感セサルヲ得ス。

張父子ノ秕政及誅求ハ教養アル支那人及滿洲人ヲ駆ツテ仄ニ改革ノ必要ヲ考慮セシメタリ。奉天律師公會長趙欣伯ハ張作霖ニ本問題ヲ提議シタルモ其ノ容ルル所トナラサリキ。奉天馮庸大學生ニ於テ一團ノ教説述モ亦張學良ノ軍閥政治ニ對抗セム爲ニ必安ナル政治改革ノ研究ヲ始メタルカ趙ハ此ノ一團ト接觸ヲ保テリ。

斯ノ加ク滿洲ニ於テハ一九三一年九月以前ニ於テモ獨立ヲ目的トセル運動存セルカ、此ノ點ニ關シ委員會ハ一切ノ資料滿洲ニ於テ新政府ノ首腦者達トノ會談ノ際ニ提供セラレタル情報ヲ全ク無視セルヤニ見受ケラル。

滿洲ノ獨立ハ未タ曾テ同ク所ナカリシトノ報告書ノ論斷力不當ナルハ以上ノ如シ。次ニ吾人ハ滿洲國成立ノ事體及之ニ對スル日本ノ態度ニ付テ述ヘントス。此ノ點ニ關シ報告書ハ事實ニ一致セサルコト否シキモノアリ。

報告書ハ滿洲ノ獨立宣言運動ハ九月十八日ノ事件ノ結果トシテ  
發生セル事態ヲ收拾スル爲日本人ニ依リ開始セラレ且組織及遂  
行セラレタルモノニシテ、之力爲日本人ハ若干支那要人ノ社名  
ヲ續り其ノ積極的協力ヲ利用セリト述へ、且日本軍司令部ノ行  
動ニ付テハ九月十八日以後政治的動機ノ頗ル顯著ナルモノアリ  
而シテ東京本謀本部ハ石獨立運動ニ援助ヲ與ヘ其ノ組織者シ指  
揮セリト述ヘ居レリ。

然レトモ斯ノ如キ急定力如何ニ根據ナキカハ少シク想ヲ固セハ  
明瞭ナルヘシ。張學良ノ下ニ於テ滿洲ノ秩序維持ノ責任者タリ  
シ官憲カ九月十八日以後ニ於テ大部分逃亡セル際、引續キ日常生活ノ恢復ヲ維持スル爲ニ何等カノ組織ノ必要ナルコト明カナ  
リキ。地方首領者ニ依リ地方自治委員會組織セラレタルカ、日本  
本立除ハ彼等ノ協力ヲ歓迎シ之ヲ援助セリ。茲シ如何ナル軍隊  
ト雖モ其ノ占領地域ニ對シ成ル可ク損害ヲ少ナカラシムルノ要  
アリ、文明生活ノ手段ヲ維持スルコトハ日本軍ノ第一ニ留意セ

ル所ニシテ、右目的ノ達成ハ自治委員會トノ協力ニ依リ初メテ可能ナリシナリ。政府ノ胚芽タル是等自治委員會力結合シテ眞ノ國家ヲ成スニ至レルハ何等驚クヘキコトニ非シテ、此ノ間日本側ノ使嗾ヲ想似スルノ餘地ナシ。滿洲ハ一人ノ統治者ヲ有スルノミニシテ、支那本部ノ如キ多數ノ權力者ノ確執ニ依リ構サルルコトナカリシセ眞ノ統治ハ紊亂ヲ極メ居レリ。從テ斯爲政者等力張謀福ヨリ威セントシタルハ異トスルニ足ラス。一九三一年九月十八日以前及以後ニ於ケル滿洲ノ實情ヲ知悉スルモノニ取リテハ張政福ヲ拆除セントスル決意カ一絞ニ瀕漫シ、其ノ結果完全ナル獨立ヲ宣言スルノ運動ニ容易ニ進展シ得ヘキ状況ニ在リシコトハ直ニ明瞭ナルヘシ。此ノ點ニ關シ夙ニ支那共和國ノ創立ト同時ニ起リタル清朝復辟運動力、嘗テ清朝發祥ノ地ニシテ後ニ其ノ帝室領タリシ滿洲ト終始多大ノ關係ヲ有シタルコトモ亦之ヲ記憶セサルヘカラス。是等ノ事情ニ通曉スルモノニトリテハ當時這般シツツアリタル「獨立運動」ハ何等ノ爲

支那洲人那リコノ人ト事及明美滿

異ヲ齊スモノニ非ス。従テ該運動力全部（九七頁第二五行）又ハ一部分（九七頁第二三行）一氏名不詳ノ日本人又ハ日本參謀本部ノ仕業ナリトノ想像ハ當然否定セラルヘキモノナリ。

報告書自身ノ陳述ニ依ルモ是等地方、省及國家獨立ノ運動ハ何レモ支那人、滿洲人又ハ蒙古人中ノ有力者ノ事業ナリシヲ見ル即チ奉天ニ於テハ奉天公會長趙欣伯、張學良時代ノ東北政務委員會副委員長袁金凱、治安維持委員會副委員長于沖漢、奉天省主席臧式毅、吉林ニ於テハ同省主席代理熙洽、哈爾賓ニ於テハ東省特別區行政長官張景惠ナリ。而シテ新國家設立計畫ノ準備ニ當レルハ于沖漢及臧式毅ノ兩者ナリキ。國家組織ノ細目ヲ作リ且獨立宣言ヲ起草セルハ奉天ニ集合セル奉天、吉林、熱河、滿洲各省及東省特別區要人並ニ蒙古族人ニシテ、新國家ノ胚芽タリシ東北行政委員會ヲ構成セルハ支那人、滿洲人及蒙古人ノミナリキ。

日  
時

更ニ是等還助ニ關スル日時ヲ考覈セハ事實ト委員會ノ商討トハ

一致セヌ甚シキ擅居ヲ示シ居ルコト明カルヘシ。奉天地方ニ於ケル沿支鐵持委員會ハ九月二十四日設立セテレ、早クモ同二十六日ニハ奉天省及東三省ノ獨立ノ意圖ヲ表明スル宣言ヲ綴セリ。同日鳳陽ハ吉林省ノ獨立ヲ宣言シ、翌二十七日哈爾賓ニ於テ治安維持委員會設立セラレタリ。更ニ十月一日張海鷗ハ瀋陽ニ於テ獨立ヲ宣布セリ。同十七日東邊鎮守使于芷山モ亦獨立ヲ宣言シ前與帝ジ元首トスル滿蒙國ノ創設ヲ提唱セリ。九月十八日ヨリ右等獨立運動ノ發生ニ至ル短期間ニ於テ日本官憲力獨立開始ノ筋整ヲ協定シ、又那人、滿洲人及蒙古人ヲシテ右筋整ヲ彼等獨自ノ計盤アルカ如ク裝ヒ、右筋整ヲ即刻實施セシムルコトヲ得タリト想像シ得ヘキヤ。反之夙ニ在滿文那人及滿洲人首領者ノ心懶ニ往來シツツモ從來發現ノ機會ナカリシ要望力、或多ノ供給ヲ有シタル政府ノ消滅ヲ機トシ自發的且自然的ニ活路ヲ見出シタルモノアリト結論スルコト、右等ノ如キ想像ヨリモ一層簡明且一層合理的ナラスヤ。

獨立宣言ノ思想力全然支那人、滿洲人及蒙古人ノ間ニ發生セルモノナルコトハ、該思想力清朝復辟ノ思想トモ關係ヲ有シタルニ顧ミレハ益々明瞭アリ。例へハ滿洲國實業部總長張燕卿（清朝當時ニ於ケル有名アル碩學ニシテ且政治家タリシ張之洞ノ息）及滿洲國外交部總長胡介石ハ何レモ其ノ運動等ニ清朝復辟運動ノ有力者ナリ。滿洲人ニシテ知名ノ復辟主義者タル現滿洲國政府總長熙洽モ亦是等一派ノ首腦者タリキ。日本官憲ニ於テモ斯ル思想ノ横溢セルコトヲ承知シ居リタルハ事實ナルカ、之ニ對シ個人的ニハ同情ヲ有シタルモノアリタルモ、日本政府及關東軍司令部ハ何等之ヲ獎勵スルカ如キコトアカリキ。

右ニ關聯シ九月二十六日幣原外務大臣及南薩軍大臣カ在滿日本官憲ニ對シ、滿洲ニ新政權ヲ樹立セントスル諸種ノ企圖ニ日本人ノ關與スルコトヲ嚴禁セル訓令ヲ發シタルノ事實ヲ指摘スルコト適當ナルヘシ。

是等ノ訓令ニ迄ヒ日本武官憲ハ何レモ獨立運動ニ關與スルヲ達

ケタルカ、其ノ具體化スルニ至ルヤ關東軍司令部ハ之ヲ無視スルコトヲ得サリキ。而シテ右運動ノ指導者カ其ノ計画ヲ完成シ之ヲ開示セルニ及ンテハ、秩序維持ノ終局的責任者タル關東軍當局ニ於テ該運動ノ行政権ヲ樹立シ一切ノ不穩分子ヲ除去スルニ至ルノ見込アルモノトシテ之ヲ重視スルヲ得サリシハ當然ナリ。報告書ハ「自治指導部」ヲ相當重視居ル處、同部ハ十一月十日ニ至リ初メテ副謀セラレ支那人ノ管理下ニ在リタルモノナリ。然ルニ報告書ハ之ヲ以テ關東軍司令部第四課ノ一械制トナシ「日本人ニ依リ組織セラレ且大部分ノ職員ハ日本人ニ依リ充タサルル」（九二頁）モノト爲シ居レリ。右ハ單ニ支那制覇者中ノ誣説ヲ其ノ體取入レ且之ヲ報告書ノ所謂「信憑スヘキ」證人ヘ其ノ何人ナルヤハ分明セスノ言ヲ以テ強メタルモノニ過キスシテ全ク事實ニ反ス。關東軍司令部ニハ常ニ滿洲ノ政況ヲ研究スル一課存在シ、一九三一年九月十八日以後ニ於テ獨立運動ノ擔頭スルニ及ヒ其ノ職掌上右運動ニ關スル一切ノ情報ヲ

日本軍隊ノ  
存在ニ基  
存ノ  
議ヲ  
タル

蒐集スルノ長アリタルハ勿論ナリ。然レトモ同謀ハ既ニ十月初以來奉天省ニ於テ組織セラレタル治安維持又ハ獨立ヲ企圖セル各種委員會ノ活動ヲ統制スルノ目的ヲ以テ于冲漠ノ統率下ニ組織セラレタル「自治指導部」トハ何等ノ關係ヲ有セサリキ。趙欣伯ハ調査委員會ニ對シ自己ノ主宰スル會力、九月十八日直後ニ於テ獨立委員會ヲ結成シ新政府樹立ニ關スル要人ノ意圖ヲ締ムル爲省內各地方ニ代表ヲ派遣セル次第ヲ陳述セリ。

其後ニ報告書ハ政府ノ變革ヲ目的トスル斯種運動ハ日本軍隊ノ存在ナカリセハ違行不可能ナリシナルヘキ旨ヲ述ヘ居レル處、日本軍隊ハ正當ノ福利ニ依リ駐在シ居ルモノニシテ、條約上ノ福利ニ基キ既道附屬地ニ駐屯シ且自衛權ノ行使トシテ附屬地外ニ出動セルモノナリ。獨立運動ハ右ノ結果發生シタル狀態ヲ利用シタルモノアリトスルモ、其ノ事實ハ同運動力自發的ナリシコトヲ訪クルモノニ非ス。他ノ諸大陸ニ於テ外國軍隊ノ存在力獨立ノ造成ヲ可能アラシメタル事例、及斯クシテ達成セラレタ

「九國條約」  
基盤  
議論

ル獨立力何等問題トセラレサリシ事例ハ多々アリ。

一九二二年ノ九國條約ハ締約國ニ對シ支那ノ主權侵害ヲ禁スルモノナリトノ議論アルヘキ處、右ハ正當ナル議論ナルモ此ノ場合ニハ何等ノ關係アルコトナシ。一締約國カ其ノ適法ノ権利ヲ倘々支那ノ領土内ニ於テ正當ニ行使スルモ、該國ハ右權利行使ノ結果ニ對シ責任ヲ負ハルヘキモノニ非ス。若シ其ノ結果カ支那ノ主權並ニ保全ヲ旨スルコトアリトルモ之カ責ヲ負フヘキハ該國ニ非ス。從テ假令張學良治下ノ滿洲カ眞ニ支那ノ完全ナル一部ナリシトスルモ日本ハ其ノ正當且必要ナル行動ノ結果ニ對シ責任ヲ負フコトヲ得ス。將又假ニ支那カ眞ニ滿洲ニ於テ統一アル行政ヲ行フ組織アル國家ナリトルモ亦同様ナリ。

矣スルニ現在ノ政權ヲ自然ニシテ自發的ナル運動ノ成果ナリト認メサルコトハ滿洲國ノ提出セル一切ノ證據ヲ無視セルコトヲ示スモノナリ。滿洲國政府ノ作成シ委員會ニ提出セル「滿洲建國小史」ハ滿洲各地ニ續發セル獨立運動ニ關スル記述ヲ載セ、

## 結論

關係者ノ姓名、宣言文及決議文ヲモ掲載シ正確且卒直ナル記述ヲナシ居レリ。即テ同書ニ依レハ是等運動ニハ商業、工業、農業及教育ノ諸團體（中ニハ會員數千ニ達セルモノアリ）其ノ代表者ヲ出シ、建國會議ニ對シテハ從來ノ慣例ニ從ヒ各地方ニ於テ四個ノ代表的地區團體ノ一致ヲ以テスル代表者ヲ任命セリ。從テ一九三二年二月二十九日奉天ニ於テ新國家ノ樹立ヲ宣言シタル全滿聯合大會ハ各方面ノ利益ヲ充分代表シタルモノアリ。報告書モ滿洲政府ノ威武ニ對スル民意如何ヲ確ムル爲ノ實証的方針ヲ述フルニ當リ、同會、職業組合及他ノ民間諸團體ニ依ル右ト全然同様ノ傳統的代表制度ヲ提案シ居ルハ奇ナリト言フヘシ（一三四頁）。

安之、第六章中ノ右ノ部分ニ於ケル委員會ノ論斷ハ新政權ノ根底ヲ成ス歴史的要素ニ反シ、又潛在セル感情ヲ喚起シタル心理的及物質的原因ニ反シ、且滿洲人民ノ間ニ存在シ新國家樹立ノ結果ヲ爲セル獨立運動ノ自發的性質ヲ證明セル一切ノ事實ニ反

ス。

日本政府ハ滿洲獨立宣言ノ運動力純正ニシテ自發的アルト共ニ民意ニ合シ且自然的アルモノナリシコトヲ茲ニ確信ヲ以テ反對スルモノナリ。舊帝至領土ハ往時ノ統治者ノ後裔ヲ其ノ元首ニ仰キ以テ横暴ナル舊軍閥ノ壓制及支那本部ノ無政府狀態ヨリ確實ニ離脱セリ。獨立ヲ實現シタル主動者カ關東軍司令部ノ一械團ナリトノ主張（九二頁）、一部ノ日本官吏カ右運動ヲ謀シ組織シ且遂行シタリトノ主張（九七頁）、及日本官吏ノ活動ス滿洲團ノ創立ニ於ケル「最モ有力ナル要因」ナリシトノ主張（一九七頁）ハ何レモ根據ナキノミナラス、帝國政府ノ明確ナル聲明ニ反シ且何等ノ證據ニ基カサルモノニシテ、報告書ノ是等ノ主張ハ支那參與員ノ誣說ヲ其ノ體悉ク採用シタルモノト認メラル。

委員會ノ有  
シタル資料

ロ、住民ノ滿洲國ニ對スル態度  
委員會力其ノ意見ヲ作成スル基礎トシテ有シタル材料左ノ如シ  
一 支那人、滿洲人、蒙古人、日本人、朝鮮人、露西亞人等ニ  
シテ商會並ニ政治、農業及教育等ノ各界ヲ代表セル人々ヨ

リ成ル相當權威アル諸團體ノ發セル請願書及宣言書  
ニ郵便又ハ其ノ他ノ方法ニ依リ送付セラレ、多分支那人ヨリ

出テタルモノト見ラルハ一千五百五十通ノ書信

二 實業家、銀行家、教師、醫師、警察官吏等トノ私的會談  
本節ノ特徵トシテ顯著ナルハ素性知レサル支那人ノ書簡ニ對シ  
テ過大ノ信用ヲ與ヘタルコト（是等書簡ハ二通ヲ除キテハ總テ  
滿洲國及日本ニ取り不利ナリト稱セラル）、並ニ公ノ覺書及前  
政權ニ對スル人民ノ不滿ヲ列舉シ、其ノ要望ヲ表明セル諸種ノ

責任アル團體ノ請願及宣言ヲ輕視セルコト之ナリ。

委員會ハ新國家ノ成立ニ反對セル一千五百四十八通ノ書簡ヲ受取  
リタリト云フモ、由來支那側宣傳振ノ猛烈ナルニ顧ミレハ書簡  
ノ數カ右ニ止リタルハ寧ロ意外ナリト云フヘシ。蓋シ滿洲ニハ

各種階級及  
民族ノ意見

約三千萬ノ人民アル處委員會ニ其ノ意向ヲ通告セルモノカ二萬人ニ付一人ニ過キストセハ、此ノ事實ハ寧ロ滿洲國ニトリ有利ナルモノニ非スヤ。他方滿洲國ヲ歓迎スル數千ノ民衆ノ諸種ノ會合ニ依リテ表示セラレ且責任アル代表及有力ナル市民ノ證言ニ依リテ支持セラレタル明白ナル證據ハ、一概ニ日本國ノ策動ニ依ル季ノメシヲ無事ニ却下セラレタリ。組織的ノ「搾取」、壓迫及欺瞞政治ノ犠牲トナリ來レル人民カ、日本側ノ脅迫及買收ヲ俟ツ迄モ無ク、少クトモ彼等ノ勞働ノ成果ヲ保障セル政府ヲ是認シタルヘキハ極メテ賄易キ所ナリ。反之農民及勞働者ノ態度カ「外國人及教育アル支那人」（一〇九頁）ノ意見ヨリシテ窺ヒ知ルコト能ハサルハ勿論ナリ。

官吏、警察官、軍人、實業家、銀行家等爾餘ノ諸階級ニ關シテハ報告書ハ苟モ滿洲國ニ敵意ヲ有スルモノニ付テハ一々之ヲ記録ニ止メナカラ、滿洲國ヲ支持スルモノニ付テハ利害ノ打算又ハ恐怖心ニ依リ動カサレタルニ止マリ何等愛國的理想ニ依ルモ

ノニ非ラスヤシテ之ヲ排シ居レリ。

最後ニ報告書ハ支那人ノ滿洲國ニ對スル反感ヲ強調シ乍ラ朝鮮人、露西亞人及蒙古人カ新國家ニ對シ衷心ヨリ示シタル賛成ニ付テハ極メテ簡單ニ之ヲ説明シ去ラントシ、朝鮮人ノ新政ニ對スル歓迎ノ事實ハ認ムルモ而モ卒直ニ之ヲ爲サスシテ此ノ歓迎カ果シテ何時迄續クヘキヤト反問シ、又蒙古人ノ概シテ同情的ナル態度ヲ認メツツモ張學良ノ勢力下ニアル北京ニ於テ蒙古王族代表者ノ爲シタル一個ノ反滿洲國宣言ヲ取立テテ強調シ居ツサ幸シテ事實ハ報告書中ノ不利ナル描寫ヨリモ遙カニ有望ナリ「滿洲建國小史」中ニ詳細ニ敍述セラレアルカ如キ新國家建設直前ノ幾多ノ大民衆示威運動ニ付再言スル迄モナカルヘク、又滿洲國反對者ノ努力ニモ拘ラス人民カ新政ニ對シ引續キ歓迎ノ意ヲ示シツツアル顯著ナル事例ヲ舉クルノ要モナカルヘシ。蓋シ新政ハ清朝覆滅以來滿洲地方住民カ初メテ享受セル文治的政府ニ對テ、現在ノ支那ヲ支配シ居ル軍閥獨裁政治ニ比シ極メテ顯著ナル對照ヲ成スモノナリ。

評報途満洲國ノ前  
告書對ノスノ批れ

ハ、満洲國ノ組、及將來

報告書ハ第六章ニ於テ満洲國ノ組織及其ノ政綱並ニ同國カ其ノ獨立ヲ確保スル爲執リタル各種ノ手段ヲ敍述シタル後、次ノ如ク述ヘ居レリ。

此ノ「政府」ノ政綱ハ數多ノ自由主義的改革案ヲ包含シ、是等ノ實施ハ單ニ満洲ニ於テノミナラス、支那ノ他ノ部分ニ於テモ亦望マシキモノナルヘン。事實是等改革ノ多數ハ支那政府ノ政綱中ニモ亦既ハレ居レリ。本委員會トノ會見ノ際、右「政府」ノ代表者ハ日本人ノ援助ニ依リ彼等ハ相當期間中ニ平和ト秩序ヲ確立スルコトヲ得ヘク、而シテ體チハ之ヲ永遠ニ維持スルコトヲ得ヘシト主張セリ。彼等ハ人民ニ對シ公正ニシテ且有效ナル行政、匪賊ノ掠奪ニ對スル保障、軍費削減ノ結果タル租稅ノ輕減、通貨ノ改革、改善セラタル交通機關及一般人民ノ政治之與權等ヲ與フルコトニ依リ、人民ノ援助ヲ獲得スルヲ得ヘシトノ信念ヲ述ヘタリヘ一〇五一一〇六

頁」。

然ルニ報告書ハ一面右ノ如キ樂觀スヘキ材料ニ舉ケツ、他面  
現在迄一滿洲國政府カ其ノ政策ヲ遂行スル為體シタル時日ノ短  
キヨトヲ充分酌量シ、且既ニ説セラレタル手段ニ對付候ト考量  
ヲ加フルモ、猶此ノ「政府」力事實上其ノ改革大失敗ヲ遂行シ

得ヘキヨトヲ示ス何等ノ徵候モ存セス、  
單ニ一例ヲ舉ケンニ彼等ノ核算制度及貨幣制度ノ改革實現ノ前  
途ニハ幾多重大ナル障礙存スルカ如シ」（一〇六頁）トノ論述

ヲ敢ウシ居ンリ。

右ニ引用セル委員ハ、批評ハ第一章中、左節ノ如キ批評ニ比ス

レハ極ル奇異ナル對照ヲ成セリ。現政府ヘ其ノ歲出及歲入ノ均衡並ニ健全ナル財政的原則ノ遵守ニ努メ來レリ。詔種ノ課稅ヘ統一セラシ且簡單化トスレリ。本來豫算制度ナキヲ以テ財政部ハ毎年度ノ歲出及歲入ノ遵守ニ努メ來レリ。中央銀行ハ設立ミ見タリ。國家財政  
說ヒヨツフ發表シ來レリ。中央銀行ハ設立ミ見タリ。國家財政

此ノ樂觀ト  
悲觀トノ別  
ヤハ故ナリ

財政  
即別  
ノ二點  
及安

委員會任命セラレ其ノ委員ニハ銀行及商業界ノ有力者包含セ  
アル。財政部ハ又徵稅ノ方法未タ甚ク満足ナラサル地方ノ財  
政ヲ監督スルニ努メツツアリ。總テ是等ノ新ナル措置ハ政府  
ノ功ニ歸セラルヘキモノナリ、、、、、、、、、、政府ハ數  
多ノ事項ニ付失敗シタルコト疑ナキモ、而モ既遂ノ業績多々  
アリヘ一七一八貝

委員會力列舉シタル支那ノ各種ノ改革案ハ實際上殆ト何等ノ實  
績ヲ得サリシニ拘ラス、右等改革案存スルノ故フ以テ支那  
ハ多クノ事ヲ成レ遂ケタリト賞讃セラレ居ルニ反シ、滿洲國力  
不當ノ觀點ヨリ不公平ノ判決ヲ下サレ居ルハ注目ニ値ス。

日本政府ハ委員會ノ悲觀的意見ノ根據ニ對シ敢テ詳細ニ瓦リテ  
論議ヲ加ヘムトスルノ意圖ナシ。

蓋シ事實ハ言語ヨリ士雄辯ナレハナリ。只重要ナル二點、即チ  
日本軍ト滿洲國政府トノ協力ニ基ク治安恢復ノ措置、及同國政  
府ノ財政狀態ニ付理事ヘノ注意ヲ喚起セムトスルモノナリ。

## 治安ノ恢復

新生ノ國家ニ於テ反動分子又ハ不平分子ノ策動ニ依リ治安ノ亂サ  
 ルルハ世界共通ノ現象ナリ。殊ニ滿洲國ノ場合ニ於テハ、舊政權  
 時代ノ巨多ノ正規軍力該政權ノ倒壊ト共ニ分散シテ匪賊ノ集團ト  
 ナリタル特殊ノ事情ヲ考慮セサルヘカラス。滿洲國政府ハ其ノ治  
 安恢復ノ計畫中、是等匪賊ノ大集團ヲ潰滅又ハ分散セシムルコト  
 ヲ其ノ第一ノ段階トシ、ヨリ重要ナラサル殘黨並ニ土着ノ小集團  
 ノ匪賊ヲ目下完成ノ途ニ在ル警察組織及其ノ他ノ行政手段ニ依リ  
 鎮定スルヲ以テ、其ノ第二ノ段階ト爲シ居レリ。一方滿洲國政府  
 ハ現存ノ交通機關ヲ改良シ以テ治安恢復事業ヲ容易ナラシメント  
 シツツアリ。右第一段階ノ工作ハ、委員會力滿洲國ニ在リタル當  
 時以來、著シク進歩セルコトヲ述ヘサルヘカラス。即チ新國家ニ  
 對スル最モ手剛キ叛徒タリシ馬占山指揮下ノ部隊ハ既ニ擊滅セラ  
 レ、又李海青指揮下ノ部隊モ既ニ敗退セリ。丁超及李杜ノ部隊ハ  
 東文鐵道東部線北方奥地ニ驅逐セラレタリ。南滿ニ於テモ、同地  
 方ノ治安擾亂ノ主要ナル禍源タリシ奉海線ヨリ鳴綠江岸ニ至ル地

支那側ノ匪  
賊援助

カルル害國ニ犯  
ナル策セノ依罪  
リコ動ン信リノ  
ト行ト用満洲使喚  
明ハスヲ

城ニ於ケル有力ナル匪賊團ハ、日滿聯合軍ニ依リ既ニ掃討セラレ、其ノ他ノ大集團モ奉天、熱河兩省境ノ奥地ニ壓迫セラレ居レリ。要スルニ南北満洲ノ近狀ハ、總括的ニ云ヘハ滿洲國政府ヲシテ前記第二ノ段階即テ警察組織ニ依ル治安恢復ニ依ル段階ニ入ルコトヲ可能ナラシムル事態トナリツツアリ。

滿洲ニ於ケル匪賊ノ現狀ニ付特ニ忘ルヘカラサルハ、是等兵匪力總テ支那本部ヨリ支持ヲ受ケ居ルノ事實ナリ。是等ノ支持ニ付テハ、其ノ陰密ニ行ハルル幾多ノ事例ヲ舉クル迄モナク、滿洲ノ匪賊ヲ援助スル爲ノ資金ノ募集力支那本部ノ各都市ニ於テ公然行ハレ居ルコトヲ指摘スレハ足ルヘシ。

尙注意ヲ要スルハ、最近ニ於テ大集團ノ活動ニ依ル治安ノ脅威ノ減少セルニ比例シテ、多數ノ小集團ノ活動力益々政治的策動ノ色彩ヲ帶ヒ來レルノ事實ナリ。例ヘハ最近満洲ニ於ケル匪賊及誘拐者ノ活動ハ主トシテ外國人ヲ目標トシ、之ニ依リテ新興國ノ信用ヲ阻害セムトシツツアル處、右ハ満洲ノ狀況カ從前ヨ

カルル害國ニ犯  
ナル策セノ依罪  
リコ動ン信リノ  
ト行ト用満使  
明ハスラ洲喰  
國ノ信用ヲ阻害セムトシツツアル處、右ハ満洲ノ狀況カ從前ヨ

支那側ノ匪  
賊援助

城ニ於ケル有力ナル匪賊團ハ、日滿聯合軍ニ依リ既ニ掃討セラ  
レ、其ノ他ノ大集團モ奉天、熱河兩省境ノ奥地ニ壓迫セラレ居  
レリ。要スルニ南北満洲ノ近狀ハ、總括的ニ云ヘハ満洲國政府  
ヲシテ前記第二ノ段階即テ警察組織ニ依ル治安恢復ニ依ル段階  
ニ入ルコトヲ可能ナラシムル事態トナリツツアリ。

満洲ニ於ケル匪賊ノ現狀ニ付特ニ忘ルヘカラサルハ、是等兵匪  
力總テ支那本部ヨリ支持ヲ受ケ居ルノ事實ナリ。是等ノ支持ニ  
付テハ、其ノ陰密ニ行ハルル幾多ノ事例ヲ舉クル迄モナク、満  
洲ノ匪賊ヲ援助スル爲ノ資金ノ募集カ支那本部ノ各都市ニ於テ  
公然行ハレ居ルコトヲ指摘スレハ足ルヘシ。

ル内ハ匪  
ヲニ相賊  
得相當ノ  
へ滅期會  
シス間威

リモ悪化セルカ如キ外觀ヲ與ヘントスル支那側反滿洲國分子ノ  
計畫的策動ナリト信セラル。

最後ニ日本政府ハ滿洲ニ於ケル治安ノ完全ナル恢復ハ尙相當ノ  
時日ヲ要スヘキコトヲ豫想シ居ルモノナルカ、斯ノ如キハ類似  
ノ狀況ニ在ル何レノ地方ニ於テモ常ニ見ル所ナリ。然レトモ日  
本政府ハ之ト同時ニ報告書ニモ援用セラル通、日本軍ノ存在  
ニ依リ、滿洲ニ於ケル主要匪賊部隊ヲ二年乃至三年以内ニ一掃  
シ得ヘシトノ確信ヲ茲ニ繰返スヲ以テ足レリト思考スルモノナ  
リ。而シテ日本政府ハ、委員會カ日本側ノ態度トシテ「日本官  
憲ハ滿洲國警察及各部落ニ於ケル自衛團ノ組織カ匪賊ヲ消滅セ  
シムルニ有效ナルヘキコトヲ望ミ居レリ。現在ノ匪賊ノ多數ハ  
元來良民ニシテ、其ノ財産ヲ總テ失ヒタル爲現在ノ職業ニ投ス  
ルニ至レルモノト信セラレ居レリ。農業ヲ再ヒ營ム機會アラハ  
是等ノ匪賊ハ從前ノ平和的生活ニ復歸スヘキコト望マレ居レリ」  
一八三頁一ト述ヘタル所ヲ茲ニ自家ノ言トシテ採用セントスル  
モノナリ。

## 財政

滿洲國ノ財政状態ニ關シテハ、理事會ハ滿洲國政府ノ提供セル左記資料ニ依リ、報告書中ノ悲觀的意見カ如何ニ根據無キモノナルヤヲ容易ニ了解シ得ヘシ。

## 歳入及歳出

一九三二年三月一日延國以來、同年（大同元年）六月三十日迄ノ中央收支狀況ハ、收入（各稅收入及監務關係收入）一九百三十萬圓、支出九百十萬圓ニシテ、建國當初即チ調查團滿洲當時ニ比シ遙カニ良好ナル成績ヲ示シタリ。

中央財政  
一九三二年  
三年度豫算

滿洲國ニ於テハ其ノ後海關ノ接收ヲ完了シ（六月）各省財政ヲ廢止シテ（七月）財政ノ中央集權ヲ行フ等、着々トシテ財政ノ基礎建設ニ努メタル結果、大同元年度豫算（自一九三二年七月一日至一九三三年六月三十日）ニ於テハ、歳入一億百萬圓、歳出一億一千三百萬圓ヲ算シ、滿洲國ノ財政的地位ハ頗ル滿足スヘキモノトナリタリ（右豫算中軍費ハ三千三百萬圓ニシテ、一九三〇年度ニ於ケル版家時代ノ軍事費一億圓ノ約三分ノ一ニ過キス、又同豫算ハ一千二百萬圓ノ歳入不足ヲ示シ居ルモ、一

## 中央銀行

方同豫算ハ一千五百萬圓ノ豫備費ヲ計上シ居ルコトヲ考慮スルヲ要ス。

次ニ滿洲國ノ幣制ニ付テハ、滿洲中央銀行ハ資本金三千萬圓ヲ以テ創立セラレ、開業當初舊省銀行ヨリ引續キタル銀行紙幣流通高一億四千二百萬圓ニ對シ、正貨準備八千二百萬圓、保證準備六千萬圓ヲ以テ七月一日營業ヲ開始セリ。

右ニ開シ、一八八二年日本銀行カ一千萬圓ノ銀資本ヲ以テ創立セラレ、全國ニ於ケル國立銀行ノ發行紙幣ヲ統一スルニ成功シタル事實、並ニ滿洲國ノ經濟貿易人口ノ狀態等ヲ考慮セハ、右資本金額ハ十分ナリト認メラル。

滿洲國政府ニ於テハ同銀行ノ獨立性ヲ尊重シ、發券銀行トシテノ機能ヲ妨ケサル様萬全ノ注意ヲ拂ヒツツアルヲ以テ、滿洲中央銀行乃至滿洲國幣制ノ基礎不安ナリト謂フハ全然當ラス。現ニ同銀行開業以來三ヶ月餘ヲ經過シ、其ノ間紙幣ハ完全ニ本位價值ヲ維持シ、通貨ハ全ク安定シ、其ノ流通極メテ順調ナリ。

意日來滿洲  
見本ニ關國  
政關國  
府スノル將

右ハ張家時代ノ實情ニ對シ顯著ナル對照ヲ成スモノナルコトヲ知ルヘシ。

滿洲ハ輸出超過國ニシテ、毎年多額ノ銀ノ流入アルヲ以テ將來ト雖モ其ノ貨幣價值ノ維持ニハ何等ノ不安無カルヘシト認メラル。

尙日本政府ハ滿洲國ノ將來ニ關シ、慎重ナル考慮ニ基ケル其ノ意見ヲ茲ニ強ク述ヘシカント欲ス。

滿洲國ハ輝カシキ將來ヲ有ス。滿洲國ハ廣大ナル領土及多岐ノ人口ヲ有スルニ加ヘ、天然ノ國境ニ國マルルノ有利ナル地位ニ在リ。同國政府ハ、支那ノ締結セル凡ユル國際約定ハ、其ノ滿洲ニ適用シ得ヘキ限り之ヲ尊重シ、且門戶開放及機會均等ノ原則ヲ忠實ニ遵守スヘキ旨ヲ自發的ニ聲明セリ。同政府ハ辨外的感情ヲ有セス、又那ニ於ケルカ如キ共產主義ノ災禍ナシ。固ヨリ滿洲國ハ今猶幼年時代ニ在リ、支那ニ屬スル凡ユル悲觀的材料ニモ拘ラス同國ニ對シ多大ノ同情ヲ示シタル委員會ハ創建後六ヶ月ニ滿タサル國家ニ對シ多少ノ忍耐ヲ示シテコソ公正ナル態度ト稱スヘキナリ。



日本國  
滿洲  
洲支那  
トノ示唆

是等  
誤解  
シ解  
招定  
キハ

報告書ハ其ノ日本政府ニ關スル記述中、滿洲國ノ一切ノ政治的及行政的權力ハ日本人官吏及顧問ノ手中ニ在リトノ全然理由ナキ推測ナシ、又是等ノ官吏ト東京政府トノ間ニ時ニ意見ノ相違アリタル旨ヲ記スル一方、軍事占領ノ事實及滿洲國ノ主權及獨立ノ維持力日本軍隊ニ依倚シ居レリトノ理由ヲ以テ、日本人官吏ハ滿洲國政府ニ對シ不可抗力ノ壓力ヲ加フル凡ユル方法ヲ有スト述ヘ居ル處、日本政府ハ斯クノ如キ言説ニ對シ敗テ反駁ヲ加フルヲ潔シトセス。

斯ル非謗力國際聯盟ノ注意ヲ惹キ得サルヘキヲ信ス。蓋シ現在ニ於テモ亦過去ニ於テモ、一般ニ獨立トシテ認メラレタル國家ニシテ、多數ノ外國人官吏ヲ傭聘シ、又ハ其ノ領土内ニ他國軍隊ヲ駐屯セシムルモノ多數アリ。聯盟國ハ最近ニ於テ、一國内ニ於ケル外國軍隊ノ存在力同國ノ聯盟加入ニ對スル何等ノ障害ヲ成スモノニ非サルコトヲ認メタリ。

一九三一年

最後ニ、報告書ハ日本ト滿洲國トノ關係ヲ明瞭ナラシムルニ當

九月十五日  
ノ譲定書

リテ委員會ノ經驗シタル困難ヲ強調シ居レル處（一〇六頁）、  
今ヤ右困難ハ一九三二年九月十五日ノ譲定書ノ署名ニ依リテ消  
失セリ。本譲定書ハ次ノ如シ。

日本國ハ滿洲國力其ノ住民ノ意思ニ基キテ自由ニ成立シ獨立  
ノ一國家ヲ成スニ至リタル事實ヲ確認シタルニ因リ  
滿洲國ハ中華民國ノ有スル國際約定ハ滿洲國ニ適用シ得ヘキ  
限り之ヲ尊重スヘキコトヲ宣言セルニ因リ

日本國政府及滿洲國政府ハ日滿兩國間ノ善隣ノ關係ヲ永遠ニ  
鞏固ニシ瓦ニ其ノ領土權ヲ尊重シ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保セん力爲  
左ノ如ク協定セリ

一 滿洲國ハ將來日滿兩國間ニ別段ノ約定ヲ締結セサル限り  
滿洲國領域内ニ於テ日本國又ハ日本國臣民力從來ノ日支間  
ノ條約、協定其ノ他ノ取極及公私ノ契約ニ依リ有スル一切  
ノ權利利益ヲ確認尊重スヘシ

二 日本國及滿洲國ハ締約國ノ一方ノ領土及治安ニ對スル一

九月十五日  
ノ議定書

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一 滿洲國ハ將來日滿兩國間ニ別段ノ約定ヲ締結セサル限り  
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二 日本國及滿洲國ハ締約國ノ一方ノ領土及治安ニ對スル一

切ノ脅威ハ同時ニ締約國ノ他方ノ安寧及存立ニ對スル脅威タルノ事實ヲ確認シ兩國共同シテ國家ノ防衛ニ當ルヘキコトヲ約ス之力爲所要ノ日本軍隊ハ滿洲國內ニ駐屯スルモノトス

本講定書ノ何レノ規定モ、又新政府ニ對スル如何ナル協力行爲モ、日本ノ國際義務ニ何等違背スルコトナキハ之ヲ指摘スルノ要ナカルヘシ。華府九國條約ニ依リ日本ハ支那ノ主權及其ノ領土的行政的保全ヲ尊重スルノ約束ニ參加セリ。然レトモ右約束ハ支那ヲシテ國家生存上通常發生スル事故ヨリ極力カレシムルコトヲ目的トスルモノニ非ス、又右約束ハ支那國民ヨリ自決ノ権利及健全ニシテ滿足スヘキ政府ヲ樹立ヘルノ權利ヲ剝奪スルコトヲ目的トスルモノニ非ス。從テ其ノ當然ノ歸結トシテ、右約束ハ各締約國ヲシテ國際修交上ノ必要ニ基キ既成ノ事實ヲ承認スルコトヲ妨クルモノニ非ス。將又之ト同様ニ、國際聯盟規約第十條モ亦「外部ヨリノ侵略ニ對シ」聯盟國ノ領土ノ保全ヲ尊

重シ且特許スルヲ目的トスルモノナル處、國內ノ發展ニ依リ聯盟國ノ領土ノ保全力害セラルコトアリトスルモ、規約中ニハ之ヲ承認セムトスル他ノ聯盟國ノ権利及義務ヲ妨クル何等ノ規定ナシ。之ニ反スル解釋ヲ固執スルハ、歐洲ニ於ケル多數諸國及米大陸ニ於ケル大多數ノ國家存立ノ基礎ヲ否定スル結果トナルヘシ。

第五章 結論

日本ノ主張  
以上日本政府ノ述へ來レル所ハ之ヲ要約スレハ左ノ諸點ニ歸着  
的支那ノ變情則  
ナル國情則  
ス。

第一、支那カ一九一一年ノ革命以來今日ニ至ル迄無政府ニ近キ  
混亂狀態ニ在ルコト、而シテ同國ハ斯ル事態力持續スル限りハ  
國家的崩壞ノ狀態ニ在リト見ルノ外ナキコト、少クトモ現下ノ  
事態ニ於テハ支那カ韓國ニシテ水滸性アルナ央政府ヲ有スルニ  
至ル時期ノ到來ハ、假ニ窮屈ニ於テ可能ナリトスルモ其ノ何時  
タルヤハ到底豫斷スルノ不可能ナルコト。

第二、右狀態ノ結果トシテ支那ハ外國人ノ生命財產ニ對シ充分  
ナル保護ヲ與ヘ得サルコト、殊ニ近年ニ於テ内爭ノ深刻化及國  
民感ノ外國ニ對スル所謂「革命」外交政策實施ノ結果、前記ノ  
狀況ハ益々著シクアレルコト。

第三、從テ諸外國ハ支那ニ於テ治外法權、租界、駐屯軍ノ維持  
内水ニ於ケル軍艦ノ常駐ト云フカ如キ今日世界ノ他ノ部分ニ於

續的行使

テハ其ノ類ヲ見サル例外的権力及特權ノ行使ヲ繼續シ居ルコト

日本ハ特ニ  
被害ヲ受ケ  
タリ

第四、支那ニ利益ヲ有スル諸外國ハ支那ノ無政府状態及對外政  
策ニ依リ均シク被害ヲ受ケタルモ最大ノ被害者ハ日本ナリシコ  
ト。

日本ハ滿洲  
ト緊密ナル  
關係ニ在リ

第五、日本ハ滿洲ト歷史的及地理的ニ最モ緊密ノ關係ニ在ルコ  
ト、同地方ニ於テ莫大ナル經濟的利益ニ加フルニ重要ナル條約  
上ノ権利ヲ有シ且多數ノ居留民ヲ有スルコト、加之國家安全ノ  
見地ヨリ政治上及戰略上滿洲ニ對シ重大ナル關心ヲ有スルコト  
要之日本ノ滿洲ニ於ケル地位ハ世界ノ他ノ部分ニ比類ナキ例外  
的且特殊ノモノナルコト。

日本ノ権益  
ニ對スル侵  
迫

第六、近年舊滿洲官憲刀右特殊地位ヲ覆滅セントスル意圖ヲ以  
テ各種ノ策動ヲ爲シ、外ニ張學良ノ國民政府トノ接近後ニ於テ  
ハ日本ノ権益ニ對スル石侵迫ハ益々頻繁且威烈トナリ來リ、形  
勢緩和ニ對スル日本側自方ノガ力ニモ拘ラス戒ヲ要スヘキ緊  
張狀態ヲ招來セルコト。

日本ノ軍事  
ナリ行動ハ正當

第七、九月十八日事件ハ右ノ如モ緊迫セル空氣ノ裡ニ起レルコト、該事件ノ當時又ハ其ノ後ニ於テ日本軍ノ執リタル指置ハ何レモ自衛權ノ範圍ヲ逸脱セルモノニ非サリシコト、公平ニ見テ日本ト同一狀況ニ置カルルニ於テハ他ノ如何ナル國ト雖モ同一ノ行動ニ出テシルヘキコト。

第八、滿洲カ支那本部ニ對シ常ニ地理的及歴史的ニ別個ノ地位ニ在リタルコト、其ノ住民カ張家ノ暴政ヲ憎惡シ同地方ヲ支那本部ノ政爭ノ渦中ニ投スルノ政策ニ反對セルコト、右地理的歴史的事情及住民ノ張家ニ對スル反對ハ相俟ツテ所謂「保境安民」運動トナリタルコト、滿洲國ノ創設ハ右運動及清朝復辟運動ヲ主動力トシタル滿洲住民ノ自發的行爲ニ基クモノナルコト、滿洲國ハ健康ナル政策ノ下ニ着實ナル進歩ヲ爲シ其ノ將來ハ極メテ有望ナルコト、最後ニ滿洲國ノ建設ニ對シ日本ノ執リタル態度及之ヲ正式承認スルニ至レハ何等國際的定ニ反セサルコト

要スルニ問題ヲ正當ニ了解センカ爲ニハ左ノ二點ヲ念頭ニ置ク  
ヲ要ス、即チ、第一ニ、支那ノ事態ハ極メテ變則的ニシテ近代  
的組織アル國家トシテノ資格ヲ認メ雖ク、從テ諸外國ハ其ノ權  
益ヲ自ラ擁護スル爲支那主權ノ制限ヲ來スカ如キ例外的權力及  
特權ヲ保有スルノミナラス必要ニ應シ、隨時之ヲ行使スルヲ常  
トセルコト、及第二ニ、對外關係ニ於ケル支那ノ特徵ハ之ヲ日  
滿關係ニ付テ見ルニ、日本ノ特殊地位及滿洲ト支那本部トノ特殊ノ  
關係ニ鑑ミ特ニ著シキモノアルコト之ナリ、而シテ特ニ強調ヲ  
要スルハ敍上支那問題殊ニ滿洲問題ノ複雜性及變則的特色ハ他  
ニ其ノ比類ヲ見サルノ一事ナリ、從テ之カ處理ニ當リテハ普通  
國際問題ニ對スル一般的方式ヲ其ノ儘適用スルコト困難ナルト  
共ニ、斯ル變則的問題ニ關スル手續又ハ結局到達セラルヘキ如  
何ナル解決方法モ通常ノ國際紛爭ニ對スル先例トハナラサルモノ  
ナリ、此ノ點ニ關シ報告書第力章冒頭ニ左ノ如ク述へ居ルハ  
味フヘキ點ナリ。

前章ノ讀者ニトリテハ本紛争ニ包含セラルル諸問題ハ、往々  
稱セラルル力如ク簡單ナルモノニ非サルコト明白ナルヘシ。  
即チ問題ハ寧ロ極度ニ複雜ナリ。一切ノ事實及其ノ史的背景  
ニ關スル徹底セル知識アルモノノミ事態ニ關スル確定意見ヲ  
表示シ得ル資格アリト謂フヘキナリ。本紛争ハ一國カ國際聯  
盟規約ノ提供スル調停機會ヲ豫メ利用シ蓋スコトナクシテ他  
ノ一國ニ宣戰セル事件ニ非ス、又一國ノ國境カ隣接國ノ軍隊  
ニ依リ侵略セラレタルカ如キ簡單ナル事件ニモ非ス、何トナ  
レハ滿洲ニ於テハ世界ノ他ノ部分ニ於テ正確ナル類例ヲ見サ  
ル幾多ノ特殊事態存スルヲ以テナリ（一二六頁）。

以上ハ支那問題殊ニ滿洲問題ニ關スル日本政府ノ基本的見解ナ  
ルカ、茲ニ右見解ニ基キ報告書第九章及第十章中ノ諸點ニ付述  
フル所アラムトス。

第九章中ノ一節ニハ「單ナル原狀恢復力問題ノ解決タリ得サル  
コトハ既ニ吾人ノ述ヘタル所ニ依リ明カナルヘシ。蓋シ本紛争

復ナル報告書ハ  
排斥ノ原狀恢復  
主張ノ演説

上日本側  
敍

滿洲國ノ維  
持ハ必要缺  
クヘカラス

カ去ル力月前ニ於ケル狀態ヨリ發生セルニ顧ミ該狀態ノ恢復ハ  
單ニ紛糾ヲ繰返ス結果ヲ招來スルニ止マルヘク、斯クノ如キハ  
全問題ヲ理論的ニ取扱ヒ事態ノ現實性ヲ闇却スルモノナリ」（二  
二七頁）トノ記載アリ。

日本政府ハ右記述ニ對シ無條件ニ同意ヲ表スルモノナルモ、同  
章中滿洲ニ於ケル現政權ノ維持及承認モ亦均シク不滿足ナリト  
ナシ居ル點ハ之ニ同意スルヲ得ス。假ニ報告會記載ノ事實ヲ全  
部眞ナリトスルモ、之ヲ當然ノ歸結トシテ右ノ如キ論斷ニ達ス  
ルコトハ不可能ナリト云ハサルヘカラス。滿洲國ノ維持及承認  
ヲ基礎トスル解決力何等國際義務ノ根本原則ニ違反スルモノナル  
コトハ既ニ述ヘタル通アリ。加之究極ニ於テハ支那國民自身モ  
斯種解決ニ依リテノミ由支ノ關係ヲ安定シ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保シ  
得ヘキコトヲ了解スルニ至ルヘキハ日本政府ノ確信スル所ナリ  
少クトモ既ニ一度其ノ成立ヲ見且着々健實ナル發達ヲ遂ケツツ

有特  
ノ日本  
ニ安全  
關心  
ヲ付

アル滿洲國ヲ解體スルコトカ、果シテ「現實ノ事態」ニ適應スル所以ナリトハ到底首肯スルコトヲ得ス。問題ノ處理調整ハ現實ノ事態ニ即スルヲ要スルニ顧み、滿洲國存在ノ威脅ナル事實ヲ無視シ又ハ同國ヲ國際修交ノ國外ニ置クハ断シテ策ノ得タルモノニ非サルコト日本政府ノ信シテ疑ハツル所ナリ。

日本ハ滿洲ニ於テ重大且特殊ナル地位ヲ占ムルヲ以テ、同地方ノ事態及日滿ノ關係ヲ不定不安ノ状態ニ放置スル能ハス。絞上ノ諸理由ニ依リ日本政府ハ滿洲國ニ對シ各國力直ニ承認ヲ與ヘ其健ノ實ナル發達ノ爲協力ヲ答メサルコトカ或モ現状ニ適應スル所以ニシテ、且滿洲ノ事態ヲ安定シ延イテ極東ノ平和ヲ齋スヘキ唯一ノ解決方法ナリト思考スルモノニシテ、假ニ他國カ日本ト同一地位ニ在リタリトセハ必スヤ同一ノ結論ニ到達シ且同一ノ方途ヲ辿リタルヘキコトヲ確信ス。之即チ日本政府カ敍上根本的考慮ニ立脚シ、兩國間ノ關係ヲ明定セル九月十五日ノ日滿議定書ニ署名シタル所以ナリ。右議定書締結ノ結果日本ノ在

事態  
進展  
刻々  
注視  
スへ  
キコト

滿洲國ヲ擁護シ、滿洲國ノ領土ヲ保全シ及内外ノ脅威ニ對シ其ノ安全ヲ確保スルノ基礎ハ談笑ノ間に確立セラレ、極東平和ノ維持ニ對シ新ニ有力ナル保障ヲ與ヘタリ。

此ノ點ニ關シ報告書第十章冒頭ノ一節ヲ茲ニ引用スルコト適當ナルヘシ。

吾人カ國際聯盟ノ諸原則、支那ニ關スル諸條約ノ精神及字句竝ニ平和ノ一般的利益ヲ顧念スルト共ニ他方現實ノ事態ヲ看過スルコトナク、且東三省ニ現存シ目下發展ノ過程ニ在ル行政機關ヲ考慮ニ入レタルハ一ニ此ノ目的ニ出ツルモノナリ。事態カ如何ニ決着スルトモ、刻下滿洲ニ於テ既成セラレツタル一切ノ健全ナル力ハ其ノ理想タルト人物タルト將又思想タルト行爲タルトヲ問ハス總テ之ヲ利用シ、以テ支那及日本兩國間ノ永續的了解ヲ確保セントスル目的ヲ以テ、本報告書中ノ諸提議カ今猶日々ニ進展シツツアル事態ニ如何ニ擴張シ適用セラルヘキカヲ決定スルコトハ、世界平和ノ至高ナル利

益ノ爲理事會ノ職能ナルヘシ（一三二頁）。

右委員會ノ意見ヲ參照シツツ報告書ヲ檢討スルニ當リ、聯盟理事會ハ恐ラク其ノ後ニ於ケル事態刻々ノ推移ニ關シ充分ナル理事會ハ、解ト満足ナル情報ヲ希望スルナルヘク、而シテ右事態ノ推移ハ、支那本部ニ於テハ依然トシテ混亂ヲ繼續スル一万、滿洲國ニ於テハ着々發達ノ遂ケラレツツアル事實ヲ示スモノナリ。日本政府ハ、理事會ニ對シ此ノ上トモ必要ナル情報ヲ供給シ、以テ本意見書緒言ニ述ヘタルカ如ク各理事ヲシテ此ノ複雜ナル事態ノ全貌ヲ充分ニ把握セシメムトスルノ用意アリ。

報告書ハ第十章中ニ若干ノ提議ヲ爲シ居レル處、同章ハ「現在ノ紛争ヲ解決スル爲支那及日本兩國政府ニ直接ニ勸告ヲ提出スルコトハ、本委員會ノ職能ニ非ス」（一三二頁）トノ記述ヲ以テ始マリ居リ、右ハ委員會ノ所定任務ニ顧ミ當然ノコトニ屬ス。又は等ノ提議力單ニ第力章掲記ノ諸原則ヲ實現スヘキ各種方法中ノ一例トシテ爲サレタルモノナルコトハ報告書モ之ヲ明カニ

シ居り、委員會自身モ右提議力臨時ノ試案ニ過キサルコトヲ認メ左記ノ如ク附加シ居レリ。

假令日本ノ「滿洲國」ニ對スル正式承認カ「ジユネーヴ」ニ於ケル本報告書ノ審議以前ニ行ハルルコトアリトルモヘ右ハ吾人ノ無視シ得サル事慮ナルカ一吾人ハ吾人ノ事業力徒勞ニ歸スヘシトハ思准セス。吾人ハ孰レニセヨ理事會ハ本報告書カ滿洲ニ於ケル關係兩大國ノ死活的利益ヲ滿足セシムルノ目的ヲ以テスル理事會ノ決議又ハ右兩大國ニ對スル勸告ニ有用ナルヘキ諸提議ヲ包含スルコトヲ見出スヘシト信スヘ一三二頁)。

換言セハ、委員會ハ日本ノ滿洲國承認ノ場合ニ於テモ是等提議ニ幾分ノ價值ヲ存スヘシトノ曖昧ナル語法ヲ用フルコトニ依リ右承認ノ場合該提議ノ價值ハ多少疑シキモノトナルヘキコトヲ認メタル次第ナリ。從テ右ニ關シ詳細ナル論議ニ入ルハ其ノ必要ナキモノノ如クナルモ、事ノ真相ヲ更ニ明瞭ナラシメムカ爲

二三ノ要點ニ關シ左ニ簡單ナル意見ヲ附加スヘシ。

(イ)

後述ノ如ク第力章中ノ原則第十ハ支那本部ノ國際管理ニニ終ルノ虞アリ、第十章中ノ諸提議ハ右ニ比シ更ニ重要ナルモノナルカ、該提議セ亦之ヲ實施スルニ於テハ滿洲ノ假裝的國際管理ニ等シク、右ハ滿洲國ノ容認セサルヘキハ勿論日本ノ立場ヨリスルモ受諾スルヲ得ス。

(ロ)

又是等提議ハ餘リニ精微煩雜ニ過クルノ嫌アリ。蓋シ之ヲ歐米諸國ニ適用スルニ於テハ不可ナカラムモ極東ノ現状ニハ適セス。委員會ノ提出セル如キ案ハ紛爭當事國力共ニ鞏固且信賴シ得ヘキ中央政府ヲ有スルコトヲ最少限度ノ前提要件トス。滿洲問題ノ如キ前例無キ複雜性ヲ有スル問題ニシテ、而モ當事國ノ一方カ鞏固且信賴シ得ヘキ中央政府ヲ有セサル場合、斯ル案ヲ適用セントスルカ如キハ徒ニ事態ノ紛糾ヲ増スニ過サルモノナリ。

(ハ)

日本政府ハ滿洲ノ軍備ヲ撤廢シ、特別ノ國際憲兵隊ノミ

## 判十原則ノ批判

ニ依リ同地方ノ平和ト秩序トヲ維持セントスルカ如テ未ハ  
現實ノ事態ニ全然適合セサルモノト認メサルヲ得ス。歐洲  
ニ於テサヘ斯ル制度ニ依リ滿洲ニ比スヘキ廣大ナル地域ニ  
瓦リ平和ト秩序トヲ充分ニ維持シ得ヘキヤハ疑問アリ。  
斯ノ如キハ臺モ滿洲住民ノ希望ニ副フ所以ニ押サルト共ニ  
日本ノ極力防止セムトスル該地方ノ不安ト混亂トヲ鎮成ス  
ルノ處アリ、日本政府トシテハ量大ナル危惧ノ念ヲ抱カサ  
ルヲ得ス。要スルニ右ハ委員會ヲ辟セル原狀恢復ニ比シ事  
態ヲ悪化スルコト又ニ大ナルモノアリ到底不滿足ナルヲ免  
レス。

具體的提議ニ對スル批判ハ以上ニ止メ、更ニ稍々抽象的事項即  
チ右提議ノ基礎タルヘキ紛爭解決ニ關スル諸原則ニ論及スヘシ  
委員會ハ第九章中ニ「如何ナル滿足ナル解決方法ト雖草擬スヘ  
キ一般的原則」ヲ明カニスルニ努メ居レル處、第十章ノ解決案  
ハ思フニ之ニ準據シテ作製セラレタルモノト認メラレル。而シ

テ是等原則中日本以府ニ於テ俗別ノ反対ナキ心ノハ既ニ日滿設定書ニ於テ二三之刀適用ヲ見タリ。支那問題ニ對シ如何ナル見地ニ立ツセ同國ニ於テ無政府狀態ノ存續スル限り、第一乃至第カノ原則殊ニ第四乃至第九ニ基キ問題ノ滿足ナル解決ニ到達スルコトノ不可能ナルハ明カナルヘシ。蓋シ右カ原則ハ原則第十ノ示スカ如ク「支那ニ於テ鞏固ナル中央政府ナクシテハ」實際ニ適用スルコト能ハサルモノナリ。支那ニ於テ鞏固ナル中央政府ヲ招來センカ爲同國ノ内部的改造ニ對スル國際協力ノ望マシキコト勿論ナルモ、此ノ目的ヲ以テスル國際協力ハ「技術的援助ハ別トシテ」、支那ノ國際管理ノ形式ニ匯スルニ非スムハ之ヲ成就スルコト極メテ困難ニシテ殆ント其ノ望ナキニ近シ。假ニ百歩ヲ譲リ、右ノ如キ國際協力カ可能ナリトスルモノ之リ依リテ直ニ鞏固ナル中央政府ノ實現ヲ見ルヘキヤハ頗ル覺束ナシ。日本ハ滿洲問題解決ノ爲ニハ斯ノ如キ事態ノ出現ニ萬一ノ望ヲ鳴シ武手シテ時日ヲ空過スルヲ得ス。

滿洲  
滿洲國  
同國  
情ニ  
敵セノ  
ラ安依  
無對

以上縷述シ來レルカ如クナルヲ以テ、苟モ現ニ恢復ノ一途ニ在  
ル平和ト秩序トヲ破壊スルノ戻アルモノハ如何ナル策ト雖ニ新  
ナル紛争ト困難トヲ招來スヘテヤ必セリ。是シテ然ラハ初メテ  
滿洲ノ事態ノ安全ニ努ムルコトコソ眞ノ經論ニ非スヤ。又過去  
二十年ノ永キリ瓦リ支那ノ再興ニ關シ多大ノ忍耐ト同情トヲ表  
示セル世界ハ、宜シク滿洲新國家ニ對シテモ今少シク理解ト希望  
トヲ以テ之ヲ迎フヘキニ非スヤ。滿洲問題ニシテ一層解決ヲ  
見ムカ支那問題自體ノ解決ハ若シク單純化セラルヘシ。滿洲ニ  
於ケル平和及善政ノ現出カ支那ニ對シ好圖ノ指針ヲ示シ、同國  
ノ態度ニ好影響ヲ與ヘ、其ノ内外政策ヲ健化シ、其ノ結果支  
那國民ニ幸福ヲ齋スハ固ヨリ列國モ亦之カ恵福ヲ頒ツヘキコト  
疑フ容レサル所ナリ。

文書成立ニ關スル證明書

(五號)

自分ハ國際聯合研究會總事長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添附セル日本語及英語ニ依リ印刷セラレ一三八頁ヨリ成ル「リツトン」報告書に對する  
英國政府意見書ト通スル印刷物ハ日本政府ノ文書ニ基キ國際聯盟協會ノ  
發行ニ係ル文書ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年 一月二十一日

於東京

社團法人國際聯合研究會  
總事長 堀内 鶴介

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日於同所

立會人 松下正壽

*not used*

## STATEMENT OF THE VICE-MINISTER OF NAVY

(Issued at 7:00 p.m. Dec. 26, 1937)

The "Panay Incident" has been brought to a conclusion with today's reply of the American Ambassador to our Foreign Minister. This was due to the fact that, in spite of the flood of misleading propaganda, the government and the people of America were fair and gained an insight into the facts of the incident, and that they understood our sincerity. The Imperial Navy which is responsible for this incident is greatly pleased. The Imperial Navy also wishes to express the hearty gratitude towards our people for maintaining calmness and reasonableness ever since the occurrence of the incident.

In the future our Navy will, more than ever, exercise discretion so that this type of incident will not recur. At the same time, we desire that the entire Japanese people give full support at this time in "turning a misfortune into a blessing", that is in clearing up the various misunderstandings and suspicions which exist between Japan and other nations in regard to the China Incident and in bringing about better understanding and goodwill.

C O R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, A. Hayashi, Acoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 1 page and entitled "Statement of Vice Minister of Navy, December 26, 1947" is an exact and true copy of an official Document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo  
on this 5th day of December 1946.

A. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness : Naegaharu Odo

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William L. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William L. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date. 13 January 1947

*not used*

DE F DOC # 190

海軍次官諭 (昭和十二年十二月二十六日午後七時發表)

「ベキ！」特事件ハ本日米國大使ヨリ外務大臣ニ致セル回答ヲ以テ一段落ナ告タル次第ナルカ右ハ事件發生以來各種誤解宣傳ノ漫中ニ於テ米國政府並ニ其ノ國民カ公正明察克ク事件ノ實相ト我方ノ誠意トテ正然シタルニ依ルハシテ事件ノ責任者タル帝國海軍トシテ汝ニ欣快ニ堪ヘ又本事件發統以來我國民カ終始冷靜ニシテ理解アル態度ヲ持シタルヲトニ歎シ深説ナル謝意ヲ表スルモノナリ。

今後我海軍ハ愈々自重自戒以テ此種事件ノ根絶ニ萬全ヲ期スルハ勿論ナルカ一方ニ此ノ機會ニ於テ支那事變ヲ繰リテ帝國ト第三國トノ間ニ介在スル各種ノ誤解疑念ヲ一掃シテ理解ト親善トニ至ラシメ以テ禍ヲ轉シテ龍トナシトニ當シ我國民一致ノ努力ヲ切望シテ已マサル次第ナリ